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ABSTRACT
Militaries generally play a vital role in the survival of states, neutralizing both domestic and
foreign threats. In addition, during moments of political crisis when political institutions and
processes break down, militaries play an integral part of a particular regime’s survival. Each
chapter of this study analyzes a critical component of military decision-making and regime
survival in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Jordan is the central case study for
each chapter. Through the collection of data from interviews with security personnel in Jordan,
this study offers an in-depth investigation of civil-military relations in the MENA region. There
is a shortage of research on this topic, and this study seeks to fill the gaps in important places in
the political science literature. In order to fill these gaps, this study begins by establishing a new
and alternative approach to understanding security decision-making called the identity-rationalist
model. This new model incorporates notions of identity into cost-benefit analysis. Then the study
tests hypotheses on military loyalty, finding that integration of the military into the political
economy of a country has the greatest explanatory power for military defection. Finally, this
study gives a detailed exploration of Jordanian intelligence services to understand why the
institutions are effective at maintaining state stability despite the volatility of the MENA region.
Together the three core chapters each contribute to the literature on civil-military relations and
understanding the complexity of security forces in the Arab world.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
In academic, policy, defense, and even revolutionary circles, an unusual degree of
consensus exists around the notion that militaries play a critical role in determining the outcomes
of popular uprisings.1 Indeed, scholars have argued that no institution matters more to a state’s
survival than the military, and no revolution within a state can succeed without the support or at
least acquiescence of its armed forces.2 While the comparative politics literature has increasingly
recognized Arab militaries as crucial to determining the outcomes of the post-2010 pro-reform
movements, scholars have directed less attention to the causal mechanisms associated with
military decision-making within a given regime. As a means to investigate military decisionmaking during periods of political unrest, this study looks at three areas of civil-military
relations. First, the study looks at how an individual’s identity is incorporated into decisionmaking during cost-benefit analysis. Second, the study compares military involvement in the
political economies of states within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and how this
impacts loyalty to regimes. Finally, the study assesses the intelligence community in Jordan and
why it is an efficient and effective organization as it is a quintessential element for stability in the
country.3
This study argues that one of the most important security and political issues concerning
the future stability of the region is civil-military relations. To understand defection and stability,
this study will assess three problems. First, the study will establish a new and alternative

1

Hicham Bou Nassif, “A Military Besieged: the Armed Forces, the Police, and the Party in Bin ʿAli’s Tunisia,
1987–2011,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 47, no. 01 (2015), p. 66.
2
Zoltan Barany, “Comparing the Arab Revolts: The Role of the Military,” Journal of Democracy 22, no. 4 (2011),
p. 28.
3
This study focuses on the question of regime stability, rather than the broader topics of societal or economic
stability (although the latter frequently will be pertinent to the former).
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theoretical construct for interpreting, analyzing, and understanding civil-military relations. This
theoretical construct is called the identity-rationalist model, and it aims to contribute to the
understanding of security decision-making by members of the armed forces. Second, the study
will assess Arab militaries’ integration into the political economy of Jordan, Tunisia, Oman, and
Egypt. This will contribute to understanding institutional support for the regimes. Finally, the
study will look at the intelligence community’s contribution to stability in Jordan. The Jordanian
intelligence community is the primary government apparatus that keeps the monarchy in power,
making it essential to regime survival and stability of the country. Each chapter analyzes a
critical component of military decision-making and regime survival in the MENA region, and
Jordan will be the central case study for each chapter. Jordan is the central case study for this
research because if other Arab states become more stable, they will likely incorporate elements
of Jordan’s approach to security. Therefore, it is the most appropriate case on which to focus.

Literature Review and Theory
The military has long been at the center of studies seeking to identify the key factors and
stages of political development. Samuel Huntington identifies juntas and coups, military revolts,
and military regimes as consistent features of military involvement in political systems
throughout Latin America and the Middle East during the 1950s and 1960s.4 His focus on
political development and “modernization” also led Huntington to examine a number of areas in
which civil-military relations could potentially shape political outcomes, including foreign
military assistance, the internal structure of the military itself, the social background of officers
performing interventions into the political arena, and the more general “politicization of social

4

Samuel P Huntington. Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale University Press, 2006), pp. 192-194.

2

forces and institutions.”5 Earlier and related works look at civil-military relations in clear
theoretical terms. On the one hand, Huntington explores the tension between soldier and
statesmen, arguing that civilian control over the military is best achieved through
professionalization of the armed forces.6 On the other hand, Morris Janowitz offers a
“constabulary” model in which military officer corps resemble police forces that organize and
apply violence in a manner that allows for tight proximity and control over the society they
protect.7 Both approaches underscore the centrality of military involvement in, and in many
cases control over, political systems.
Preeminent scholars have since added to this research program and identified additional
questions concerning the relationship between militaries and political regimes. Alan Dahl argues
that in order for a state to be governed democratically, two conditions are required: (1) military
and police organizations exist and are subject to civilian control; and (2) the civilians who
control the state security apparatus must themselves be subject to the democratic process.8 The
difficulty of meeting both of these conditions perhaps sheds light on the larger challenges of
democratic consolidation and the cultivation of robust civil society observed in recent decades.9
Despite these lasting insights on civil-military relations, crucial questions remain over how to
interpret and gauge the proper role of armed forces in political affairs. What is the nature of
power-sharing arrangements between the military and political leaders in authoritarian states? To

5

Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 192-194.
Samuel P. Huntington and Morris Janowitz. Reviewed by Eliot A. Cohen “Politics of Civil-Military Relations; The
Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait” Foreign Affairs. September 1997.
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/53283/eliot-a-cohen/the-soldier-and-the-state-the-theory-and-politics-ofcivil-milit.
7
Ibid.
8
Robert Alan Dahl. Democracy and its Critics (Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 244-245.
9
According to Larry Diamond, civil society is conceived as “the realm of organized social life that is voluntary,
self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared
rules.” See Larry Jay Diamond. “Toward democratic consolidation.” Journal of democracy 5, no. 3 (1994), p. 5.
6
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what extent do military leaders require patronage to remain loyal to repressive, nondemocratic
regimes? On these topics, consensus in the political science literature remains elusive.
Conventional wisdom in civil-military relations holds that armed forces should remain
ideologically detached and physically separate from political institutions. Other perspectives
contend that such separations need not be as stark. Rebecca Schiff argues that three partners –
the military, political elites, and the citizenry – should aim for a cooperative relationship that
may involve separation, but not necessarily require it.10 This view, known as concordance
theory, prioritizes agreement between the three partners on “the social composition of the officer
corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style.”11 In
contrast, James Burk critiques the dominant strands of civil-military relations by pointing out
that they either: (a) focus on the matter of protecting democracy and neglect the problem of
sustaining democratic value and practice, e.g., Huntington; or (b) focus on the matter of
sustaining democratic values and subsequently neglect the problem of protecting the democratic
state, e.g., Janowitz.12 Despite Burk’s sharp analysis of the normative belief that civilian political
control of the military is preferable to military control of the state, there remains a larger gap in
the literature regarding how militaries behave under authoritarian regimes as well as how states
ultimately succeed in transitioning to democracy.
To address civil-military relations within authoritarian and transitional contexts, regional
analysis becomes increasingly important. In assessing civil-military relations in South America
(Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina) from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, George Philip
argues that there are two potential tracks of military-authoritarian rule. The first track concerns

10

Rebecca L. Schiff “Civil-military relations reconsidered: A theory of concordance.” Armed Forces & Society 22,
no. 1 (1995), pp. 7-8.
11
Ibid.
12
James Burk. “Theories of democratic civil-military relations.” Armed Forces & Society 29, no. 1 (2002), p. 14.

4

the military elites themselves, who must decide how much repression to apply to the larger
society and how much power the military officers should be allowed to acquire.13 Following the
inevitable splits between ‘hardliners’ and ‘softliners’ on these issues, with the former pushing for
greater degrees of repression, Philip avers that the armed forces typically attempt to garner a
degree of political acceptability. Thus, the second track deals with the efforts of military elites to
establish forms of political legitimacy. To varying degrees, military leaders seek to initiate
constitutional reforms, develop political institutions, shape electoral outcomes, and achieve
economic growth, or some combination of these tactics.14 The constant balancing between
maintaining systems of repression and earning political legitimacy confronts all militaryauthoritarian regimes. Yet, the repression/legitimacy approaches to understanding civil-military
relations focuses almost exclusively on endogenous political dimensions.
Exogenous factors, such as economic interpretations of military-authoritarianism in Latin
America offer an additional and valuable perspective of political unrest. Gordon Richards
identifies economic difficulties as a key source of breakdowns of authoritarian regimes in
Ecuador (1979), Peru (1980), Argentina (1983), Uruguay (1984), and Brazil (1984).15 According
to Richards, the resurgence of democratic government had less to do with the internal, domestic
politics of various countries and more with the economic crises that undermined military
regimes.16 Specifically, Richards contends that the likelihood of regime breakdown is “directly
correlated with deviations from real output and inflation from their historic norms, or politically
acceptable levels.”17 Furthermore, authoritarian regimes are more likely to collapse with the
13

George Philip, “Military-Authoritarianism in South America: Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina,” Political
Studies, No. 32 (1984), pp. 17-18.
14
Philip, pp. 18-19.
15
Gordon Richards, “Stabilization Crises and the Breakdown of Military Authoritarianism in Latin America,”
Comparative political studies 18, no. 4 (1986), pp. 449-450.
16
Ibid.
17
Richards, p. 450.
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occurrence of recession, hyperinflation, balance of payment crises, or exogenous factors, such as
global shocks or extreme fluctuations in international markets.18
Looking at both endogenous and exogenous dynamics within the broader theoretical and
empirical work on civil-military relations ultimately constitutes a body of knowledge that can be
applied to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Whether concerning the degree of
professionalization of the armed forces, military detachment from (or penetration into) political
systems and institutions, military strategies to repress a population or cultivate political
legitimacy, as well as the integration of militaries into states’ political economies all bear direct
relevance on explaining civil-military relations in the Arab world. In what is becoming a nearconsensus view, the decisions made by militaries throughout the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings are
seen to have played a crucial role in determining the outcomes of national protest movements.19
However, roughly five years after the height of the protest period, military decision-making
processes remain poorly understood. While previous literature helps to contextualize the
conditions under which Arab militaries remain loyal to dictators or support pro-reform
movements, the specific policies implemented by regimes under duress lack clear explanation.
Still, comparative research offers a strong starting point from which to evaluate the potential
causal mechanisms of military decision-making processes vis-à-vis defection and non-defection.
Scholars argue that the level of political institutionalization20 and the number of
attempted coups21 may help explain and predict military decision-making in domestic politics.

18

Richards, pp. 450-451.
Robert Springborg, “Arab Militaries,” in The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle
East, ed. Marc Lynch (2014), p 142.
20
Derek Lutterbeck, “Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil–Military Relations.” Armed Forces & Society 39,
no. 1 (2013): 28-52.
21
Holger Albrecht, “The Myth of Coup-proofing Risk and Instances of Military Coups d’état in the Middle East and
North Africa, 1950–2013.” Armed Forces & Society (2014): 1-29.
19
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Analysts also point to post-retirement appointments, financial rewards,22 and comprehensive
military economies, or “military, Inc.”23 as conceivable indicators of political power enjoyed by
the armed forces. In addition, research has examined declining military loyalty toward a regime
as a consequence of weakened national economies24 as well as potential responses to such
decline through the use of domestic coercion or the “buying off” of opposition.25 Examining
each of the above areas of research helps to provide context to the investigation of military
decision-making during periods of political unrest.
Building upon these approaches, this research design prioritizes military integration into a
states’ political economy as a primary determinant of military loyalty toward a regime. Albrecht
and Schlumberger correctly observe that Arab authoritarian incumbents suffer from an inherent
lack of “democratic” legitimacy.26 The authors are also right to point out that Arab regimes have
faced serious economic crises and strong Western expectations of democratization and marketeconomic reforms, which have contributed to a “structural crisis of legitimacy.”27 However,
Albrecht and Schlumberger neglect the specific economic policies and methods of financial cooptation that have been historically utilized by Arab regimes to retain the loyalty of the armed
forces and address larger structural crises of legitimacy. Gregory Gause III goes further by
identifying the central role that militaries played during the Arab uprisings as well as citing

22

Hicham Bou Nassif, “Wedded to Mubarak: The Second Careers and Financial Rewards of Egypt's Military Elite,
1981–2011.” The Middle East Journal 67, no. 4 (2013): 509-530.
23
Robert Springborg, “Economic Involvements of Militaries.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 43, no.
03 (2011): 397-399.
24
Samer Soliman, The Autumn of Dictatorship: Fiscal Crisis and Political Change in Egypt Under Mubarak.
Stanford University Press, 2011.
25
James Worrall, “Oman: The “Forgotten” Corner of the Arab Spring.” Middle East Policy 19, no. 3 (2012): 98115; see also Marc Valeri, “Domesticating Local Elites. Sheikhs, Walis and State-Building Under Sultan Qaboos,”
in Regionalizing Oman, pp. 267-277. Springer Netherlands, 2013.
26
Holger Albrecht and Oliver Schlumberger. ““Waiting for Godot”: Regime Change Without Democratization in
the Middle East." International political science review 25, no. 4 (2004): 371-392.
27
Albrecht and Schlumberger. ““Waiting for Godot”: Regime Change Without Democratization in the Middle
East,” p. 385.
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specific economic policies intended to quell dissent, e.g., the late King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia
announcing spending plans in 2011 of more than $100 billion to raise state salaries, cancel
planned subsidy cuts, and increase the number of state jobs.28 Such policies are critical to regime
co-optation strategies. Yet, Gause III, and the discipline of comparative politics more broadly,
still come up short in connecting not just civilian government integration into Arab states’
political economies, but military integration as well.
While the issue of military integration into the political economy looks at military loyalty
through an institutional lens, this study will also assess individual decision-making through
establishing the identity-rationalist model. The dominant modes of the thinking about why
members of the military choose to participate in the security services include the rationalist,
structuralist, and culturalist paradigms.29 Although rationalism makes the strongest case to
understand why individual behave the way they do, it is ultimately insufficient for security
analysis because it typically focuses too much on material and physical safety. Rationalism holds
that an individual will choose between options to maximize their utility, but the missing piece of
this calculation in the academic literature is about identity. A person’s identity is at least an equal
contributing factor to such decision making, and this study will explore how this operates to fill
in the gaps in the literature.

28

F. Gregory Gause III, “Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth Of Authoritarian Stability.”
Foreign Aff. 90 (2011), p. 87.
29
See Peter D. Feaver, Armed servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Harvard University Press,
2003); Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.
Harvard University Press, 1957; Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. Free
Press of Glencoe, 1961; Geertz, Clifford. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, 1973.
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Methodology
Arriving at a better understanding of military loyalty toward a given regime requires the
use of appropriate methods to answer the stated research question. A brief survey of the social
science literature that addresses the larger goals of conducting effective research, defining key
methodological concepts, and exploring the relevant links between them will help to determine
this research design’s methodological orientation. In their seminal text on social science
research, King, Keohane, and Verba argue that scientific research is “designed to make
descriptive or explanatory inferences on the basis of empirical information about the world.”30
The authors distinguish between descriptive inference, which uses observations about the world
to gain understanding about other unobserved facts; and causal inference, which involves
learning about causal effects from observed data.31 Indeed, the wider focus on causal inference
when conducting effective social science research is well documented.32
Attempting to generate causal inferences is thus directly related to selecting a
methodology appropriate to a given research question. Peter Hall explains that the term
“methodology” refers to the “means scholars employ to increase confidence that the inferences
they make about the social and political world are valid.”33 Like King, Keohane, and Verba, Hall
contends causal inferences are in fact the most important variety of inferences and that the
“object of a methodology is to increase confidence in assertions that one variable or event (x)
exerts a causal effect on another (y).”34 Of course, assessing the nature of causal relationships,

30

Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative
Research. Princeton University Press (1994), p. 7.
31
King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), p. 8.
32
Henry E. Brady and David Collier, eds. Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards. Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2010; see also James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. “Comparative Historical
Analysis.” Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences (2003): 3-38.
33
Peter A. Hall, “Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Research.” Comparative historical analysis
in the social sciences 374 (2003), p. 373.
34
Hall, p. 373.
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both in theory building and hypothesis testing, requires scholars to make a number of ontological
assumptions about the nature of the social and political world. Here, Hall defines ontology as
“the character of the world as it actually is.”35 Moreover, Hall argues “ontology is ultimately
crucial to methodology because the appropriateness of a particular set of methods for a given
problem turns on assumptions about the nature of the causal relations they are meant to
discover.”36
The research questions posed in this study assume that military decision-making plays a
central role in regime responses to political unrest. In order to effectively answer the research
questions and address their inherent assumptions, this section weighs the benefits and drawbacks
of qualitative and quantitative approaches. In articulating the differences between qualitative and
quantitative research traditions, Goertz and Mahoney highlight the important distinction between
“within-case analysis” and “cross-case analysis.”37 From a qualitative perspective, within-case
analysis requires broad knowledge of specific cases, which tends to explain why most qualitative
studies have a small N. Furthermore, “within-case analysis involves the use of specific pieces of
data or information to make inferences about the individual cases,” which may decisively
support or undermine a given theory.38 In contrast, Goertz and Mahoney explain that quantitative
analysis applies statistical methods to conduct cross-case analysis, which typically involves an
experiment that contrasts subjects who receive a treatment with those who receive the control.39
The ontological assumptions of this proposed study regard military loyalty toward an
authoritarian regime as unequivocally tied to either direct benefits (e.g., salaries, career benefits,

35

Hall, p. 374.
Hall, p. 374.
37
Gary Goertz and James Mahoney. A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in The Social
Sciences. Princeton University Press, (2012), p. 10.
38
Goertz and Mahoney, pp. 10-11.
39
Ibid.
36
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retirement benefits, privileged access to state institutions, etc.) or indirect benefits (prestige of
military service, social status, influence over the distribution of state patronage, etc.). Thus, this
project lends itself to a qualitative approach where “necessary” and “sufficient” conditions are
explored.40 It may be, for example, that in 2011 Bahrain’s oil wealth allowed the regime to
disperse benefits to its military and citizens, thereby thwarting pro-reform demonstrations. Yet,
such wealth did not (and does not) exist in Egypt, nor would economic conditions alone explain
Egypt’s uneven trajectory back to an authoritarian system. In other words, a broad quantitative,
statistical analysis of economic conditions in the Middle East from 2010 to 2015 would only tell
a limited, albeit potentially important part of the civil-military relations story.
These particular research questions this study seeks to answer requires qualitative
methods to assess the causal mechanisms for individual and institutional decision-making. There
is a dearth of available current and reliable data, which minimizes the utility of quantitative
methods in this circumstance. In addition, the nature of decision-making is a series of dialogues
within the self and between people. Scholars typically cannot quantify this process in a
systematic or comprehensive way. Considering the relevant factors of this research, an in-depth
single case study of Jordan and comparative case studies to other Arab regimes is the preferred
methodology. Hall helps to elucidate the logic behind this decision by outlining when scholars
should use “regression analysis” versus “systemic process analysis.”41 In broad terms, Hall
contends that standard regression methods will be especially useful when there are a large
number of cases that are relatively independent from one another, and the outcomes are
dependent on a small set of causal variables that are powerful enough to demonstrate a consistent

40
41

Ibid.
Hall, p. 397.
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impact across cases.42 In contrast, systemic process analysis allows scholars to investigate
complex causal processes (e.g., those that transpire over a longer period of time) and thus enable
scholars to produce explanations that “contain more extensive specifications of causal
processes.”43 Systemic process analysis may better reveal the internal dynamics of the armed
forces, such as culture, history, levels of professionalization, etc., which possibly drive levels of
loyalty toward a regime.
As suggested above, conducting quantitative analysis would only partially explain civilmilitary relations in the Middle East. To address this shortcoming, this research project will
assess the following qualitative factors: culture, history, professionalization/politicization of the
armed forces, and social connection (addressed in case studies). In addition to a survey of the
extant literature on these topics, original interviews with available sources (e.g., retired or noninstitutionally affiliated government employees, military personnel, scholars, journalists,
members of civil society organizations, etc.) were conducted in the MENA region from August
2016-October 2017.
Among three viable methods to conducting qualitative research as it applies to this
specific project, process tracing offers the most promising approach to answering the research
question. Mahoney frames process tracing as fundamentally “a case-based methodology that can
be applied only with good knowledge of individual cases.”44 From this perspective, process
tracing can provide insight about the existence of causes, mechanisms, or auxiliary traces of the
theory and is therefore capable of effectively supplementing and complimenting the findings of

42

Ibid.
Hall, pp. 397-398.
44
James Mahoney. “After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research.” World Politics 62, no. 01 (2010),
p. 131.
43
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mainstream quantitative analysis.45 Similarly, the appeal of nested analysis resides in its ability
to combine quantitative and qualitative analysis where scholars may want to perform crossnational analysis that examines not only general patters but also specific country cases.46
However, because nested analysis first requires quantitative analysis as a precondition to any
qualitative evaluations, it falls outside of a key goal of this research, which is to prioritize both
case-specific and actor-specific dynamics of military loyalty and decision-making.
Triangulation, lastly, provides an additional avenue through which to consider a multimethod approach to answering the stated research question. Yet similar to nested-analysis,
triangulation is less effective at recognizing the “big, slow-moving and invisible” causal
processes47 at work throughout the history of authoritarian regime durability in the Arab world.
The institutional learning and adaptation over time has produced the specific skills, such as
partial economic liberalization48 or variations of liberalized autocracies,49 required for autocratic
regimes to satisfy the demands of militaries and repress larger civilian populations. Granting
attention to the big, slow-moving, and invisible processes at work will help to explain these
dynamics. For Pierson, these processes are “incremental” or “cumulative” and change in a
variable is continuous but extremely gradual.50 Triangulation, then, is problematic for this
research design because of its relatively limited focus on a specific phenomenon. According to

45

Ibid.
Evan S. Lieberman, “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research.” American
Political Science Review 99, no. 03 (2005), p. 450.
47
Paul Pierson, “Big, Slow-Moving and Invisible: Macrosocial Processes in the Study of Comparative Politics” in
Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, eds. Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. New York: Cambridge
University Press. Chapter 5 (2003), p. 181.
48
Samer Soliman, The Autumn of Dictatorship: Fiscal Crisis and Political Change in Egypt Under Mubarak.
49
Brumberg, Daniel. “The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy.” Journal of democracy 13, no. 4 (2002): 56-68.
50
Paul Pierson, “Big, Slow-Moving and Invisible: Macrosocial Processes in the Study of Comparative Politics,” p.
181.
46
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John Brewer and Albert Hunter, triangulation aims to “pinpoint the values of a phenomenon
more accurately by sighting in on it from different methodological viewpoints.”51
Each chapter of this study will utilize case studies to build a theory, test hypotheses, or
explore a key idea about civil-military relations and security. Chapter One uses an in-depth case
study of Jordan to understand individual decision-making and build theory, i.e., the identityrationalist model. An in-depth case study is ideal to build theory such as this because it
elucidates how choices are made, which quantitative data has a limited ability to achieve within
the scope of this study. Chapter Two uses comparative case studies to test hypotheses on why
militaries defect in the MENA region, and incorporates process tracing to accommodate the
small-n sample. Chapter Three also uses an in-depth case study, but this chapter explores and
illuminates the quintessential nature of Jordan’s intelligence services to regime survival and
stability of the country. The nature of the research and objectives of this study, therefore, make
qualitative methods the preferable option.

Interviews
Among a variety of data-collection techniques, this research project conducts and utilizes
interviews as a means to gather information on civil-military relations in the MENA region. The
interview questions outlined here were intended to generate detailed, holistic descriptions of
military involvement in state political economies as well as the specific roles carried out by
military leaders during the Arab uprising period of 2010 to 2012. In line with interviewing
objectives in political science, these interviews shed light on varying perspectives, unearthed
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competing interpretations of events, and explored the informal interactions and behaviors of
military actors that have been critical to political outcomes during periods of unrest.52
This research design utilized semi-structured (or in-depth) interviews. The purpose of
such interviews was to explore the research topic openly and allow respondents to express their
ideas and interpretations in their own words.53 Semi-structured interviews are appropriate for this
research topic because they seek to identify the processes by which militaries remain loyal to (or
defect from) political regimes. Specifically, this research employed a process tracing
methodology in which an insight or piece of data provides information about a “context, process,
or mechanism, and that contributes to distinctive leverage in causal inference.”54 This interview
research aims to identify the causal processes that have occurred over time and shaped civilmilitary loyalty and defection during recent popular uprisings in the Arab world. The following
are the questions asked during the interviews:
Interview Questions: Military Officials (Retired or Active Duty)
1. Could you please describe your career trajectory?
Military History and Security Dynamics
2. What is the relationship between the armed forces and the Jordanian government?
Arab Uprisings
3. Could you describe the social and political dynamics in Jordan at the time of the Arab
uprisings (2010-2012)?
4. What were the security concerns of the military during this time period?
5. What role did the police forces play at the time of the protests?
Military Benefits
6. What are the main career options for military service members?
7. What post-career benefits are available for retired military service members?
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Economic Conditions
8. What role does the military play in Jordan’s economy?
Broad Topics and Final Questions
9. Is there anything that you think I’ve missed?
10. Who else should I talk to?
Respondent Selection
The above semi-structured interview questions were adapted for a number of different
respondents. Priority respondents included retired and non-institutionally affiliated members of
the Jordanian Armed Forces along with members of the police force, government officials,
political party members, academics, journalists, and leaders of NGOs. The goal was to prioritize
interviews with respondents directly involved in, or knowledgeable about, the domestic and
regional security dynamics in 2010-2012. The sampling techniques for this interview research
included two related forms of non-random sampling, reputational and purposive. Reputational
sampling required that I interview an initial group of military actors and then ask them to
forward my information to additional respondents who may be interested in participating in my
study. Purposive sampling, or judgment sampling, is a form of non-random sampling that selects
elements of a population according to specific characteristics deemed relevant to the analysis.55
Actors with specific knowledge of the security and political dynamics of the Arab uprising
period are critical to the stated research objectives.
Practical issues presented important challenges that needed to be overcome. For example,
conducting interviews that address security-related topics are always sensitive in the MENA
region.56 Thus, the semi-structured interview questions here are tailored to investigate relatively

55

Layna Mosley, ed. Interview Research in Political Science (Cornell University Press, 2013), p. 41.
It should be noted that because I have a military history, study political science, and research security dynamics,
Jordanian citizens often refer to me as a member of the CIA.
56

16

broad security and defense topics. No question threatens the standing of the political regime,
government, or head of state. Questions concerning corruption are also specifically avoided.
Many of the topics were simply intended to address regional themes surrounding the Arab
uprisings, the domestic manifestations of protests, and military responses to such protests.
National security decisions are never characterized as illegitimate or repressive.57 Interviews
were not recorded. In order to protect respondent identities and confidentiality, the contents of all
interviews were hand written, transcribed, and stored on a secure computer file.

Outline of Dissertation: Chapter One
The first chapter explores the puzzle of military decision-making and behavior in the
MENA region on an individual level. Essentially, why do people join the military and support its
actions against certain threats? The relevance of this research question rests upon the important
characteristics of the region. The Middle East is one of the world’s most volatile regions and
remains strategically important for the global economy and international security. Regional
stability persists as a priority for the international community. This chapter posits that individuals
include identity in their cost-benefit analysis on perceived or actual threats, which will impact
their behavior. As such, this chapter establishes the identity-rationalist model in which
considerations of identity are incorporated into utility maximization calculations in order to
explain how militaries behave in relation to society and the polity. On their own, rationalist and
identity-centered approaches to civil-military relations are insufficient. Rationalist models
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overemphasize the material interests that motivate and drive decision-making.58 However,
culturalist traditions, which recognize the importance of communal identity and values,
underemphasize core incentives and disincentives that regimes utilize to maintain military
loyalty.
Given this background, this chapter hopes to make two contributions to civil-military
relations scholarship. First, the identity-rationalist model advances current theoretical work on
civil-military relations by situating identity within a rationalist approach. The identity-rationalist
model enhances the current understanding of civil-military relations by combining the most
salient aspects of each approach. Along with strategic calculations rooted in material interests,
identity remains a quintessential variable for determining how Arab militaries will behave when
internal and external security threats exist. At the crux of this new approach is the incorporation
of identity into the cost-benefit analysis of the rationalist paradigm. Typically, rationalism looks
at individual decision-making as a cost-benefit analysis that assesses material gains and physical
security. However, the new approach includes how individuals use the understanding of their
own identity into cost-benefit analysis. Second, this chapter presents original data from
interviews gathered in Jordan, which contributes to a more holistic and historically-rooted
understanding of military decision-making in Jordan and the larger MENA region.
During periods of political crisis like mass protest movements, military personnel must
assess and make decisions on a number of security issues. Therefore, this chapter focuses on
individual decision-making and how security personnel will use self-interest combined with their
own understandings of identity to make decisions. Evaluating decisions at the individual level
sheds light on the specific factors security personnel take into account when determining whether
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or not to engage in certain policies. These factors include considerations of how one’s career and
livelihood will be affected, threats to personal safety, and one’s standing in his or her
community. Upon weighing such factors, individual decisions matter because they can escalate
to group or collective action aimed at regime removal. For example, if enough individuals resist
orders, abrogate allegiances, or actively work against a regime, regime collapse becomes a
possibility. Thus, a central goal of this chapter is to elucidate how identity is included into these
decision-making processes.

Chapter Two
Chapter Two explores a different aspect of military loyalty at an institutional level as
opposed to an individual one. Taking militaries at the national level as the unit of analysis, this
chapter poses the following research question: under what conditions do militaries defect from
authoritarian regimes? The relevance of this research question lies in the fact that decisions made
by militaries throughout the Arab uprisings played an essential role in shaping the outcomes of
pro-reform movements.59 Arguably, no institution matters more to a state’s survival than the
military, and no revolution within a state can take root without the support or non-interference of
its armed forces.60 While the political science literature has increasingly recognized Arab
militaries as crucial to determining the outcomes of post-2010 pro-reform movements, scholars
have directed less attention to the causal mechanisms associated with military satisfaction within
a particular regime. Given this context, this chapter contends that militaries remain loyal or
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defect primarily due to levels of economic integration, but perceptions of political power also
play a role.
The chapter applies established analysis to military integration into the national
economies of Jordan, Oman, Egypt, and Tunisia; the cases are used as falsification of the
hypotheses because each country has distinct socio-political and economic structure. This
chapter utilizes comparative case studies and process tracing conduct a structured comparison of
military behavior in Jordan, Oman, Egypt, and Tunisia to address the following hypotheses:
•
•
•

Hypothesis 1 (Political-Economic School): If the military is well-integrated into the
political economy of the state, then it will be less likely to defect.
Hypothesis 2 (Political Power School): If the military perceives it is losing political
power, then it will be more likely to defect.
Hypothesis 3 (Military Cleavage School): If the military lacks internal sectarian
cleavages (e.g., ethnic, religious, or class-based differences), then it will be less likely
to defect.

The empirical variation regarding how Arab militaries have either supported or defected
from regimes under duress suggests that the overall political and economic status of militaries
within a state may impact military decision-making. Policies that indicate high-levels of military
involvement in political economies are hypothesized to increase the likelihood of loyalty toward
a regime facing protest movements. More broadly, this study aims to empirically test the
proposition that the stronger a regime’s record of satisfying the economic interests of military
personnel, the more likely a military will be to support a regime facing large-scale protests.61
Although similar arguments have been theorized, few attempts have been made to provide
empirical support to such claims.
To that end, this chapter aims to make two scholarly contributions. First, recent
theoretical work addressing the importance of military integration into states’ economies remains
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underdeveloped. This chapter hopes to articulate the extent to which regimes attempt to ensure
military loyalty through material incentives. Second, this chapter offers empirical support to the
above proposition through the analysis of original interview data gathered in Jordan. This data
elucidates specific regime policies that dramatically boost the material benefits of military
service and continued loyalty.

Chapter Three
Arab militaries are critical to determining the outcomes of pro-reform movements, yet
scholars have directed less attention at intelligence agencies during periods of crisis. Chapter
Three addresses this gap by focusing on the critical role intelligence services play in maintaining
national security priorities and state stability. Specifically, this chapter explores how Jordanian
intelligence services are effective at safeguarding the regime. The relevance of this topic
continues to increase as some observers argue that the US intelligence community’s partnership
with its Jordanian counterparts has become more important than its relationship with Mossad,
Israel’s national intelligence agency.62 This chapter contends that Jordanian intelligence agencies
are effective because of their professionalization (hierarchy, meritocracy, and specialization of
subject matters and skillsets). Professionalization also comes from cooperating with and learning
from foreign intelligence agencies in Europe, the United States, and other states with highly
developed intelligence services. Because of this professionalization, Jordanian intelligence
services are able to eliminate effectively threats from domestic tribes and Islamists through
appeasing and co-opting leadership, disrupting lines of communication, and neutralizing targets.
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All of this has been a significant contribution to the relative political and security stability of
Jordan.
Chapter Three aims to make two contributions to civil-military relations and security
studies scholarship. First, the chapter provides an in-depth, historically-rooted account of the
structure of Jordanian intelligence services. This account includes information pertaining to the
recruitment and training of intelligence operatives, first-hand information regarding the level of
cooperation and rivalry among Jordan’s intelligence services, and Jordan’s national security
priorities. Among others, these priorities consist of border security, terrorist infiltration into
Jordan’s refugee camps, and identifying, tracking, and neutralizing terrorist sleeping cells in
Jordanian territory. Ultimately, this chapter argues that Jordanian intelligence agencies are the
primary reason for Jordan’s continued political stability because of its efficiency. Moreover, the
efficiency of Jordanian Intelligence is connected to how it effectively eliminates threats from
tribal dissatisfaction and Islamists. Part of the effectiveness is rooted in King Abdullah II’s
ability to understand and balance Jordan’s tribal composition to maintain security. The analysis
of data from this chapter explores the structure and maturation of Jordanian intelligence
networks within the context of Jordan’s historical development. The chapter then addresses the
puzzle of how Jordan’s intelligence services are exceptional in their ability to protect the regime
and maintain stability in the country.

Conclusion
Arab armed forces continue to play a critical role in regime durability and survival within
the region’s authoritarian political systems. Yet the specific outcomes of the post-Arab uprising
period lack clear explanation. This research project seeks to better explain military decision-
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making during the recent periods of political instability. Qualitative analysis in the form of
process tracing will ideally shed light on the context-specific decision-making calculations made
by militaries over time. The ontological nature of the stated research question assumes that while
militaries are primarily concerned with their respective domestic standing, larger regional trends
also have an impact on how decisions such as loyalty toward a regime are ultimately made. To
more effectively uncover such dynamics, this research utilizes and collects a variety of
qualitative data, while also conducting controlled case study comparisons. The literature
reviewed helps to reveal the need for both the refinement and expansion of existing theoretical
perspectives on civil-military relations in the Arab world. As noted previously, conventional
wisdom holds that armed forces should remain ideologically detached and physically separate
from political institutions. However, this view lacks direct relevance to Arab authoritarian states
where highly centralized regime control over government, unique ideological foundations for
legitimacy which often involve Islam, and deeply entrenched networks of patronage and
corruption simply preclude traditional conceptions of effective civil-military relations. This study
hopes to contribute to the research on civil-military relations in the Middle East and North Africa
by offering a new theory on security decision-making (the identity-rationalist model), assessing
how economic integration impacts loyalty to regimes, and exploring the causes of efficiency in
Jordanian intelligence services.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE IDENTITY-RATIONALIST MODEL: INTERPRETING CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS IN JORDAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
Introduction
Regarding civil-military relations, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) remains
one of the most complex and difficult regions in the world to understand. Political systems
include an assortment of authoritarian regimes from absolute and semi-constitutional monarchies
(Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan) to semi-presidential republics (Egypt and Tunisia). Levels
of political repression range from zero tolerance of dissent to relatively open societies that boast
democratic means of political participation and representation. From a security standpoint, Arab
states are equally diverse. Depending on the country, armed forces, militaries, intelligence
services, police forces, and private security firms operate with strong government support or are
deliberately undermined by heads of state to minimize threats to the regime. Indeed, the very
nature of statehood and autonomy are uniquely blurred across the region. In the cases of Iraq,
Syria, Yemen, and Libya, the political and security sectors have broken down to the point where
the states have failed or are only minimally functioning. Since the Cold War, international actors,
especially the United States, Russia, and Iran, have been incredibly active in the affairs of Arab
states and openly contribute arms, money, and training to multiple state and non-state actors.
Among experts and ordinary citizens alike, classifying the protracted political and military
conflict between Israel and Palestine remains a matter of intense contestation. The diversity of
actors, political systems, security apparatuses, and conflicts present daunting challenges for those
who strive to understand civil-military relations in the MENA region.
One of the most important security and political questions concerning the future stability
of the region relates to civil-military relations. Essentially, why do some Arab militaries defect
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while others remain loyal? During periods of political crisis, military personnel can defect by
going into exile, resisting or ignoring orders from heads of state, or abrogating allegiances to a
regime. This chapter focuses on individual decision-making as opposed to how the military
operates as an institution. Evaluating decisions at the individual level sheds light on the specific
factors security personnel take into account when determining whether or not to remain loyal.
These factors include considerations of how one’s career and livelihood will be affected, threats
to personal safety, and one’s standing in his or her community. Upon weighing such factors,
individual decisions matter because they can escalate to group or collective action aimed at
regime removal. If enough individuals resist orders, abrogate allegiances, or actively work
against a regime, regime collapse becomes a possibility. Thus, a central goal of this chapter is to
elucidate the dimensions of individual decision-making that potentially form the basis for larger
acts of defection, such as attempting a coup or initiating a civil war.
Typically, scholars examine civil-military relations and individual decision-making
through three primary approaches: (1) rationalist approaches analyze strategic action rooted in
coalition building, game theory, and bargaining theory; (2) structuralist approaches examine
institutions and their organization, procedures, and rules at the domestic, regional, and
international levels; and (3) culturalist approaches focus on the subject, often at the individual
level, which includes individually held beliefs or shared ideas, attitudes, and interpretations.63
Subsequent sections of this chapter will further define each approach as well as evaluate their
respective strengths and weaknesses.
In order to build upon the strengths and address the shortcomings of these approaches,
this chapter presents a new and alternative theoretical model that I have developed. I call this
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new theoretical construct the identity-rationalist model. The development of this model stems
from an examination of civil-military relations literature, original fieldwork in Jordan, and the
use of the case study method.
The identity-rationalist model holds that there is a strategic interaction between selfinterest and identity that informs decision-making. Specifically, individuals weigh the potential
costs and benefits of their decisions while also considering the impact of the decisions on
different aspects of their identity. For the purposes of this chapter, identity is defined as the
complex interaction, prioritization, and/or combination of one’s internal orientation to the world
and external expression of familial, communal, educational, ethnolinguistic, religious,
nationalist, and professional backgrounds. Rather than offer a comprehensive discussion of
identity in the MENA region, this chapter pursues the more limited objective of demonstrating
how and why identity factors into decision-making during periods of political crisis.
This chapter is divided into two main parts. Part I will start by assessing the three main
theoretical approaches to studying civil-military relations (i.e., rationalist, structuralist, and
culturalist). The chapter then presents the identity-rationalist model as a new way to interpret,
analyze, and better understand military decision-making. Following this explication of the
identity-rationalist model, the chapter surveys the relevant civil-military relations literature that
informs the identity-rationalist model. Part I concludes by explaining how case studies can
effectively contribute to theory development. Part II draws upon Jordan as its central case study
to develop the identity-rationalist model and demonstrates its utility for analyzing civil-military
relations. When developing the model from this case study, Part II also highlights how the
identity-rationalist model compliments recent civil-military relations research and fills important
gaps in the literature.
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Ultimately, this chapter argues that the identity-rationalist model advances our
understanding of military decision-making by demonstrating that actors are interest-driven,
intentional, account for their identity, and gather the information required to make well-informed
decisions during periods of political upheaval. Ideally, scholars will be able to build upon, refine,
and challenge the identity-rationalist model to more accurately interpret and analyze military
decision-making in the context of global security.

Part I: Theoretical Approaches to Studying Civil-Military Relations
Following the Arab uprisings that began in late 2010, scholars have increasingly
identified the role of Arab militaries as critical to understanding the outcomes of widespread
protests and regime responses.64 While various analytical perspectives have been employed to
understand the political dynamics of the Arab uprisings, scholars need to direct attention at
developing new approaches to better understand Arab civil-military relations. Recent theoretical
approaches are inadequate because they typically focus on the MENA region’s resistance to
democratization. For instance, scholars examine the presence or lack of strong civil societies and
institutions, regime management of economies, income and literacy levels, democratic
neighbors, and democratic culture.65 These studies clarify important pieces to the
democratization puzzle but lack a broader theoretical framework that explains the crucial role
that militaries play in safeguarding regimes. Within comparative politics, the division between
rationalist, structuralist, and culturalist approaches often inform and guide the answers to such
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questions. These schools of thought offer a viable starting point to interpreting events in the
Middle East but inevitably come with limitations.
In broad terms, David Pion-Berlin outlines the approaches in the following manner. The
rationalist approach analyzes strategic action, which includes coalition building, game and
bargaining theory. Structuralist approaches focus on institutions and their organization and rules
at the domestic, regional, and international levels. Culturalist perspectives analyze the subject,
often at the individual level, which includes individually held beliefs or shared ideas, attitudes,
and interpretations.66 Much of civil-military relations scholarship, particularly in Latin America,
falls into one (or a combination) of these theoretical camps. Examining the details of each
approach helps to elucidate the aspects most relevant to the study of civil-military relations in the
MENA region. Although each approach has explanatory power, each one also has weaknesses
and deficiencies that limit their application to modern governance in the Arab world.
The rationalist approach is guided by four fundamental assumptions: (1) the individual
(or analogue of the individual) is the primary unit of analysis; (2) individuals are considered
rational actors and pursue their goals and strategies in a manner that maximizes the likelihood
they will achieve their objectives; (3) the aspirations of individuals are basic, mainly consistent,
and capable of being ordered; (4) individuals have the ability to accurately interpret situations,
recognize other actors and their objectives, and make rational decisions and calculations.67
Within a rationalist framework, actors are regarded as more pragmatic than ideological.
Individuals are interest-driven, intentional, and capable of acquiring the necessary information to
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make well-informed, deliberate decisions. As such, agency plays a central role in rationalistoriented research.68
Rational choice theory is particularly strong in its attempts to explain the role of regime
elites in preventing democratization. Arab dictators have long sought to professionalize militaries
without providing the armed forces with meaningful political power.69 Other scholars explain
that militaries played a dominant role in thwarting political change during the Arab Spring and
that the more integrated militaries are into a state’s political economy, the more likely it will be
to support a regime under duress.70 Post-retirement career appointments and benefits also allow a
regime to co-opt and preserve the loyalty of military elites.71 Finally, “coup-proofing,” a
technique often used to protect against defection, is a central part of many regime strategies to
maintain power. Coup-proofing involves creating parallel security institutions, distributing
material incentives, and exploiting communal ties. Although widely used, coup-proofing is not
always effective.72 Research suggests that building parallel security institutions and offering
material incentives foster competition and motivate defection within the security apparatus. In
contrast, regime exploitation of communal ties mitigates these effects and more reliably ensures
military loyalty.73 Stripping the military of political power, integrating the military into a state’s
economy, offering post-retirement benefits, and coup-proofing reveal the strategies used by
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regime elites to maintain military loyalty. Similarly, non-elites must make strategic calculations
when navigating these strategies in order to maximize utility in repressive environments.
Of the three approaches this chapter examines, rational choice theory provides the
greatest theoretical insights pertaining to civil-military relations, particularly because current
events demonstrate the applicability of agent-centric models. Jillian Schwedler’s work on the
inclusion-moderation hypothesis is relevant in this context. As in Schwedler’s study of Jordan
and Yemen, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (Jamāʻat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn) attempted to enter
mainstream politics in order to achieve its goals.74 Rational choice theory elucidates
contingency-based arguments and decisions whereby individual actors make calculated decisions
to participate in, or refrain from politics. Considerations on whether or not to engage in politics
mirror similar evaluations in security sectors. The rationalist approach best explains civilmilitary relations in the MENA region and why militaries remain loyal because individual
decisions regarding defection can carry heavy costs. If identified, regimes punish defectors
through execution, exile, arrest, or other purges and individuals must weigh the likelihood of
such consequences. However, a key variable is missing in rationalist approaches. Identity adds
explanatory power within the rationalist approach/principal-agent model as the costs or benefits
of defection affect one’s family, tribe, or sect.
Structuralist, or institutional, approaches differ from rational choice theories by
prioritizing the “enduring influence of organizational rules, patterns, and traditions on personal
behavior.”75 While recognizing the importance of the social context of politics and the motives
of individual actors, institutional approaches insist upon “a more autonomous role for political
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institutions.”76 Historically, such institutions included bureaucratic agencies, legislative bodies,
and judiciaries.77 The definition of institutions has since expanded to encompass “formal or
informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure
of the polity.”78 In contrast to rationalist theories, structuralist approaches view institutions not
only as forces in their own right, but that they have the power to alter the behavior and decisionmaking processes of rational actors in ways that extend beyond pure self-interest calculations.79
Samuel Huntington’s theory, outlined in The Soldier and the State, falls within a structuralist
approach to civil-military relations by focusing on the interaction of political actors in the
institutional settings of government. Huntington assesses the nonmaterial determinants of
behavior, such as identity, norms, beliefs, and ideas. Huntington’s conception of civilian control
also stresses the importance of identity and the ideology of professionalism, a focus shared by
Morris Janowitz in The Professional Soldier.80
Structuralism and historical institutionalism are relevant because bureaucracy permeates
the daily existence of those who live in the region. Important aspects of one’s life from
university to jobs, marriage options and opportunities, domestic freedom of movement, and
international travel are controlled in some way by state institutions. Institutions are the extension
of autocrats in the region, and the priorities of the autocrat determine the influence of
institutions. Yet this is why institutions are not all encompassing in the people’s lives. They only
matter when the political leadership want them to matter and can end up being feckless. For
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instance, a regime may allow the presence of an internationally observed, independent electoral
commission to oversee parliamentary or presidential elections. However, international observers
and domestic employees may find their work underfunded, limited in mandate, or later
discredited by the regime. Examples of autocrats in the MENA region winning presidential
elections with more than 95% of the vote are not uncommon. As such, institutions are not
autonomous, and the structuralist approach becomes incomplete and misleading.
A key weakness of structuralism is that it fails to fully account for the roles of individual
actors during crucial stages of political development. From a rational choice approach, some
analysts argue that individual actors and their respective use of technology played a crucial role
in shaping the outcomes of pro-reform demonstrations in Egypt and Tunisia81 and the wider
Middle East.82 Other scholars disagreed and argued that technology was not a driving factor, and
that indeed, the “revolution will not be tweeted.” 83
Stemming from the work of Clifford Geertz and James C. Scott, culturalist approaches to
researching politics have widely influenced the disciplines of political science, sociology, and
anthropology.84 As a theoretical approach, culturalism is akin to constructivism in which reality
is co-created, reality is what humans make of it, and culture forms preferences. Culturalist
theories typically focus on ideas, beliefs, attitudes, and interpretations that affect political
behavior.85 Wendy Hunter explains that culturalist accounts of Latin American politics often
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refer to “orientations such as elitism, authoritarianism, corporatism, and patrimonialism.”86
Hunter outlines how these principles had strong foundations in Spanish Catholicism, which led
to Latin American societies becoming hierarchically structured by rank and vertically structured
into prominent groups such as the military, the church, and the bureaucracy. Along these lines,
militaries that are actively involved in domestic politics and contribute to nation building can be
understood through a culturalist lens. That is, tradition and ideals guide military decision-making
regarding the degree to which the military plays a direct role in the affairs of the state.87
From this approach, political development in the Middle East directly corresponds to a
history of kin-based, tribal ties. For example, kind-based models of social and political life
explain variation in women’s rights in Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria, which contrasts with the
Western class-centered models. 88 Likewise, Abdellah Hammoudi explains authoritarianism in
Morocco through a paradigm of authority that juxtaposes absolute authority and absolute
submission, which has its roots in Islamic mysticism.89 While culturalism effectively engages the
central role that Islam plays in Arab politics, it fails to recognize the centrality of individual
actors, as well as the institutions that shape the limits of Islam in politics.
Culturalism has explanatory power because familial and tribal affiliation shape politics
and conflict in the MENA region. Concerning Iraq and Syria, recent scholarship routinely
identifies sectarian divisions as crucial to understanding conflict dynamics.90 It fails as an
analytic approach, though, because culturalism is too amorphous. For instance, it is difficult to
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answer the questions of whether or not sectarian divisions drive conflict, or conflict inflames
sectarian divisions, or both dynamics intensify each other. Other scholars challenge this line of
inquiry entirely and instead point to the manufactured and politicization of sectarianism in Iraq.91
In either case, culturalism struggles to explain conflict because aspects of culture change slowly
over time, while violence can erupt from one day to the next depending on the conflict’s spark.
Cultural aspects like religion are used in conflict-related discourse by political leaders and even
citizens, but actors will often prioritize security, money, and power when necessary, which aligns
with rational choice.
In sum, militaries remain loyal or defect based on perceived or actual threats, and identity
is a key variable in determining these threats. On their own, rationalist and culturalist approaches
to civil-military relations are insufficient. Rationalist approaches overemphasize the material
interests that motivate and drive decision-making. However, culturalist approaches, which
recognize the importance of communal identity and values, underemphasize core incentives and
disincentives that regimes utilize to maintain military loyalty. The identity-rationalist model
advances the current understanding of civil-military relations by combining the most salient
aspects of each approach. Along with strategic calculations rooted in material interests, identity
remains a quintessential variable for determining how Arab militaries will behave when internal
and external security threats exist. At the crux of this new model is the incorporation of identity
into the cost-benefit analysis of the rationalist approach. Although the rationalist approach has
greater explanatory value, one element of the culturalist approach that is applicable to
understanding civil-military relations is the role of identity. Typically, rationalism looks at
individual decision-making as a cost-benefit analysis that assesses material gains and physical
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security. However, the new approach will include how individuals use the understanding of their
own identity into cost-benefit analysis as well as economic and security concerns.

Identity-Rationalist Model
The rationalist approach best explains civil-military relations in the MENA region and
why militaries remain loyal to regimes. However, a key variable is missing in the model. Identity
adds explanatory power within the rationalist approach. The following two sections draw upon
rational choice, the principal-agent theory, and the security dilemma to illuminate the interaction
of self-interest and identity in security-related decision-making. Rational decision-making of this
nature becomes especially relevant with respect to civil-military relations. How much power
should militaries wield within political systems? How do political leaders determine levels of
defense spending, promotions, division of military responsibilities, and national defense
priorities? In partial or non-democracies, is the military a threat to the regime itself? These
questions speak to how political leaders must balance competing interests. Yet these questions
also indicate that identity plays a large role in shaping how much militaries aim to participate in
politics and how much political involvement political leaders allow.92
It is important to start with the fundamental assumptions of the identity-rationalist model in
order to understand its explanatory power.93 The key assumptions are:
•
•
•

Individuals are rational actors that will maximize utility in their decisions.
Civil-military relations is a series of strategic interactions between the military and
civilians in which decisions are based on expectations of behavior.
The process of decision-making is iterative over time as the threat environment changes.
Principles and agents must adjust their preferences according to the threat environment.
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•
•

Identity partially contributes to the individual, group, and state-level understanding of the
threat environment.
Punishments, rewards, and incentives shape actor decision making. An individual, group,
and state will assess what punishments, rewards, and incentives are acceptable partially
based on their identity.

Therefore, the identity-rationalist model holds that there is a strategic interaction between selfinterest and identity that informs decision-making. Specifically, individuals weigh the potential
costs and benefits of their decisions while also considering the impact of the decisions on
different aspects of their identity. From a positivist perspective, researchers will empirically
observe this model’s validity in the decision-making processes of individuals, groups, and states
based on their statements, declarations, and discussions on why and how they should act. Based
on these empirical observations, researchers can then offer predictions on the behavior of
individuals, groups, and states during political crises.
Egypt provides a brief example to help elucidate the applicability of the identityrationalist model. Between 2011-2013, the Egyptian military removed two leaders in quick
succession during the Arab Spring because they each threatened the military’s position.
Following the 2012 election, Mohamed Morsi attempted to remove the power of the military in
governance and move the country in an Islamist direction. After considering its options (i.e., the
potential punishments, rewards, and incentives of action or inaction), the military intervened to
remove Morsi for self-interest and identity reasons.94 First, Morsi harmed military interests
(privileged economic and political position). Second, Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood would
have changed the identity of Egypt away from Arab nationalism and the military’s desired

94

Some observers argued that Morsi’s “moves to entrench Islamic laws and concentrate power in the hands of the
Muslim Brotherhood…alienated liberals and secularists.” This demonstrates the importance of and competition over
Egypt’s national identity. See “Egypt Crisis: Army Ousts President Mohammed Morsi.” BBC, July 4, 2013,
accessed June 30, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23173794.

36

identity of “guardians of the revolution” (i.e., neutral on partisan processes).95 The identityrationalist model makes no definitive claims pertaining to Egyptian identity, military identity, or
Islamist identity, etc. Instead, the model highlights that identity is incorporated into the decisionmaking processes of military personnel and institutions.
The identity-rational model builds upon previous theoretical approaches to civil-military
relations, primarily the rationalist approach and security dilemma. The rationalist approach
operates under the assumptions of rational choice theory. Rational choice holds that individuals
have preferences and will choose the option that satisfies their preferences through decisions
based on some form of cost-benefit analysis. Recent theoretical and empirical work draw upon
rationalist approaches to explain civil-military relations. Peter Feaver’s principal-agent theory
connects rational choice and military decision-making by exploring questions of agency
relationships, e.g., stockholder-board, employer-employee, voter-politician, or congressbureaucracy. Specifically, the principal-agent framework analyzes how political or economic
actors in a superior position (principals) control the behavior or corresponding actors in
subordinate positions (agents).96 Strategic interaction and hierarchy are the distinctive features of
the principal-agent framework. According to Feaver, interactions between civilians and the
military are strategic because the decisions civilians make are contingent upon their expectations
of what course of action the military will take, and vice versa. In democracies, these interactions
occur in a hierarchical environment because civilians hold privileged positions where
mechanisms of authority have legitimacy and durability.97 In this setting, military agents choose
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to either “work” or “shirk;” the former implies military subordination to civilian authority and
the latter involves insubordination.98
A related paradigm to rational choice within the study of conflict is the security dilemma.
As a theoretical approach, the security dilemma gained traction during the Cold War where it
provided insights related to how and why states sought to control or neutralize other states.99
Initially, scholars applied the security dilemma to interstate war to understand state behavior and
conflict dynamics. More recently, the security dilemma has been applied to intrastate war to
analyze conflict between state and sub-state actors. Since the mid-1940s, civil war has become
the most frequent and deadly form of conflict.100 Of the 127 post-WWII conflicts recorded in the
Correlates of War Project, more than 72% were some form of civil war. Between 1945 and 1992,
these conflicts comprised roughly 64% of the total battle deaths and approximately 82% of the
nation months at war.101 Under the security dilemma, an actor (individual, group, or state) will
maximize security as its preferred outcome, and this causes others to do the same. As each
party’s attempt to increase its security reduces the security of other parties, even non-offensive
actions invoke a security dilemma. While there is an important difference between predatory
versus defensive actions of a state, the security dilemma implies that both state and non-state
actors similarly evaluate both actions as threatening.102
A distinction exists between means used and ends sought within rational choice and the
security dilemma. This distinction originates from Max Weber’s work Economy and Society
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where he outlines the differences between “instrumental rationality” and “value rationality;” the
former focuses on efficiency and the latter on outcome. While both of these rationalities are
expressions of goal-driven behavior, they differ with respect to the costs of pursuing such
behavior.103 Instrumental rationality involves a strict cost-benefit calculation where goals are
abandoned if the costs of reaching them are too high. Value-rational behavior is a “conscious
belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of
behavior, independently of its prospects of success.”104 Within the context of the security
dilemma, the strategic interaction between self-interest and identity falls under value rationality.
Actors seek security and preferences through cost/benefit analysis while incorporating matters of
identity at the individual, group, or state level.
Combining identity with rational choice and the security dilemma offers the possibility of
a deeper and better understanding of civil-military relations. As stated above, the identityrationalist model holds that there is a strategic interaction between self-interest and identity that
informs decision-making. Because of this strategic interaction, individuals will assess the costs
and benefits of their decisions, and part of this consideration will be how the decision impacts
their identity. Furthermore, the identity-rationalist model advances scholars’ understanding of
civil-military relations because militaries include identity dynamics into their calculations on
loyalty or defection. Whether military personnel decide to support or resist a regime directly
affects their respective communities, which shapes how an individual reaches a decision.
Incorporating a complex notion of instrumental and value rationality, while emphasizing the role
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of identity, creates an opportunity to expand beyond earlier rational choice conceptions of
strategic, self-interested decision-making.

Identity
The identity-rationalist model offers a new way to understand and explain the individual
decisions of military personnel during periods of political crisis. The model incorporates notions
of identity to advance existing rationalist approaches to civil-military relations. As such, this
section presents a conception of identity as it functions within the identity-rationalist model. For
the purposes of this chapter, identity is defined as the complex interaction, prioritization, and/or
combination of one’s internal orientation to the world and external expression of familial,
communal, educational, ethnolinguistic, religious, nationalist, and professional backgrounds. It is
important to note that this chapter has the limited objective of explaining how identity is part of
security decision-making as opposed to offering a comprehensive discussion of identity in the
MENA region.105
A number of conceptions of identity at the individual, communal, and national levels
inform this chapter’s definition of identity. As a useful point of departure, James Fearon argues
that scholars typically use “identity” in two distinct but connected senses: social and personal. In
the sense of social identity, Fearon explains that identity simply refers to a “social category, a set
of persons marked by a label and distinguished by rules deciding membership and (alleged)
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characteristic features or attributes.” 106 In the sense of personal identity, “identity is some
distinguishing characteristic (or characteristics) that a person takes a special pride in or views as
socially consequential but more-or-less unchangeable.”107 Therefore, identity has two
overlapping dimensions. It simultaneously refers to social categories and to elements of an
individual’s self-respect and dignity.108 This chapter largely agrees with Fearon’s notion of
identity with one important exception. Rather than remain “more-or-less unchangeable,”
personal identities may overlap with group, institutional, or national identities and usually
change over the course of time and experience. Shared notions of identity have a profound
impact on an individual’s understanding of him or herself and often shape individual decisions
and action.
Extending beyond individual or communal notions of identity, arriving at a consensus
understanding of identity at the national level is elusive because no one person has the
knowledge or power to define a nation’s identity in its entirety. In this context, the identityrationalist model focuses narrowly on how security personnel characterize their respective work
responsibilities and larger commitment to their country’s security, i.e., their professional identity.
On this topic, civil-military relations scholarship provides meaningful insights. As noted earlier
in this chapter, both Huntington and Janowitz focus on the non-material determinants of military
behavior, e.g., identity, norms, beliefs, or ideas. The concept of civilian control of the military is
“largely identity-driven and centers on an ideology of professionalism.”109 For Huntington, “a
highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which
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secures legitimate authority within the state.”110 The causal chain for Huntington’s theory
proceeds as follows: autonomy leads to professionalization, political neutrality, voluntary
subordination, and civilian control of the armed forces.111 Once security personnel internalize
professionalism as part of their identities, they become amenable to subordination to their
civilian counterparts.
The identity-rationalist model argues that actors’ preferences shift depending upon how
an individual views her or himself within a community.112 In many Arab countries, tribal
affiliation and protecting one’s tribe stands as a foundational responsibility, especially in the
context of religious obligation or doctrine. However, it is important to situate this argument in
the broader context of identity formation in the MENA region. As Safwan Masri explains,
identity stems from the circumstances into which one is born, like a religious identity or
nationality.113 These identities are imposed socially, not biologically, and they become the
dominant orienting principle to the world for most communities. Masri would also comment that
this identity can go beyond individual desires after he mentioned to a friend that he did not want
a Muslim burial. His friend retorted that “the best advice that he could conjure up was for me not
to die in Jordan…”114 Although religious identities may structure individual identity in the
MENA region, it is misleading to assume that religion’s influence is uniform across and within

110

Huntington, The Soldier and The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, pp. 83-84.
Ibid; see also Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations, p. 18.
112
Interview questions for this study did not specifically ask participants to describe aspects of their personal or
social identity. Rather, identity emerged as an important dimension of decision-making through the course of the
interviews and thus led to the development of the identity-rationalist model. In order to test potential hypotheses of
the identity-rationalist model, future research should structure interview questions that focus on actors’ preferences
when deciding how to act during moments of political crisis or military conflict. Such questions should also ask
participants to describe the importance of self-perception within their communities when making decisions during
such periods. Subsequent participant responses may provide the necessary data and variation that researchers can
then use to determine the validity, accuracy, and generalizability of the identity-rationalist model.
113
Safwan M. Masri, Tunisia: An Arab Anomaly (Columbia University Press, 2017), p. XXII.
114
Ibid.
111

42

countries or understood the same way by the region’s sub-groups. In major cities, Islam’s
interpretation and practice are very different from Beirut, to Tunis, to Muscat, setting aside
Tehran and Jakarta.
Still, even if those living in the MENA region were to agree with Masri’s description of
religion’s effect on identity formation and transformation, there may be disagreement over the
characterization of Islam’s influence in the “Arab world” – a term which Masri recognizes as rife
with complexity and contestation. Masri explains that the “Arab world” is a relatively new
concept, disseminated during the Ottoman empire and promulgated by pan-Arab political
ideologies in the mid-twentieth century as part of the notion of an “Arab nation.”115 Masri rightly
contends that “shared modern histories produced an Arab identity that is singular and
reductionist and that does not take into account variations in nationality, ethnicity, religion,
language, and individuality.”116 In academic discourse, then, the “Arab world” most responsibly
refers to Arabic-speaking countries rather than describes the identity of a homogenous
population.117
In Oman, Marc Valeri interprets the recent revival of communal prejudices in the context
of state development. Valeri asserts that “the Omani state, both as a geographical territory and as
a scene of ambitions and encounters, has contributed to making an individual aware of his origin,
his social class, and his language – in a word, his ‘identity.’”118 Essentially, economic
competition and difficulties led to frustrations and demands based on identities “or elements of
difference” within Omani society. Sultan Qaboos contributed to the growth of these “visible
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differences” and prejudices by legitimizing and allowing the “monopolisation of tribal or ethnic
registers to the state’s benefit.”119 The example of Oman shows how notions of individual
identity not only play a central role in state formation, but also form the foundation of contested
arenas of determining or redefining a country’s national identity.
In articulating complex notions of identity related to Middle East security, fundamental
questions arise: What does it mean to be Arab, Muslim, or Jordanian? What does it mean to
strongly support, or identify with, or be sympathetic toward anti-Israel, anti-US, or anti-West
extremist movements? For those who identify as agents of change, what does it mean to be in
favor of political reform? Because identity is socially constructed, there are no simple answers to
these questions. In actuality, each of these questions is intensely contested and debated. Yet it
remains clear that the ways in which individuals answer such questions have direct consequences
for their respective lives. If a Muslim puts his religion above his national identity, he may be
targeted by intelligence services as a threat to the survival of the regime. Political and/or
religious dissidents or extremists are likely targeted by both regional regimes as well as US and
European partners in an effort to combat terrorism, even if violence is not imminent. Political
activists may also be silenced, harassed, imprisoned, or killed by authoritarian governments that
view political reform as an existential threat that includes the abrogation of the country’s
identity.
In plain terms, identity shapes many of the conflict dynamics currently facing the Arab
world. While the answers to the above questions are context-specific and highly variable, the
issue of identity colors any interpretation of civil-military relations in the MENA region and
beyond. This section focuses narrowly on how security experts and personnel define themselves
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and their respective work within the broader milieu of Arab society. Interview material presented
later in this chapter provides ample evidence to demonstrate the importance of communal,
religious, nationalist, and professional identities vis-à-vis individual decisions of loyalty and
defection.
Literature Review: Security Decision-Making
There is a significant amount of literature that delves into the decision-making of security
actors at individual and institutional levels during periods of political crisis. Essentially, this
literature evaluates why policy makers, militaries, and governments choose to use force or other
policies to quell unrest. Literatures on civil-military relations, the security dilemma, nationalism,
and individual leaders all contribute to understanding security decision-making, but a gap still
exists in each of the literatures that the identity-rationalist model seeks to fill. For example,
existing studies of civil-military relations under authoritarian regimes attempt to explain military
decision-making during periods of social instability.120 While these studies effectively detail the
specific dynamics of countries and cases, there remains a need for further theoretical
development that the identity-rationalist model enhances. Each type of literature does not fully
incorporate how actors will make security decisions while considering notions of identity. As
described above, actors will include their identity when making decisions on security, such as
going to war to protect a national identity or to protect those with whom they share an identity.
The literature on civil-military relations expounds decision-making by military personnel,
which is an important foundation for the identity-rationalist model. Peter Feaver’s principalagent framework helps to explain military behavior during periods of political crisis. In the
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principal-agent model civilians (principals) contract the military (agents) to defend against
foreign and domestic threats. Albrecht and Ohl’s recent study of military behavior in Syria,
Yemen, and Bahrain successfully builds upon Feaver’s principal-agent model. During moments
of political crisis, military members can exit by remaining in the barracks or fleeing into exile,
resist by siding with the opposition or initiating a coup, or remain loyal to the regime by
defending it through the use of force.121 Albrecht and Ohl disaggregate the military, outline
differences in preferences among officers and soldiers, and look at the constraints which operate
upon all military actors. The authors argue that high-ranking officers are not only military
personnel, but also members of the political elite. As such, military elites decide whether or not
to remain loyal based on their expectations for regime change and removing incumbents. In
contrast, soldiers view military service as a job, but one where hierarchical control constrains
exit or resistance as openings for desertion increase.122
As evidence of these different decision-making processes, Albrecht and Ohl analyze the
disparate outcomes in Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain during periods of popular unrest. The authors
classify the distinct outcomes under three types of defection: horizontal defections (commanders
remain loyal while subordinates defect); vertical defections (commanders and subordinates
within the same unit either defect or remain loyal); and dual loyalty (commanders and
subordinates remain loyal).123 In Syria, most military commanders remained loyal while large
numbers of subordinates defected, largely as individuals (horizontal defection). In Yemen, some
military commanders and subordinates within the same unit either defected or remained loyal
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(vertical defection). Bahrain, in contrast, saw both commanders and soldiers defend the regime
(dual loyalty).124
The principal-agent framework within the rationalist paradigm has a great deal of
potential for explaining civil-military relations during political crises. A key strength of the
principal-agent framework is that it explores problems of agency and how principals in superior
positions control the behavior of agents in subordinate positions. Agency theory emphasizes
strategic interaction and punishment during periods of tension and unrest. This approach reveals
how civilians anticipate military behavior, how obedience is not guaranteed, and how the
probability that civilians will uncover and punish military disobedience shapes interactions.125
Albretch and Ohl correctly point to the varied strategic calculations made by high-ranking
officers and soldiers when considering loyalty versus defection. However, there is a lack of
attention paid to the importance of identity (tribal, religious, familial) when assessing military
behavior during periods of crisis. While Albrecht and Ohl identify self-interest concerns for
lower-ranking soldiers (e.g., salary and a limited prospect for professional advancement), they do
not expect soldiers’ preferences to be linked to considerations about the regime’s survival.126
Instead, conditions on the ground influence subordinates, including their “emotions, identity,
relationship with demonstrators, public discourse, a commander’s charisma, and more.”127
Albrecht and Ohl recognize the potential impact of identity and other nonmaterial factors on the
decision-making of lower-ranking soldiers, but choose not to extend this importance to highranking officers. This paper attempts to make precisely this extension. Identity influences
decision-making at all levels of the military apparatus. Even more, in the larger context of civil-
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military relations, identity tells the principal who needs protecting from whom and determines
the direction of the agents.
Based on the principal-agent model in which civilian principals contract military agents
to defend against foreign and domestic threats, this study argues that identity plays a
quintessential role in the level of agency given up and risk accepted. Actors not only consider the
costs and benefits of their decisions, but also how those decisions will affect their wider
communities. In this context, identity is a key variable for the outcomes articulated by Albretch
and Ohl. Patriotism and nationalism, loyalty to a king or royal family, and sectarian ties all help
to explain the outcomes of exit, resistance, and loyalty by commanders and subordinates within
authoritarian regimes. Therefore, identity is a critical variable to understanding how individuals
will behave during periods of political unrest and who within the military hierarchy will remain
loyal. Periods of political instability make decisions of loyalty and defection more acute because
the risk of failed or thwarted defections carry the potential consequences of execution, exile,
arrest, or other forms of punishment against a defector’s community. Identity is connected to
these decisions for a wide range of reasons. Lower-ranking soldiers from poorer areas of a
country may feel a great sense of pride in military service and representing his or her family or
tribe. High-ranking officers may feel that they are guardians of not only a state’s physical
security, but also its national history, tradition, and honor. During interviews, military personnel
rarely emphasize the amount of a paycheck or the array of benefits that accompany military
service. Rather, respondents often characterize service in terms of pursuing a calling, taking up a
responsibility, and honoring a commitment. These concepts depend upon highly developed, and
deeply internalized, notions of identity and self.
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There is a significant amount of literature beyond civil-military relations that directly
supports the thesis of the identity-rationalist model, even though the authors did not directly
apply the paradigm. As identity becomes part of the calculations in the security dilemma and
achieving the preferred outcome, salient socio-political issues are better elucidated. Decisionmaking by political leaders incorporates identity into national security policy, cause/ending of
wars, and civil-military relations, which historical examples also demonstrate. Literature
supporting the identity-rationalist model comes from works on the security dilemma,
nationalism, and leadership.
Examining Cote d’Ivoire, Matthew Kirwin applies the security dilemma to interpreting
the state’s slide into near civil war in October 2002. Kirwin explains that elites engage in
“outbidding” to promote increasingly extreme nationalist positions to garner widespread public
support. As in many cases, extreme nationalist rhetoric relies heavily upon notions of identity.
Kirwin also points to the importance of international actors as they carefully observe conflict
dynamics and gauge threats to their respective cross-border interests. For example, if
neighboring states share a sizable ethnic group across a border, both governments may fear spill
over from the other state’s conflict. For Kirwin, this expanded application of the security
dilemma falls under the Stephen Saideman’s definition of security, which includes economic,
physical, and political security.128 This redefinition of the security dilemma allows for its
application to a greater number and range of cases where a multiplicity of actors and interests
complicate straightforward interpretations of conflict.
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Other scholars apply the security dilemma to understanding identity issues and conflict in
equally creative and rigorous ways. Jennifer Mitzen articulates the concept of ontological
security, or security of the self, where individuals routinize relationships with significant others
and then become attached to those relationships.129 After assessing ontological security at the
individual level, Mitzen scales up her argument and applies it to states. Like individuals, states
seek the stability of relationships, cooperative or conflictual, where routines become forms of
attachment that are either rigid or reflexive.130 For Mitzen, such interactions shape and help to
explain conflict among states. Other scholars similarly focus on sub-state actors to elucidate state
security concerns and state behavior. Applying the security dilemma to the breakup of
Yugoslavia and relations between Russia and Ukraine, Barry Posen contends that groups
emerging from fallen empires often produce mutual fear and competition. Posen recommends
that outsiders pay attention to local groups’ strategic views if they wish to understand and
perhaps reduce such conflict.131 Which groups fear for their physical security? What military
options remain? For Posen, answering such questions provides windows of opportunity to help
groups feel less threatened and minimize violence.132 Similarly, Paul Roe scales down the
security dilemma to sub-state actors when evaluating the onset of ethnic conflict. The collapse of
multi-ethnic states brings with it the absence of a central government and an anarchic
environment. As a result, ethnic, religious, and nationalist groups are forced into a type of “selfhelp situation much like that in the international system.”133 Apart from analyzing the onset of
conflict, Anders Wivel highlights the difficulty of forming security agreements within the
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European Union, as issues of identity and influence over priorities affect big and small states
differently.134
The above applications of the security dilemma to matters of inter and intrastate conflict
demonstrate how mutual concern over security issues manifest in diverse ways depending upon
the context of the conflict and the actors involved. At individual, group, and state levels,
concerns over other actors’ security capabilities influence threat perception and response. The
above research also shows that notions of identity factor into strategic calculations, sometimes in
surprising ways.
Building upon Weber’s notions of rationality, Ashutosh Varshney focuses on the
nationalism of resistance in ethnic conflict and argues that a combination of instrumental and
value rationality better explains ethnic and nationalist behavior.135 Varshney contends that
rational choice theories are unable to answer fundamental questions in the study of ethnicity and
nationalism. Why do ethnic and nationalist movements grow when the cost of participation is
high? Why do minorities typically feel a stronger sense of group identity than do majorities? For
Varshney, rational choice theories over-emphasize the role of leaders who manipulate ethnicity
or national feelings.136 Instead, a more productive way to interpret nationalist movements in
ethnic conflict is to recognize dignity and self-respect as foundational to nationalism and ethnic
behavior. Dedicated to a set of values, resisting nationalists are able to mobilize, sustain action,
and endure consequences with very high costs, and can do so for long periods of time.137
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Varshney asserts that the “cost-benefit calculus of such behavior does not work in a way that
easily aligns with a standard account of instrumental rationality.”138
This view corresponds with social movement and social identity theories that point to
mobilization to express identity and protect interests. In literature exploring management
dynamics in corporate settings, conventional wisdom holds that interest-based calculations drive
stakeholder group action. This interest-based view is consistent with rational choice theory and
prioritizes self-interest as the basis for group mobilization. However, recent scholarship
challenges this notion and argues that interests do not easily translate into action. Instead, a
desire to express identity and self-interests can drive mobilization.139 Similar to Varshney’s
analysis, interest-based explanations are incomplete for understanding and predicting stakeholder
action when groups pursue lost causes or rewards where the benefits are negligible.140
Contrary to conventional wisdom, Erik Gartzke and Kristian Gleditsch offer evidence
that suggests conflict is more likely among states with similar identities and cultural ties; for
example, Buddhist states are 2.5 times more likely to go to war with each other, everything else
being equal. Moreover, the probability of conflict rises when one group is politically privileged
in one state but a minority in another.141 They measured the presence of politically salient
transnational ethnic groups through language, religion, and ethnicity. In a dyad where one group
is the majority in one state and the second largest ethnic group in other, the two states are more
likely to go to war.142 They state that this demonstrates a “more complex relationship between
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cultural similarity and differences than has been suggested by previous studies…,” but the
authors do not fully explore the complexity.143 Their conclusion, though, indicates that identity is
incorporated into security decisions making, even if how is not completely understood.
In addition to separatist conflict and territorial dispute, individual leaders have a
significant impact on international relations and are also important for establishing the
intersection of identity and security. Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack lament the lack of
attention afforded to the role of personalities, the importance of personal idiosyncrasies, and
human error in the study of international relations. The authors explain that political scientists
typically focus on the anarchic system, domestic politics, and institutional factors more than
individual leaders. For some international relations theorists, a number of specific objections
render the study of individuals moot.144 In contrast to these trends, Byman and Pollack argue that
the goals, abilities, and faults of individuals are essential to the “intentions, capabilities, and
strategies of a state.”145 Comparing Saddam Hussein and Hafiz al-Asad, Byman and Pollack
contend that evaluating the personalities of the two dictators foreshadows, to a considerable
extent, the course of despotic regimes. In the Middle East, where states are uniquely beholden to
the whims of idiosyncratic leaders, Byman and Pollack’s analysis remains especially pertinent.
Individual leaders become relevant to the identity-rationalist model as how the particular leader
views his country will determine strategic behavior and security decisions. For example, Saddam
Hussein invaded Kuwait partially because of his view of Arab nationalism and that Iraq should
lead the Arab world.
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Studies examining audience costs offer additional empirical evidence gathered through
rational choice models and the inclusion of identity. Political leaders make calculations to stay in
power and pursue interests, but domestic audiences have tremendous power to remove leaders
from power in both democracies146 and non-democracies.147 The leverage held by domestic
audiences shifts according to the nature and structure of the political system, but all leaders must
gauge the risks associated with pursuing a given agenda irrespective of a state’s political
makeup. This calculus directly factors into how leaders select allies, protect against internal and
external threats, and plan for elections or other transfers of power. How the audience sees their
identity will inform leaders about their ability to make decisions. During the Iran-Iraq war,
Saddam Hussein successfully rallied the Shia population to his cause against Iran despite being
their co-religionists. Shias in Iraq put their national identity before their religious affiliation,
which allowed Saddam to fight Iran.
Available literatures on security decision-making shows there are a number of
calculations made by individuals, institutions, and governments on when to act during periods of
political crisis. Feaver’s principal-agent model, for example, explores how the civilians as
principals over the military as agents affects behavior, but there is a distinct lack of identity in
this discussion that limits the model’s utility. Concepts of identity like nationality and ethnicity
play a role in decisions, and the literature on nationalism and security dilemma do demonstrate
that how individuals, institutions, and governments see themselves becomes part of the
consideration, whether it is the government turning to extreme nationalism or ethnic groups
competing for control of land and resources. The group’s identity, especially in contradistinction
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to the those outside the group, factored into internal conflicts like in Yugoslavia. Social identity
theories follow this logic in which groups will mobilize to express their identities and protect
interests. Individual leaders also make such calculations, and their idiosyncratic behavior can be
related to how he or she views what their country should be. Audience costs can constrain such
decisions, though, and leaders must also follow to a certain extent how his or her “audience”
views the country’s identity.
What each set of literature lacks is a combination of traditional security analysis and
concepts of identity. On the one hand, the principal-agent model and security dilemma take
threats, stability, and interests seriously, but fail to fully account for the importance of identity
that individuals, institutions, and governments show in their decision-making. On the other hand,
literatures on nationalism, ethnicity, individual leaders, and audience costs incorporate identity,
but they rely too heavily on the concepts because utility maximization is typically present as
well. The identity-rationalist model fills in the gaps to each of these literatures by giving a
parsimonious explanation for security decision-making and the behavior individuals, institutions,
and governments that gives weight to utility maximization, material interests, and identity.

Theory Building Through Case Studies
This chapter exclusively deals with theory development and hypothesis generation as a
means to further the academic literature on civil-military relations. It does so through an in-depth
case study of Jordan’s civil-military relations to explicate a theory on how identity is part of
security calculations. Future research can apply and test the new identity-rationalist model to
other cases in the region and world. The use of a case to build theory is based on established
academic work that offers the same theory building without testing. In particular, Daniel Byman
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and Kenneth Pollack’s “Let Us Now Praise Great Men” offers a theory for future political
science scholars to test. It is widely accepted in international relations and security studies
literature to use case studies for such theory development.148 Case studies allow scholars to
inductively develop theories by delving substantially into an issue, giving real-world context to
unusually revelatory or exemplary phenomena.149 In addition, as the theory developed
incorporates a hard-to-measure construct (identity), a case study is of greater methodological
value.150
Case studies are important for theory building because each case is used “for the
development of a nuanced view of reality,”151 and this means that “case studies are likely to
produce the best theory.”152 Take as an example the theory of deterrence and whether or not it
works in foreign policy. For much of international relations, statistical modeling struggled to
have a “genuine theoretical impact.”153 However, studies of World War I, World War II, Korean
War, Vietnam War, the Falklands War, and Cuban Missile Crisis all had a genuine theoretical
impact. Christopher Achen separated the idea of deterrence from the rational deterrence from
modeling and argued that historical generalization clarifies the complexity of how deterrence
works.154 Rational models overly simplify the problem and change an understanding rooted in
experience to one of abstract analysis. Erik Dahl stated explicitly the practical utility of case
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studies for understanding singular events in the broader context, which allows analysts to assess
future events.155 One of the examples Dahl uses is that a of a terrorist attack. By systematically
studying a single attack, the researcher can thoroughly understand the organization and its
behavior. Modeling may prove simpler, but it will often fall into the “descriptive fallacy.”156 If
individual decision makers do not utilize the exact same process in their mental calculations of
the model, then the model does not apply.157
Peter Feaver also argues that case studies are the better methodological tool for
understanding military history and issues and that such case studies can inform scholarly debates
in political science.158 Important as well, Feaver argues that political science lacks a general
consensus for a theory of civil military relations, and that the literature needs to produce a theory
to test against the data.159 This chapter attempts to do exactly what Feaver suggests should
happen by assessing Jordan to build the theory of the identity-rationalist model. Jordan is the
most appropriate case for studying civil-military relations in the Middle East for practical
research purposes and because it represents the preferred structure for Arab regimes. In terms of
practicality, information from academic literature and media accounts are more widespread and
available to scholars; interviews are also more likely because of the modicum of protection that
the government provides along with general political stability and security. Internecine conflict
in other countries and government structures are less conducive to scholarly research. There are
multiple factors that contribute to Jordan as the primary case study, which include: political
legitimacy, nature of Hashemite rule, lack of natural resources while still having economic
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growth, support from the international community, and social cleavages that did not spread into
the military organization. Each of these factors make Jordan’s polity and civil-military relations
the realistic goal for Arab countries, particularly autocratic or monarchical states.
As Anthony Giddens wrote, “research which is geared primarily to hermeneutic problems
may be of generalized importance in so far as it serves to elucidate the nature of agents’
knowledgeability, and thereby their reasons for action, across a wide range of actioncontexts.”160 This chapter attempts to do exactly this and establishes a theory that will “serve to
elucidate the nature of agents’ knowledgeability.” Case studies are well accepted within
qualitative methodology to build theories, in this case Jordan, that will be tested in the future.
Multiple scholarly texts on case studies as a methodology support this idea, primarily because
quantitative methods are limited in theory building enterprises; they are more useful for theory
testing. Concerning the region discussed in this chapter, Middle East scholars and area studies
specialists utilize case studies to develop theories and ideas entirely devoid of hypothesis testing.
Even within political science, serious scholars that focus on the Middle East do not test
hypotheses.

Part II: Applying the Identity-Rationalist Model to Jordan
Political theorists often ascribe theoretical clarity and parsimony as strengths of
rationalist approaches to political questions. As such, rational choice models employ stricter
empirical tests than do other analytical paradigms.161 Researchers aim to discover actors’
preferences through observation, thereby demonstrating empirically that actors make decisions

160

Anthony Giddens. The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge: Polity Press,
1984), p. 328.
161
Hunter, p. 40.

58

and strategic calculations through rational processes to maximize their preferences.162 The most
effective rational choice analyses are those that identify the interests and goals of actors at the
outset, as opposed to studies that infer them from behavior. Persuasive studies present
predictions that are empirically falsifiable and avoid labeling idiosyncratic behavior or anomalies
as “rational” after the research is completed.163
This section applies the identity-rationalist model to the case of Jordan using extensive
interview data from fieldwork in Jordan. It then establishes the model’s explanatory value and
utility for explaining civil-military relations in Jordan and the MENA region. The identityrationalist model asserts that actors consider identity dynamics when making calculations about
whether or not to remain loyal to, or defect from, a regime. Members of the military,
intelligence, police, and private security apparatuses not only behave out of self-interest but also
make determinations about how their actions will reflect upon and impact their families, tribes,
and larger country. Jordan’s monarchy is sensitive to such calculations and provides both
material and non-material incentives for continued loyalty. Military personnel not only gain
access to special career, health and education, and post-retirement benefits but also enjoy the
prestige and honor of national service.
The value of the identity-rationalist model is not simply to balance self-interest with other
questions of identity. Instead, the model interrogates the conceptualization of self-interest as
primarily (or even exclusively) material. In other words, tribal solidarity, family welfare, and
even certain conceptions of national identity are not necessarily separate from “self-interest.” To
assess these dynamics, the following section draws upon relevant literature and interviews
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conducted in Jordan from April—October 2017 to understand how identity operates within
Jordan’s security environment and historical context. Interviewees include high and low-ranking
members of the Jordanian armed forces, police, and intelligence services as well as retired US
military personnel. Respondents also include cyber security experts, academics, lawyers,
journalists, and banking and finance specialists.164

Socio-Political Factors for Military Behavior/Decision-Making in MENA
Before applying the identity-rationalist model to Jordan, it is important to establish a
foundation for understanding civil-military relations in the Arab world. A number of theoretical
approaches are relevant to the study of military behavior and decision-making in the MENA
region. Some of this works stems from research on development and authoritarianism in Latin
America while other research focuses on challenges to authoritarian systems in the Middle East.
This literature speaks to the nature of civil-military relations in the Middle East and supports the
identity-rationalist model. Recognizing identity as a critical component of security dilemma
calculations sheds light on socio-political factors that also influence military behavior. As such,
this section highlights how the identity-rationalist model compliments recent civil-military
relations research and fills important gaps in our understanding of security personnel decisionmaking during moments of political turmoil.
Modern analysis of civil-military relations in the MENA region stems from earlier work
on modernization, development, political transition, and economic liberalization. Daniel Lerner
contends that socioeconomic modernization (e.g., urbanization, industrialization, literacy, and
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media participation) leads to greater political participation.165 Modernization theory predicts that
as ‘pre-modern’ or ‘traditional’ societies undergo processes of social evolution, traditional
beliefs and cultural characteristics become less pronounced. The individual gains greater agency
and replaces families, tribes, or communities as the primary unit of society. This, in turn,
advances Third World states toward industrial prosperity and liberal democracy because
individuals increasingly push for social and technological development.166
In contrast, Samuel Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies argues that
socioeconomic modernization increases political instability as new groups compete in social and
political arenas.167 Because armies in the postcolonial world are usually the most
institutionalized segment of the state apparatus, the absence of wider political institutionalization
can lead both to political and social instability and favors military-led authoritarianism.168
Specific to authoritarian regimes and democratic transitions in Latin America, O’Donnell and
Schmitter observe that while the degree of military penetration of the polity and society varies
across regimes, military leaders routinely make strategic decisions about how and when to
intervene in politics. For instance, when the armed forces lack both a connection and a
responsibility toward regime policies, it is easier for them to stay away from the instability and
conflict of the transition by declaring themselves protectors of public order and national
security.169 Yet even when militaries avoid egregious intrusions into political systems, problems
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tend to arise when either the institutional interests of the armed forces are threatened,170 or when
civilian leaders select to install and uphold nondemocratic regimes. In such cases, the armed
forces work to protect their privileged positions in society and civilians maneuver to guard or
expand their interests. Thus, the decay of the previous political system leads to the emergence of
new and competing factions where differing priorities increase the potential for conflict.
Recent scholarship has increasingly focused on the link between the Arab uprisings,
armed forces, and civil-military relations. Derek Lutterbeck explains that while military forces
have been central actors in the Arab uprisings, they have responded quite differently to
prodemocracy movements, ranging from support for protest movements, to internal fracturing, to
strong backing of the regime in power.171 Lutterbeck argues that these differences can be
explained with reference to different forms of civil-military relationships and unique
characteristics of the military apparatus. More specifically, the degree of institutionalization of
the armed forces and their relationship to society at large can account for the divergent responses
to pro-reform movements.172 High levels of institutionalization require security forces to be
meritocratic, apolitical, free of favoritism and corruption, and committed to the national interest.
Low levels of institutionalization entails security forces based on tribal or family ties to the
regime, highly ideological and politicized, as well as susceptible to favoritism and corruption.173
Problematically, Lutterbeck’s emphasis on military institutionalization as a determinant
of successful democracy movements fails to align with recent developments. Lutterbeck
classifies both the Egyptian and Tunisian militaries as security forces that have relatively high
degrees of institutionalization, with Tunisia’s military as the more institutionalized of the two.
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Lutterbeck concludes that a “strong connection between the armed forces and society has led to
(relative) openness to reform movements—again with the Tunisian military showing a greater
degree of openness than its Egyptian counterpart.”174 However, Lutterbeck’s notion of
institutionalization of the armed forces lacks an adequate explanation of the Egyptian military’s
willingness to back or defect from a regime. Egypt’s recent democratic reversal included the
2013 overthrow of democratically elected President Mohamed Morsi and the installment of
Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces Abdel Fattah el-Sisi as president. Egypt’s military
leadership entered into the political arena when its interests were threatened. Such action appears
unrelated to the level of institutionalization of the armed forces because key decisions of loyalty
and defection never went beyond a core group of military elites.
Traditional approaches to the study of political transition focus on political elites and
view the military as one of the most powerful groups in society. More recent work on civilmilitary relations in the MENA region examines the economic resource base of the military,
including its sections and factions. Yet these sections and factions neither determine military
action (as in structuralist theory), nor is their importance neglected (as in institutionalist
approaches).175 This approach assumes that by studying deep socioeconomic and political
change, including socioeconomic order and social redistribution, we can better understand
processes of national transformation.176
The identity-rationalist model recognizes the importance of the social and political
context within which civil-military relations transpire. However, it prioritizes the role of
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individual decision-making in shaping outcomes over the structural or institutional features of
society. Interpreting how autocrats manage threats to their power demonstrates the utility of the
identity-rationalist approach. Political systems in the Middle East routinely use a mixture of
guided pluralism, controlled elections, and selective repression to manage potential threats.
Fareed Zakaria’s notion of illiberal democracy177 and Daniel Brumberg’s liberalized autocracy
argue that this mixture is not simply a “survival strategy” but a “type of political system whose
institutions, rules, and logic defy any linear model of democratization.”178 Still, autocrats must
decide how to balance these competing interests and defend against threats. The subsequent
political system is a direct result of strategic decision-making.
Building upon the above literature, incorporating identity into a rationalist approach
shows the value of the identity-rationalist model in interpreting civil-military relations in the
MENA region. Lerner’s modernization theory predicts that developing states will move toward
liberal democracy as they achieve social and technological development. Yet Learner’s approach
largely ignores the persistence and importance of communal or tribal identity in developing
states irrespective of technological advances. Huntington’s alternative view that socioeconomic
modernization will increase political instability more accurately aligns with recent history.
Following the Arab Spring, many Arab states witnessed increasing competition over state
resources and political power. The identity-rationalist model adds to this perspective by arguing
that part of the reason such competition increased is because Arab societies were also contesting
notions of national identity during their respective political transitions (e.g., in Tunisia and
Egypt).
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Similarly, O’Donnell and Schmitter contend that armed forces are often predisposed to
protecting the public order and national security. The identity-rationalist model accounts for this
behavior by emphasizing the ways in which armed forces are committed to various notions of
national identity as opposed to merely acting out of material interests. As noted above,
Lutterbeck’s argument that military institutionalization leads to a greater openness to reform
movement fails to align with recent history. Instead, depending on the context, high levels of
military institutionalization may result in a more sophisticated security apparatus that more
effectively serves the interests of authoritarian regimes. In contrast, the identity-rationalist model
emphasizes the role of identity in decision-making. Security personnel who serve in a highly
institutionalized military may remain loyal or defect from a regime not only because the security
apparatus is institutionalized and sophisticated but also because identity factors into how an
individual views her or his role as a public servant to the nation. While the literature referenced
in this section establishes the complexity of civil-military relations in the MENA region, the
following sections demonstrate how the identity-rationalist model fills important gaps in our
understanding of military behavior during periods of crisis.

Historical Context of Nationalism and Tribalism in Jordan
Those knowledgeable about Jordan’s political and security environment typically
attribute the country’s stability to a three-part relationship. One respondent, who previously
worked as a lawyer, professor, and NGO consultant, explains that there is a “triangle” between 1)
The monarchy and royal court; 2) Prime Minister and Cabinet; and 3) Intelligence services.179
Another characterization of this relationship views the “triangle” as a power-sharing arrangement
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between King Abdullah II, the government, and the security sector, with various actors wielding
more influence than others depending on the context. While King Abdullah II has the final word
over matters of state, this “triangle” manages internal and external threats, balances demographic
differences, and responds to competing demands from Jordan’s citizens and large immigrant and
refugee populations. Understanding this three-part alliance requires an examination of Jordan’s
historical development and tribal makeup. In turn, this examination sheds light on the centrality
of tribalism and nationalism in Jordan’s civil-military relations and decision-making processes.
With the support of British and other European powers, the Emirate of Transjordan was
created following the end of World War I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Under the British
Mandate for Palestine and the Transjordan Memorandum, Emir Abdullah I became the leader of
Transjordan due to his military leadership against the Ottomans during the Arab Revolt.
Abdullah I used his significant diplomatic skills to acquire and sustain the loyalty of the tribes.
Moreover, Abdullah I cultivated an image of prestige and presented himself as a leader who
could unite tribes and settle disputes.180 In the early stages of state formation, Abdullah I
established close relationships with local notables and shaykhs who would later become
members of the government and civil service.181 Abdullah I also “took advantage of the three
main characteristics of society: the notion of tribal solidarity, the tribe as the basic unit
of organization and identity, and the leadership role of the shaykhs.”182
King Abdullah’s grandson Hussein, and Hussein’s son and current king Abdullah II,
continued this tradition of patronage and support with Jordan’s tribes.183 In power from 1952180
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1999, King Hussein’s “authority ultimately rested on the armed forces and the intelligence
apparatuses, which were predominantly dominated by tribal members.”184 A respondent for this
study, and former high-ranking police officer, pointed to this history as a “foundation for the
Kingdom” where Abdullah I and Hussein relied upon the cooperation of the tribes to consolidate
power.185
Given this history, scholars argue that viewing tribalism through the concept of
nationalism best explains Jordan’s state system and institutions. “Jordanian nationalism is
different from Western nationalism and other Arab nationalism. Here, tribal identity is
important.”186 From a security standpoint, Jordan’s internal stability connects to the idea of
‘citizenship,’ which “presupposes the transformation of tribal and paternal ties into a national
identity.”187 As such, the monarchy works closely with ‘traditional’ leaders who function as the
arbitrators between the ‘ashirah (tribe) and the state. This interaction results in the creation of a
national polity where ‘traditional’ leaders provide security and lend legitimacy to the regime.188
In matters of security, discourses surrounding the partnership between the monarchy and
the tribes often reference the formation of close personal relationships. The monarchy aims to
establish deep personal ties with tribal leaders and their family members. A former military
officer in the Jordanian Army explained that King Hussein would remember the specific names
of tribal elders and many of their family members when he would visit them.189 Like his father,
King Abdullah II considers the Army “family.” In the past, in Bedouin communities and other
rural areas, it was a “great honor” to join the military. If a man joined the Army his community
184
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and family would “throw him a party similar to a wedding party.”190 A former senior intelligence
officer remarked that King Hussein was, and King Abdullah II remains, on very personal terms
with the tribes. King Abdullah knows the names of the tribal members and these people believe
in the King. Moreover, when the monarchy faces political problems, the tribes “are the stick his
Majesty shakes” to protect himself against challenges to his power.191
The monarchy continues a tradition that prioritizes the establishment of good
relationships with the tribes. Historically, these relationships helped the monarchy to determine
how to structure security services, how to recruit new agents from various regions of Jordan, and
whom to promote to key leadership positions. On this topic, many respondents considered the
events of 1970s period onward as key to understanding Jordan’s security development. The
conflict between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Jordanian Army shaped
Jordan’s internal security.192 In 1971, three-time Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal was
assassinated by the Black September unit of the PLO outside of a hotel in Cairo, Egypt. One
respondent also pointed to Habis al-Majali as an important example of Jordanian nationalism.
Al-Majali was a long-time military commander who fought against Israelis, Palestinians, and
Syrians. Al-Majali was from the southern city of Karak while Wasfi al-Tal was born in the
northern city of Irbid. Promoting and empowering security officials from different regions of
Jordan allowed the monarchy to balance competing interests among the tribes, reinforce the
regime’s image as impartial and fair, and ultimately guard against defection. However, the
promotion of high-ranking military commanders from different regions of Jordan slowed as
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tensions with the PLO and other groups rose. From the 1970s onward, security was only for
Eastern Jordanians. Security agencies always thought the tribes would hold Jordan together.193
A former surveillance and cyber security specialist explained that tribalism is an integral
part of not just the structure of Jordanian society but also of the general strategy that the regime
uses to maintain a delicate stability.194 The interviewee outlined demographic differences that
must be balanced to secure this stability by distinguishing between “Palestinian-Jordanians” and
“Jordanian-Jordanians.” The former references Palestinian citizens, immigrants, or refugees
living in Jordan; or Palestinians and their descendants who are fully naturalized Jordanian
citizens. The latter refers to Jordanians who are descendants of major tribes in the historical cities
and towns in Transjordan (e.g., Al Karak, Ajlun, Amman, Aqaba, Balqa, Irbid, Jerash, Madaba,
etc.).195 Because of varying levels of tension between the two groups, the monarchy works to
empower both groups and maintain civil organization. Allowing one group to clearly dominate in
social, political, economic, or security sectors would risk the onset of political instability, and
within the military, defection. Thus, “loyalty is first to tribe, then to King. The concept of
citizenship is very skewed because of tribalism.”196 In other words, encouraging loyalty to one’s
tribe and the monarchy minimizes the tension that can arise as a result of identifying as
Palestinian-Jordanian or Jordanian-Jordanian.
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Arab Uprisings and Regime Decision-Making
The onset and outcomes of the Arab Uprisings in Jordan and the wider Middle East and
North Africa are well documented. However, due to the sensitive nature of security-related
topics across the MENA region, fewer studies attempt to gauge political and military decisionmaking during this period. My interviews provide evidence that the Jordanian armed forces and
intelligence services skillfully maneuvered threats to King Abdullah II’s power. In addition to
King Abdullah’s promise of political reforms, minimizing tribal differences, expressing notions
of shared identity, and non-violent tactics stand out as successful examples of such maneuvering.
In the wake of protests, King Abdullah II reshuffled cabinet personnel and promised a
number of political reforms. On February 1, 2011, Abdullah II fired his cabinet and appointed
retired general and former prime minister Marouf al-Bakhit as the new prime minister. This
move appeared to be a concession to protesters’ dissatisfaction with the previous prime minister,
Samir Rifai, who failed to alleviate Jordan’s economic problems.197 Prior to al-Bakhit’s
appointment, on January 20, 2011, Prime Minister Rifai presented a $230 million package in the
2011 budget to expand bread subsidies, decrease fuel prices, and spur economic growth. Protests
continued despite this proposal, which led Rifai to up the amount of the package to $550 million.
The new measure, which subsidized fuel and staple products like rice and sugar, also failed. As a
result, Rifai was removed from his position.198 The appointment of al-Bakhit intended to
alleviate pressure from the protests. Yet analysts interpret this move as a re-affirmation of the
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King’s “commitment to the status quo,” as al-Bakhit was “decidedly a member of the ‘old
guard.’”199
Along with changes in personnel, King Abdullah II created an institutional measure to
quell protests. In March 2011, King Abdullah II tasked the National Dialogue Committee with
revising the electoral law and the Political Parties Law, and amend the constitution. As a whole,
King Abdullah II vowed to reform parliament, increase active political party participation in the
parliament, fight corruption, and promote democracy.200 Dissatisfied with the National Dialogue
Committee and its June 2011 proposals for elections, opposition codified into a political coalition
and established the National Front for Reform (NFR). The NFR called for the “rule of law” in
Jordan, “demanded constitutional amendments, government accountability, anticorruption
efforts, a guarantee of press freedoms, and improvements in the educational system, as well as
economic, judicial, and security reforms.”201 Ultimately, opposition movements were unable to
maintain momentum and their demands went largely unmet. This is partially due to the fact that
the regime avoided direct, violent confrontation with protesters, which likely would have
inflamed tensions further.
King Abdullah II’s public statements and proposals were calibrated with behind-thescenes instructions to his security officials on how to confront and manage protesters. These
instructions were a combination of strategic calculations on behalf of a regime focused on
survival, but also instructions sensitive to the tribal and national dynamics of Jordan. The
regime’s response to protests was one of caution and restraint. From a civilian perspective, a
former journalist explained that the military stayed out of the protest as a last resort, but that the
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police engaged protesters and gave them water and juice. The respondent articulated that the
“police had a good strategy” of non-confrontation in order to “decrease the anger of the people
on the streets.” The police were trying to show the protesters that they were “with them and not
against them.”202 A former credit analyst echoed this characterization and said that both the
military and government “were very cautious” and wanted to avoid engaging the wrong groups.
The security forces wanted to project an image that “this does not happen in Jordan.”203 The
interviewee also mentioned that security officials maintained calm despite the presence of an
anti-demonstration group from Salt (a city near Amman) that came to Amman and threw rocks at
protesters because they wanted the protests to end. Several shots were fired but the Jordanian
government played it “very smart, well.”204
From the perspective of security officials, a former military officer in the Jordanian Army
concluded that “the King played it well” by allowing demonstrations and instructing the security
agencies not to interfere.205 The respondent explained that Jordan is a “web of people” made up
of Circassians, Kurds, Armenians, Iraqis, and Palestinians. To balance group dynamics, security
agencies, used a “soft security” approach where protesters were treated with respect and given
water and bread by police. However, the “soft security” approach had two effects: one positive
and one negative. On the one hand, it stopped the revolt. On the other hand, the “soft security”
approach diminished respect for (and fear of) security agencies for those who viewed this
approach as weakness from the government.206
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In order to manage domestic unrest, King Abdullah relied upon Hussein Hazza’ AlMajali, who headed the Public Security Directorate from May 2010 to March 2013.207 A number
of respondents for this study credited Al-Majali with the successful implementation of a policy
of non-antagonism toward the protesters.208 Although King Abdullah II instructed the military to
remain outside of protest areas as a last resort, al-Majali spearheaded the effort for police forces
to allow protesters to express their demands. A former intelligence officer explained that some
protests began in southern Jordan and moved north. Protesters wanted jobs, opportunity, and
equality of life. In response, King Abdullah II responded by signaling to protesters that ‘I am
with you,’ which “took the air out of the balloons” of protests. The intelligence officer recounted
how the protest movements lasted from 6 months to one year, but no significant threat
materialized against King Abdullah II. That was a “red line” and after one to two years,
Jordanian intelligence agencies successfully divided opposition movements, “cut
communication” from south to north, and “solved it on the ground.”209 Intelligence operations
infiltrated pro-reform groups, disrupted their networks, and undercut any lasting threats to the
monarchy.
One respondent, who served as a police officer at the time of the Arab uprisings, echoed
both the strategic calculations of the regime as well as its sensitivity to tribal and national
dynamics. The former police officer expressed a willingness to stop the demonstrations if need
be, but also explained that police do not think of political issues only in terms of security.
Instead, “they [Jordanians] are all my citizens.”210 The police did not use violence, e.g., “the
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stick and the shield” but rather attempted to be friendly with demonstrators. In essence, the
police said: “show your message, but don’t go to the ‘red line.’ Then go home.” As a result, the
police removed a “spark” for violence and larger protests.211

Intelligence Recruitment, Gathering, and Tribalism
Managing events like the Arab uprisings requires a sophisticated national security
structure. In many Arab countries, civilians tend to respect and trust militaries more than police
forces. Historically, militaries fall under the Ministry of Defense, which is more resistant to
infiltration by anti-regime elements because of higher levels of professionalization. In contrast,
police forces typically report to the Ministry of Interior where autocrats build up overlapping
centers of authority that safeguard against potential coups and other forms of defection. As a
result, police forces have a reputation for being less professionalized and more susceptible to
corruption. In daily interactions, citizens of Arab countries often remark that military personnel
are more trustworthy than members of the police force. More than these sectors, civilians tend to
both respect and fear intelligence agencies, including military intelligence. Different from
military and police forces, intelligence services are specifically tasked with gathering
information on international and domestic threats. Across the MENA region, this responsibility
has typically been fulfilled with sharp efficiency and brutality. Kidnapping, torture, execution,
and arrest are not uncommon tactics of intelligence agents who apprehend anti-regime actors. As
such, a great deal of care goes into how regimes select intelligence operatives. In Jordan, tribal
and nationalist factors lie at the center of strategic calculations concerning how to structure the
various sectors of the security apparatus.
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One senior intelligence officer remarked that Jordanian intelligence is “smart and
hardworking” and that it relies upon “human” as opposed to “technological” intelligence. The
extensive network of Jordanian intelligence has a ratio of “one intelligence officer for every five
to six Jordanian citizens.”212 This respondent said that most people who are pure Jordanian (i.e.,
Jordanian-Jordanians) have loyalty to the country and the royal family. Each Jordanian family
has one or two people working for the government or for security. “Low-middle” and “poorer
classes” are satisfied with what they have, e.g., “salary, schools, medical services, other
benefits.” They live a “low profile life,” not in the cities, but in rural areas these citizens are
independent.213 Because of the tribal dynamics, the respondent explained that it is not easy to
recruit for the intelligence departments. Typically, intelligence departments recruit from
Palestinian-Jordanian, Bedouin, and other tribes, and attempt to select candidates in a way that
balances the tribal composition of the agencies. For instance, each year intelligence services will
take one candidate from one tribe and two from another, and vice-versa the next year. This
alteration keeps things balanced.214
A different former intelligence officer articulated the rationale for this recruitment
strategy, stating “Jordan is built from families. From an intelligence perspective: if I am from
Jerash, I know most of the people from Jerash. I know people from Jerash more than I know
people from Karak.”215 Thus, Jordanian intelligence services actively recruit candidates from
their home cities, train them, and then embed these agents back into their home communities.
These personal connections then form the basis for effective intelligence gathering. This
respondent described how Jordanian intelligence collects information and “cancels problems
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before they become problems.”216 For example, if a Syrian wants to attack a mall “we stop him.
We have connections with all intelligence services, [e.g.,] CIA, KGB, Mossad. We work on
terrorist issues. I’m talking about ‘pure Jordanians.’” The interviewee expanded and said that the
threat does not come from the US or Israel, but from the Islamists. “We [international
intelligence agencies] work together to be safe. Geographically, we [Jordan] are in the middle of
many problems. Jordan is relatively good because we love the country.”217
Regarding intelligence gathering, a significant number of intelligence officers identified
Islamists as threats.218 One agent bluntly stated that Jordanian intelligence thinks Islamists are
threats. “We followed them from the 1980s until now. We collect all of this information. In [the]
1980s we would ask people with beards to explain what they think, believe.”219 This same agent
participated in intelligence gathering prior to the 1989 general election, the first of its kind since
1967. The agent detailed how he was asked to stop a Muslim Brotherhood candidate from
winning the election. The agent and the team monitored the Muslim Brotherhood candidate
twenty-four hours a day, including all of his communications, travel, and trips to the mosque.
The agent claimed that the Muslim Brotherhood candidate did not win the election because of
their intelligence operations.220 Writing on the 1989 and 1993 elections, Glenn Robinson
provides insights as to why Jordan’s monarchy was wary of opposition groups participating in
elections. Robinson explains that although the parliament elected in 1989 had little power to
enact change in Jordan, “its large contingent of opposition figures, primarily from the Muslim
Brotherhood, acted as a relatively vocal watchdog of government policy.”221
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Jordan’s intelligence gathering and recruitment strategies demonstrate the extent to which
Jordan’s monarchy acts strategically. The intelligence services acquire candidates from a range
of geographic locations with distinct tribal characteristics, and then uses these agents to guard
against threats to the regime. King Abdullah II’s understanding of the importance of these tribal
and national dynamics stems from his family lineage, which recognizes the crucial role that
tribes play in maintaining Jordan’s security. The security services reflect Abdullah II’s
awareness of tribal dynamics and work to ensure they remain on the same page as the monarchy.

Security Dilemma
At the domestic level, security officials expressed an array of concerns related to Jordan’s
current security environment. These concerns correspond to the security dilemma at the
domestic, regional, and international levels. One former military officer articulated a concise list
of these concerns: Domestically, terrorism from ISIS and their sleeping cells; political activities
of the Muslim Brotherhood (although this is changing and was a larger concern in the past); the
PLO is resurgent and organizing in refugee camps; social ills such as drugs (e.g., “Joker”),222
poverty, violence, rising crime and suicides rates, and the diminishing middle class.223 The
respondent expressed concerns over the rise in religiosity, stating there are now “more veils and
more beards,” which, along with a faltering education system makes terrorist recruitment easier.
The respondent also identified the expanding LGBTQ population as a security concern. This
concern is perhaps best interpreted in the context of larger perceived threats to Jordanian culture.
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Security personnel and civilians alike lament the overwhelming influence of Western companies,
advertising (in major cities most signs are in both Arabic and English), and forms of
entertainment such as music and movies. Some Arab citizens view growing (or more visible)
LGBTQ populations as part of this larger cultural transformation. Internationally, the respondent
explained that regional instability is a threat to economic markets, stifles investment, and hurts
growth. As for other regimes in the region, the presence of international NGOs, which
“sometimes go against the government and society,” remains a concern for Jordanian
intelligence services.224
A retired police officer drew the link between external security concerns and their impact
on domestic life in Jordan. The interviewee labeled ISIS’s tactics as “horrific” and that their
atrocities make him think of his brother, sister, and family. “ISIS is making religion dirty. There
is a far distance between ISIS and Muslims.”225 A cyber security specialist linked the rise in
extremism to long-term economic instability, as the economic consequences of major cultural
shifts are unclear.226 How will businesses operate in an increasingly conservative environment?
Will international investors stay or seek opportunities elsewhere? This comparison relates to
Jennifer Mitzen’s concept of ontological security, where both individuals and states seek the
stability of relationships. 227
Dating back to the 1990s, security and intelligence agencies prioritized stopping external
threats from taking root in Jordan. A former intelligence officer explained that Jordan has “many
problems” that originate from outside the country. These threats “terrorize Jordan.”228 From 1996
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to 2006, Jordanian Intelligence succeeded in thwarting “more than 200 terrorist operations and
attacks.” These successes were “not announced to the Media.” The attacks were planned by
organizations such as Palestinian groups like the PLO, Hamas after 2000, Hezbollah supported
by Iran, and al-Qaeda.229 The dilemma, then, is that infiltration of external groups into Jordan
results in minimized security at the individual, communal, and state levels.

Border Security
Many respondents pointed to border security as a top priority for military and intelligence
agencies. One former intelligence officer stated that even before ISIS, Jordanian intelligence had
been worried about the Syrian border for 20 to 30 years.230 The respondent argued that
ethnoreligious factors exacerbate border tensions, explaining that while Jordan is roughly 99%
Sunni, Syria and Iraq have larger Shia populations.231 Here, Kirwin’s application of the security
dilemma to near civil war in Cote d’Ivoire applies. In essence, elites promote increasingly
nationalist rhetoric that relies heavily on notions of identity. When conflict occurs, leaders gauge
threats to their respective cross-border interests.232 This is true for Jordan during the Iran-Iraq
War, the Gulf War, the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, and the Syrian war following the Arab
uprisings. Also applicable is Gartzke and Gleditsch’s finding that violence is more likely among
states with similar cultural characteristics.233 Specifically, if one group is the majority in one
state and the second largest ethnic group in other, the two states are more likely to go to war.234

229

Ibid.
Author interview with former intelligence officer, Amman, Jordan, June 6, 2017.
231
Ibid.
232
Kirwin, p. 50
233
Gartzke and Gleditsch, p. 53.
234
Gartzke and Gleditsch, p. 74.
230

79

Interviewee responses provided evidence of how Jordan reacted to regional conflict. A
former professor explained that after the first Gulf War the Gulf states realized that Jordan was
not a real ally. As with Egypt and Qatar, “politics is done on a personal level between heads of
state,” unlike the West where relationships happen between governments. Because of its decision
to forego joining the international coalition during the Gulf War (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates were all members), Jordan could no longer get money
from the Gulf states. Therefore, Jordan “dug itself deeper and deeper into debt,” which caused
major security problems.235
Weapons smuggling across borders also reveals Jordan’s security priorities and strategic
decision-making. A former senior intelligence officer remarked that after the Gulf War and from
1990 to 2002, weapons smuggling from Iraq “was a mess” and Jordanian intelligence focused on
controlling the border.236 Political dynamics intensified the challenge of border defense. The
respondent recounted how the PLO and fundamentalist groups would tell their supporters that
the Jordanian government should allow weapons to be transferred and smuggled to the West
Bank [to fight Israel]. When Jordanian intelligence said “no,” Jordan was labeled as the same as
Israel.237 Today, Jordan remains a “hot point.” In the west, tensions consistently flair between
Palestine and Israel. In the east, Iraq is only beginning to retake territory from ISIS. In the north,
Syria’s active war continues. The interviewee claims that all three borders are hot and Jordan
“needs an eagle eye to control it.”238 Strategically, Jordan depends on international cooperation
with intelligence and logistics to accomplish this goal. A former cyber security specialist frames
these partnerships as follows: “Always take into account Israel. We can get all the support we
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want to keep Israel safe. Strategically, we have to use that avenue. But ISIS and the internal
growth of extremism are the biggest threats. It didn’t come from nowhere.”239

Analysis
The material gained from interviews for this study provides evidence of the connection
between rationalism and identity. During and after the Gulf War, Jordanian intelligence focused
on weapons smuggling from Iraq and the ethnoreligious characteristics of networks seeking to
advance such exchanges. Following the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty, security officials
profiled and investigated members of the PLO who attempted to assassinate King Hussein for his
involvement in the accord. Currently, Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate (GID) and
military intelligence services investigate resurgent PLO elements and ISIS affiliates both within
Jordan’s refugee camps and larger society. In these cases, and in general, security officials
consider the family name, place of origin, religious affiliation, personal and professional
contacts, and past institutional associations as relevant to assessing an individual’s threat level.
Intelligence services also recruit operatives from, and then return them to, their host communities
precisely for their on-the-ground knowledge of people and families. With approximately one
intelligence agent for every five Jordanian citizens, the reasons for which Jordan remains stable
within an unstable region become clearer. Security services identify and stop threats before they
materialize, a remarkable outcome given that two of the world’s most violent countries share a
border with Jordan.
Different aspects to Jordanian identity are included in their security and strategic
decision-making. Take for instance the domestic threats to Jordan’s security previously listed.
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On one end of the spectrum Islamism and Islam that is too conservative are considered visible
threats, i.e., too many beards and veils. On the other hand, social ills like drug use, social
permissiveness, and perceived sexual deviancy (LGBTQ) are also considered a threat. This
relates directly to the debate between Lerner and Huntington. Socio-economic modernization
either produces stability or conflict. According to the interviews, Huntington proved more
accurate. Modernization led to the liberalization of society and a conservative religious response.
The respondents dislike the changes towards either end of the spectrum, seeing them as direct
threats to the security of the country. The identity of the country matters for its security concerns.
Another aspect of identity in Jordan at a countrywide level is nationalism, particularly in
juxtaposition to the Palestinians. Ethnic identity matters socially due to a lack of assimilation and
economically because of disenfranchisement. Jordanian-Jordanians do not always have affable
feelings towards Palestinian-Jordanians, which inhibits their integration into the security
apparatus. In addition, Palestinians have historically posed a direct national security threat
through the PLO, and they continue to do so as the PLO operates in refugee communities. The
PLO supported the removal of the Hashemite monarchy in the early 1970’s, and this led the
Jordanian military to expel the organization from the country. An opposing ethnic group,
therefore, threatened the national identity of the country, which was intimately connected to the
monarchy. Kirwin’s understanding of leaders’ appeals to nationalism in order to garner support
conforms to this experience as well. Jordan’s government, and even society, can disenfranchise
the Palestinians because they are not “real” Jordanians.
Loyalty to the monarchy is not only about nationalist identity, it is also connected to the
personalities of the individual leaders. Abdullah, Hussein, and Abdullah II all created personal
relationships with tribal leaders and to a certain extent transferred this to individual soldiers. As
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one interviewee remarked, the monarch would try to remember the names of tribal leaders, and
tribes would be proud of their connection to the king. As Byman and Pollack noted, the
idiosyncrasies of leaders are relevant for their governance and behavior, and the monarchs’
personalization of politics connected them to the tribal identity. They treated the military as
family, and this allowed the tribes to include loyalty to the monarchy into their identity. Such
loyalty would become useful during the Arab Spring as the tribal networks were valuable for
quelling hostilities and used for intelligence gathering. Lutterbeck brought up this concept with
his description of military institutionalization. The level of institutionalization will affect how the
security forces will be committed to the national interest or tribal interests. Jordan’s tribes are
connected to a national figure, the monarch, and this becomes conflated with the national
interest.
Interview data gathered for this study demonstrates how security officials are highly
responsive to identity dynamics when attempting to manage opposition movements and threats to
Jordan’s national security. On a multiplicity of levels identity is incorporated into the strategic
decision-making by the military and government, primarily because opposition movements often
challenge the notions of identity the regime aims to cultivate. Whether it is over religion,
nationality, tribalism, or the monarchy, the military, intelligence services, and police will all use
the identity of individuals and communities to determine appropriate policy. How regimes deal
with opposition movements becomes symbiotic with how regimes prevent defection. Security
professionals interviewed consistently discussed opposition movements to create a clear
distinction between regime loyalists and potential threats. They discussed how strong Jordanian
security service are through connectedness, e.g., a national identity that supersedes sectarian
religion. Training and motivation contribute to a homogeneity in the security services that
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opposition movements threaten. Therefore, they pull closer to the regime and are less likely to
defect when socio-political instability portends changes to state identity.
In addition to articulating strategies to undercut opposition movements, respondent
statements also provide insights into how the monarchy structures security services to avoid
coups and other forms of defection. The monarchy utilizes a two-pronged approach to achieve
this objective. On the one hand, the regime uses material incentives such as reliable salaries,
privileged access to health and education services, and post-retirement benefits to ensure military
loyalty. On the other hand, security personnel benefit from non-material rewards like the prestige
and honor that accompany military service. This approach resonates with Varshney’s notions of
“instrumental rationality” and “value rationality.” Actors make decisions regarding loyalty and
defection through strict cost-benefit analysis and by determining the value of holding to identitydriven beliefs irrespective of a decision’s costs or consequences. Jordan’s monarchy provides
both material and non-material incentives to members of the security apparatus to incentivize
continued loyalty.

Future Research and Implications
Case studies allow for the development of new theories and are used to assess previously
unidentified variables to craft hypotheses for testing. They do so by examining causal
mechanisms in individual cases through process-tracing. In an individual case there are typically
a significant number of explanatory and intervening variables, and case studies allow for
inductive observations to recognize the conditions requisite for explaining the outcome. Using
Jordan as the case study, this chapter developed a new theory that scholars can utilize to study
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civil-military relations and other topics within international relations and security studies. For
example, future research can undertake testing the theory through such hypotheses as:
•
•
•

If the military lacks an institutional identity, then the military will be more likely to
defect.
If the military lacks a connection to a national identity, then the military will be more
likely to defect.
If there is an external threat, the military will seek to unite the forces behind an
institutional or national identity.

Although the theory developed in this chapter is applied to defection by militaries, the identityrationalist model could be used to better understand other areas of international relations. For
example, understanding regime decision-making or the causes of war. Such hypotheses could
include:
•

•

•

If national identity is threatened by another actor, the military and/or state will be more
likely to ally with “imperfect partners” (i.e., states/actors whose identity are in direct
opposition to the their own). Historical examples of this are Jordan’s relationship with
Israel or the Afghan Mujahedeen working with the United States.
If the regime perceives the military is likely to defect, conflict with rival identities is more
likely. Typically referred to as jingoism, the identity-rationalist model could give
theoretical support to this as a cause of war.
If a nation-state’s security is threatened over an issue of identity, it is more likely to go to
war. Key cases to understand this could be Israel’s use of force against sub-state actors,
Pakistan’s devotion to keeping Kashmir, and Iran’s “exporting the revolution.”

Future research’s testing the theory will require further case studies and analysis of the identityrationalist model in different contexts to broaden or narrow its scope. However, the model
presents significant opportunities to research and better understand civil-military relations and
conflict outside the context of the Middle East and North Africa.
For example, one of the limitations of this study is that it did not ask respondents to
describe aspects of their personal or social identity. Instead, through the course of conducting
interviews, identity emerged as an essential component of security personnel decision-making.
Participant responses thus revealed the need for further theorizing of civil-military relations in
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Jordan and beyond. To address this gap, future researchers should endeavor to test the above
hypotheses (and others) by conducting interviews with security actors and asking them to
describe their respective decision-making processes during moments of political crisis or military
conflict. Questions should also ask respondents whether or not notions of identity and selfperception factor into decision-making during such events. Subsequent participant responses
may provide the necessary data and variation that researchers can then use to determine the
validity, accuracy, and generalizability of the identity-rationalist model.
In addition, the identity-rationalist model provides theoretical support for understanding
practical foreign policy decision-making, filling a necessary gap between academia and policy
makers.240 What separates this model from grand theories like structural realism is that it can aid
policymakers in understanding individual decision-making by foreign leaders and actors.
Countries and sub-state actors will incorporate their identities in crafting national security policy.
Policy specialists need a general conceptual model to have a logic behind successful policymaking, e.g., deterrence theory with nuclear weapons during the Cold War.241 By studying the
culture, dialogue, and identity of enemies and allies, policymakers can adapt this model to
predicting outcomes of negotiations and conflict. Therefore, the identity-rationalist model offers
testable hypotheses for future research by academics while also creating policy-relevant research
for decision-making in national security.

Conclusion
To guard against internal and external threats, actors within Jordan’s security apparatus
make strategic calculations. These calculations incorporate both rationalist and identity elements.
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Individuals, both principals and agents, are interest-driven, intentional, and gather the
information required to make well-informed decisions. In this way, actors pursue goals in a
manner that increases the likelihood they will reach their objectives. Yet security actors also
account for identity when making decisions about how to evaluate the nature of threats, the
ideological orientation of subversive groups, and the potential reach of cross-border networks. In
addition to responding to threats, Jordan’s security apparatus builds and maintains its capability
by recruiting operatives and gathering intelligence through well-established, identity-driven,
tribal networks. Internationally, King Abdullah II publicly cultivates alliances with commitments
to moderation and mutual benefit as well as behind-the-scenes assurances that Jordan
understands the composition of tribal, familial-based relationships in the MENA region. At the
individual, state, and international levels of civil-military relations, identity informs decisionmaking about how to defend against threats and secure domestic stability.
Interpreting civil-military relations through the identity-rationalist model helps to
mitigate long-standing theoretical critiques of rational choice arguments. These critiques hold
that rational choice approaches are inherently conservative; deterministic; assume material
interests motivate all people; assume that people’s preferences are unchanging; and fail to take
historical context into account.242 The identity-rationalist model recognizes that actors’
preferences change depending upon how an individual views her or himself within a community.
In Jordan, tribal affiliation and protecting one’s tribe stands as a primary responsibility. Actors
within the security apparatus decide how to respond to internal and external threats by
considering the delicate tribal balance Jordan seeks to maintain. There is simultaneously strategic
action to advance self-interests and restraint as an acknowledgement that winner-take-all
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approaches can lead to failed security objectives, as in Iraq and Syria. This combination, of goalseeking behavior and restraint, underlies calculations about how security services operate in
identity-based environments.
In the context of regional instability, the identity-rationalist model presents new
opportunities to interpret loyalty and defection in the Middle East and North Africa. Members of
the police, military, intelligence, and private security apparatuses not only act out of self-interest
but also consider how their actions will affect their communities and country. At times, loyalty
carries with it a nationalist pride in serving the king, or an unenthusiastic acceptance of the status
quo. Defection carries the risk of more violence. In both informal conversations and formal
interviews in the region, it is not uncommon for a discussion about political reform and attempts
at democratization to end with the statement: ‘Look at Iraq; look at Syria.’ The idea is that
people remain intensely aware of the fragility of peace and the proximity of war. Better then, to
understand the limitations of cost-benefit analysis and the persistence of competing interests,
interests which so often fall along lines of identity.
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CHAPTER THREE
MILITARY DEFECTION DURING THE ARAB UPRISINGS:
THE CENTRALITY OF MILITARY INTEGRATION INTO
STATE-LEVEL ECONOMY
Introduction
Militaries generally play a vital role in the survival of states, neutralizing both domestic
and foreign threats. In addition, an integral part of a particular regime’s survival is whether or not
the military will remain loyal during crises. Scholars of democratic movements and
revolutionary politics have placed the military as the most important institution for a state’s
survival, and the success of internal regime change requires either the support or passive
acceptance by the military.243 History is full of military coups in which senior officers overthrew
leaders as a means to protect their conception of the nation, like in Turkey, or eliminate a
perceived threat, like in Chile. During the Arab Spring that started in 2011, the decision by
militaries to remain loyal would help decide if a country transitioned to democracy, fell into
conflict, or maintained stability.244 Although political science scholarship recognizes this
relationship, there is a dearth of literature that explores why Arab militaries remain loyal to or
defect from regimes.
This chapter seeks to systemically analyze a cross-section of Arab countries and their
civil-military relations to understand this relationship. Specifically, this chapter will look at three
potential explanations of military loyalty to regimes in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA). These explanations include military integration into the national economy, military
perceptions of political power, and sectarian cleavages within the military (e.g., ethnic, religious,
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or class-based differences). As such, this chapter will take militaries at the national level as the
unit of analysis to answer the question: under what conditions do militaries defect from
authoritarian regimes?
This question is critical because militaries played a central role in protecting regimes
from the political crises that occurred during the Arab Spring. Faced with pro-democracy
demonstrations, anti-corruption protests, and calls for greater political openness, authoritarian
regimes relied upon militaries to control demonstrations and safeguard entrenched political
systems. Militaries responded by pursuing a range of strategies to engage, placate, or violently
repress demonstrations. These strategies and the subsequent actions of militaries directly shaped
post-revolutionary outcomes across the MENA region.
For example, the relatively weak and apolitical Tunisian military largely avoided violent
confrontation with protesters, which contributed to early social reconciliation efforts,
constitutional development, and the administration of successful elections.245 In sharp contrast,
Bashar al-Assad allowed the Syrian military to fire upon and kill protesters in the early part of
2011, an action that helped create a split between pro and anti-Assad elements within the
military. The hardening of conflicting loyalties among Syrian military personnel led to
widespread military defections and a bloody civil war.246 With the exceptions of Bahrain and
Yemen, Gulf States managed to quell simmering social discontent by increasing subsidies or
dispensing direct cash payments to citizens.247 As a result, Gulf States minimized the role of
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militaries in managing protests and avoided the more severe violence witnessed in other parts of
the MENA region. These examples illustrate how military decisions to intervene, and the degree
to which militaries intervene, greatly affect revolutionary outcomes. Understanding the political
and economic dimensions of military decision-making will shed light on the conditions that
regimes attempt to foster in order to reduce the likelihood of defection.
In this context, scholars have identified military integration into the national economy as
an important determinant of military satisfaction with authoritarian regimes.248 The more a
regime is able to satisfy the political and socioeconomic demands of the armed forces, the more
likely it is that the security and defense sectors will remain loyal.249 In general, “a state that pays
its soldiers generously and otherwise treats them well will be better placed to receive their
enthusiastic protection.”250 Government policies aimed at strengthening military integration into
the national economy come in two forms. First, governments can pursue global economic
integration via liberalization of the economy, trade agreements, and other market supporting
policies in an attempt to spur economic growth. Although there is no guarantee that such policies
will produce a stronger economy, regimes aim to increase state revenue and often prioritize
expanding their defense budgets in order to allocate additional resources to the military.251
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Second, governments can give direct economic benefits to members of the military that includes
education, access to better healthcare, housing allowances, loans without interest, etc.
Authoritarian regimes often use a combination of the above policies to attempt to grow their
economies, allocate resources to key segments of support, and ensure the continued loyalty of the
armed forces.252
While some scholarship has theorized that the incorporation of militaries into the
economy is a key aspect of preventing defection, there is a dearth of empirical work to support
this claim. This chapter aims to offer such empirical support and contribute to the debate over the
nature and role of Arab militaries during revolutionary periods. This chapter will also explore
other possible explanations of military loyalty, including military perceptions of political power
and sectarian cleavages within the military (e.g., ethnic, religious, or class-based differences).
In order to contribute to this field of inquiry, this chapter utilizes a small-n, comparative
case-study approach to answer the research question: under what conditions do militaries defect
from authoritarian regimes? In practice, small-n case-study research blends causal-process
analysis with correlational analysis.253 Causal-process analysis, or process tracing, is the
“analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the
purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally
explain the case.”254 Regarding small-n case-study research, Alan Jacobs explains that “case
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analysts often unpack cases into multiple sub-cases (temporally or cross-sectionally) and analyze
the correlation of suspected causes and outcomes across those sub-cases.”255 Drawing upon these
methodological foundations, this chapter aims to identify the factors that influenced military
decision-making regarding defection during the Arab Spring. The chapter then presents
hypotheses that offer competing explanations for why militaries either remained loyal to or
defected from authoritarian regimes. In analyzing the cases of Jordan, Tunisia, Oman, and Egypt,
this chapter hopes to elucidate the economic, political, and social factors that contributed to
military loyalty, and thus each country’s revolutionary outcome.
Both empirically and methodologically, this chapter builds upon previous work
examining military defection during the Arab Spring. In evaluating Bahrain, Egypt, and Syria,
Sharon Nepstad utilizes a qualitative comparative method and finds that two factors are most
likely to facilitate or obstruct military mutiny: (1) whether troops receive economic or political
benefits from the regime; and (2) whether troops perceive the regime as fragile, based upon the
international community’s response to the conflict.256 Empirically, this chapter offers evidentiary
support for Nepstad’s first proposition and considers a variation of the second, i.e., how military
perceptions of losing political power may affect calculations to remain loyal to a regime.
Methodologically, like Nepstad’s research, this chapter utilizes a qualitative comparative
approach. It also agrees with Nepstad’s assessment that it is difficult to know which factors
“truly had the greatest weight in troops’ decisions” and that “future researchers ought to
conduct surveys and qualitative interviews with soldiers, asking them to identify the factors that
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matter most.”257 Although this chapter lacks survey data, it incorporates wide-ranging interview
responses from military personnel, security experts, and civilians in order to identify and analyze
the key factors that motivated loyalty or defection.
As with any project that attempts to track decision-making processes over time, the
sequence of variables is greatly important for drawing unbiased causal inferences from
correlations.258 David Collier explains that effective process tracing “gives close attention to
sequences of independent, dependent, and intervening variables.”259 Research that lacks rigorous
attention to the sequence of variables risks mistaking the wrong variables as the cause of a given
outcome. The factors that influence military personnel to remain loyal to a regime may be deeply
individual and idiosyncratic or rooted in institutional associations. Members of the military may
value specific benefits of service (e.g., stable income, privileged access to public services, etc.),
or they may take pride in service to the nation. As such, this chapter attempts to account for a
diverse array of motivations and provide a limited but clear picture of each country’s Arab
Spring trajectory.
This chapter argues that the strongest explanatory variable for explaining military loyalty
is the level of integration by the military into the political economy of a state. As such, this
independent variable determines the likelihood of defection or non-defection by the armed
forces. The sequenced causal mechanisms, i.e., the steps between cause and effect, include
whether or not: (a) the economic interests of the military are safeguarded; (b) the regime
threatens these safeguards; and (c) the military is satisfied. This chapter applies this sequence to
each of the country cases and therefore attempts to isolate and minimize intervening variables
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that may skew causal inferences.260 Ultimately, the Jordanian and Omani militaries remained
integrated into state-level political economies, while their Egyptian and Tunisian counterparts
did not, with the outcome being non-defection in the former cases and defection in the latter.

Theory and Literature Review
The theory and literature review portion of this chapter is divided into three sections.
Each section presents differing theoretical perspectives that help frame the specific hypotheses
this chapter will test. Each section draws upon political economy and civil-military relations
scholarship and applies it to the Middle East and North Africa to contextualize the conditions
under which Arab militaries remain loyal to regimes. The sections are as follows: (1) Competing
Perspectives on Arab Militaries; (2) Economic Interconnectedness Literature; and (3) Economic
Benefits Literature.
The first section (Competing Perspectives on Arab Militaries) argues that civil-military
relations scholarship lacks an updated theoretical framework for understanding military decisionmaking in the MENA region. Specifically, civil-military relations scholarship should
acknowledge the broader movement of Arab militaries away from national defense toward
material growth in support of the state. The second section (Economic Interconnectedness
Literature) contends that regimes utilize a variety of economic liberalization policies in an
attempt to grow their national economies and allocate additional revenue to defense sectors. The
third section (Economic Benefits Literature) explores the range of specific benefits that regimes
direct toward armed forces personnel to ensure continued loyalty. When combined, these
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sections offer theoretical support for this chapter’s argument by identifying the specific strategies
and resources regimes employ to prevent defection.

Competing Perspectives on Arab Militaries
There are a number of institutional, political, economic, and foreign policy tools that
regimes utilize to link the vital interests of the military to the government. For instance, scholars
argue that the level of political institutionalization261 and the number of attempted coups262 may
help explain military decision-making in domestic politics. Observers also point to postretirement appointments, financial rewards,263 and comprehensive military economies, or
“military, Inc.”264 as conceivable indicators of political power enjoyed by the armed forces.
Along these lines, research has examined declining military loyalty toward a regime as a
consequence of weakened national economies265 as well as potential responses to such decline
through the use of domestic coercion or the “buying off” of opposition.266 In addition, the level
of international patronage bestowed upon a military establishment to advance common interests
and act upon shared objectives, i.e., “transnational authoritarianism”267 has emerged as an
important area in understanding civil-military relations in the Arab world. Analyzing each of the
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above areas of research helps to provide context to the investigation of military decision-making
during periods of political upheaval.
Theories of the relationship between coercive power and material wealth tend to fall into
two analytical perspectives. Economic interconnectedness approaches view the overall strength
of a state’s economy as the primary indicator of military satisfaction with its economic standing,
which includes such aspects as liberalization and trade. Economic benefits approaches prioritize
the specific ways in which militaries are integrated into the state-level economy. This includes an
analysis of military salaries, pensions, retiree benefits, housing subsidies, public health
insurance, education assistance, and other benefits for service members’ families.268 Both
approaches contribute to determining military satisfaction within a state.
Before explicating the intersection of political economy and civil-military relations, it is
important to understand the structural and political context of civil-military relations in the
MENA region. Due to the proliferation of security forces, nonstate armed groups (NSAGs), and
the widening roles of traditional militaries, existing conceptual frameworks struggle to
characterize civil-military relations in the MENA region. Zeinab Abul-Magd and Elke Grawert
explain that most conceptualizations evolved from a previous era’s theorizing about the
sociology and politics of militaries and are “informed empirically primarily by civil-military
relations in Western democracies and/or Latin America.”269 The authors contend that the fit of
this theorizing has never captured the realities of the MENA region and recent developments
reveal the need for revised theoretical work.270 Military responses to the Arab uprisings, ongoing
268
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conflicts, refugee crises, resource scarcity, and the increased role of nonstate actors and major
powers in regional issues all point to theoretical complexities that remain unexplored.
To address these complexities, theoretical work should first focus on the central
objectives of armed forces in the MENA region. Strikingly, Abul-Magd and Grawert argue that
“material growth and reward have supplanted national security as the raison d'être of these armed
forces and their officers.”271 Moreover, the authors assert that emerging political and class
alliances of militaries continue to push the central mission of armed forces from fighting to
enrichment.272 Whereas Arab militaries formerly championed import-substitution
industrialization, they now embrace “at least some elements of neoliberalism, including the need
to forge business relationships with global economic actors, whether from the East or West.”273
This shift from national defense to economic enterprise is dramatic. In the post-colonial
era, and particularly during the Cold War, Arab militaries primarily relied upon financial or
material support from the United States and the Soviet Union. This support allowed Arab
militaries to focus on thwarting internal and external threats to state security. Today, Arab
militaries engage in a range of economic activities, which necessitates a new understanding of
the relationship between the global economy and the primary mission(s) of Arab armed forces.
Following the Arab Spring, regimes have increasingly relied upon the armed forces to generate
revenue. Additional revenue then serves the dual purpose of strengthening the national economy
and providing armed forces personnel with the economic recourses that incentivize loyalty.
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Economic Interconnectedness Literature
Scholarship focusing on Latin America provides insights as to how economic integration
may shape civil-military relations in the Arab world. Over the last two decades, liberalization has
been an important policy because it affects military integration into the economy. Governments
lose a degree of control over the economy, but liberalization frequently leads to economic
improvements and usually includes increasing interconnectedness between regional
economies.274 Interconnectedness refers to the level of trade and capital flows between countries.
Regarding the redemocratization that took place in Latin America during the 1990s, David Mares
explores the extent to which regional interconnectedness of states’ economies acted as a catalyst
for democratic control of the military. Mares explains that many analysts and policymakers
“perceive the historically rapid rates of [economic interconnectedness] among various groups of
Latin American nations as indicative of a decreased security threat environment.”275 With fewer
internal and external threats to security, governments are free to form economic partnerships
with former rival states. Economic agreements create national wealth that is then distributed
among branches of the government and the general populous.
Between states, levels of economic interconnectedness fluctuate between minimal and
complete. This range includes informal or merely rhetorical economic agreements, to limited
functional cooperation for specific technical reasons, to more formal integration of national
economies such as free trade, customs unions, common markets, economic unions, and total
economic integration.276 Mares explains that the general theoretical logic concerning economic
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interconnectedness and international security risks stems from research on trading
relationships.277 Essentially, trade spurs economic growth and material wealth to the parties
involved. However, a security dilemma occurs when one, or both, of the parties utilize the
increased revenue to invest and enhance military capabilities. In such instances, states may
abandon wide-ranging economic partnerships with rival states.278
Mares finds that while international security threats from old rivalries decline under
liberalizing integration, alternative security threats persist.279 Not all actors benefit equally from
the increased material wealth resulting from trade agreements. Instead, the “skewed internal
distribution of the benefits of economic integration may constitute the greatest threat to both
further economic integration and democratic control of the military.”280 When the winners and
losers of economic integration are citizens of the same country, competition arises that
potentially pits hardline regime supporters against reform advocates. Politically, competition
may result in a stalemate and make economic policies harder for the regime to implement. In
matters of security, political factions may openly criticize the regime or rival groups, which may
lead to a regime crackdown on opposition groups or violent confrontation between the groups
themselves. In such scenarios, regimes are likely to close ranks, identify core supporters, and
financially reward key constituencies.
Concerning the Middle East, the effect of economic liberalization on government control
of the military reflects Mares’ findings in Latin America. In the MENA region, economic
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liberalization did not result in democratization. Rather, regimes continue to push liberalization
policies in an attempt to grow their respective economies, and to the extent this occurs, the
regime will direct additional revenue to key domestic supporters.281 In Latin America, Mares
contends that the combination of internal and external threats “poses the greatest challenge to
democratic control of the military.”282 In the Middle East, regimes have long sought to leverage
internal and external threats to consolidate power over their own security apparatuses while also
pointing to such threats as a reason to delay democratic reforms. Both in Latin America and the
Middle East, the link between economic liberalization and government control over state security
organizations remains tenuous. As a result, theoretical work should examine how regimes
attempt to grow national economies and distribute the benefits among their respective societies.
Economic integration by the military is related to liberalization because the overall strength of a
state’s economy is the primary indicator of military satisfaction with its economic standing.
Focusing on the Middle East, there is a debate between whether or not high levels of
defense spending contributes to economic growth and development. Conventional wisdom holds
that large defense and wartime spending diverts resources away from productive investment and
human-capital formation.283 Richards et al. explain that while this conventional wisdom may be
accurate, a counterargument with respect to LDCs is that large defense outlays may stimulate
economic growth. Defense expenditures contribute to growth in two ways. First, they fund heavy
industry (armaments), advanced technology developments, the training of technocrats, and largescale defense industry employment. Second, a large military establishment may garner foreign
281
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aid and investment, thereby strengthening a state’s foreign-exchange position. Referencing
previous research, Richards et al. aver that defense outlays often come with high opportunity
costs because they shift “resources from ‘high-growth projects’ that entail a reduction not only in
public outlays but in dependent private outlays as well.”284 Richards et al. conclude that there is
no correlation in the MENA region between defense expenditures as a proportion of GDP and
rates of economic growth.285 Other studies dispute these findings and argue that large defense
expenditures do in fact enhance economic growth in the Middle East and Turkey.286 Moreover,
defense sectors may be more productive than civilian sectors, likely because defense sectors
utilize advanced technology more often than other sectors of the economy.287
To date, the lack of available and reliable economic data on the MENA region leaves the
connection between defense expenditures and economic development under-examined.288 What
is clear, however, is that irrespective of the strength of national economies, Arab states maintain
disproportionately high levels of defense spending relative to budgets for other government
sectors.289 According to the US Central Intelligence Agency, Arab states occupy nine of the top
twelve positions in the global ranking of military expenditures as a percent of GDP.290 These
rankings use data from 2014 to 2016 (the most recent available). Combined with studies that
examine the pre-Arab Spring period,291 evidence suggests regimes prioritize defense spending
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regardless of the strength of national economies. In this context, regimes pursue economic
liberalization policies in an attempt to spur economic growth. To the extent that such growth
occurs, regimes can provide the armed forces with additional revenue and resources to ensure
loyalty.

Economic Benefits Literature
Generous postretirement appointments and financial rewards bestowed upon military
elites could also signal the degree to which militaries would potentially defect from or support a
regime under public pressure. Hicham Bou Nassif explores how former Egyptian president
Hosni Mubarak (in power from 1981 to 2011) used a variety of patronage mechanisms to
increase the privileges of Egypt’s top brass. Such mechanisms of control included appointments
to governorships, ambassadorships, military advisory roles, government ministries,
telecommunication and information sectors, civil aviation and airports, as well as various
appointments to the bureaucracy. Egypt’s massive administrative state oversaw factories, farms,
production of nonmilitary equipment, and other industries.292 In addition, Mubarak siphoned off
money from Egypt’s public budget intended for disaster management, emergency response, and
other security related activities to pay military and police leaders in direct cash installments, or
‘alawat wala’ (literally: loyalty allowance). Over the course of his roughly 30-year tenure, Hosni
Mubarak made Egypt’s elite wealthy and unanswerable to the law in return for their loyalty.293
Robert Springborg has labeled this type of patronage system “Military, Inc.,” i.e., where
military officials manage a sprawling economic empire that directly owns companies active in
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the industrial, agricultural, construction, telecommunications, and service sectors.294 Moreover,
“officer economies” come into existence as military officers, many of them retired, capitalize on
their regime connections by gaining ownership of privatized state-owned enterprises or by
forming companies that thrive on state contracts.295 Similarly, in analyzing Egypt’s political
economy over the past 30 years, Samer Soliman, in The Autumn of Dictatorship: Fiscal Crisis
and Political Change in Egypt Under Mubarak, details how the Mubarak regime’s failure to
facilitate capitalist development in the country ultimately weakened the state to revolutionary
forces and political change.296 Although published in 2011, both the Springborg and Soliman
pieces suggest that Egypt’s political trajectory is highly sensitive to military involvement in the
state’s political economy.
Another way to try and gauge the degree to which militaries remain loyal to regimes is by
looking at the number of attempted coups. The underlying logic is that fewer coup attempts
would indicate a higher level of military loyalty toward the status quo. During periods of
political protest, coup-averse militaries would potentially insulate the regime from revolutionary
forces. Yet, this view of military satisfaction, and the likelihood of defection or non-defection, is
also problematic. Holger Albrecht explains that coups d’état is a classic indicator for measuring a
military’s involvement in politics. Conventional wisdom holds that regime consolidation
involves the successful application of coup-proofing by civilian incumbents. Such measures are
designed to de-incentivize the overthrow of a regime by power-hungry officers.297
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According to Albrecht, coup-proofing typically entails fostering loyalties among officers
and incumbents through ethnic, religious, and personal bonds; recruiting military personnel from
privileged minorities and mercenary soldiers; counterbalancing divided security apparatuses;
frequently rotating officers to preclude alternative power centers; extending patronage to the
officer corps through economic privileges and opportunities for self-enrichment; and allowing
the stationing of foreign troops as a means to solidify bonds with status quo oriented foreign
powers.298 However, Albrecht finds that coup-proofing in authoritarian regimes is only partially
successful because such actions merely reduce the number of coups and coup attempts. Yet, the
overall risk of coup remains high as long as authoritarian rule persists.299 By extension, then,
measuring the number of coup attempts, or efforts at coup-proofing, would both fail as reliable
indicators of military satisfaction with a regime.
In sum, the previous sections identify the relevance of the following hypotheses by
narrowing in on the most important determinants of military loyalty. First, the primary
responsibility of Arab armed forces continues to shift from national defense to enrichment of the
state. Second, regimes pursue economic liberalization policies in an effort to combat the types of
economic underperformance typically observed in the MENA region. When possible, regimes
allocate additional revenue toward militaries to limit dissatisfaction within security apparatuses.
Third, regimes use an expansive array of institutional and individual benefits to reinforce the
commitment of security personnel to the regime. These factors inform this chapter’s theoretical
approach and help structure the following hypotheses.
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Hypotheses:
The above factors help to determine the different dimensions to military integration into
states’ economies. As noted above, regimes funnel economic revenues and other benefits to key
segments of domestic and/or international support. There is a well-documented record detailing
how regimes combine such patronage, either direct or indirect, with other mechanisms to guard
against internal threats to power while keeping the security apparatus strong enough to maintain
national defense priorities. A systematic evaluation of the potential factors that undermine or
contribute to the loyalty of armed forces toward a given regime form the basis the hypotheses
this chapter will assess. In the subsequent section of this paper I present three hypotheses that are
associated with distinct schools of thought: (1) Political-economic; (2) Political power; and (3)
Military cleavage. Examining military defection and non-defection from these perspectives will
more clearly elucidate the conditions under which Arab armed forces defect from dictators to
support protestors.

Political-Economic School
Building upon Barany’s 2011 classification, Arab militaries are theorized to be less likely
to defect from a regime under duress if a number of economic conditions are met. According to
Barany, a state that pays its soldiers generously will be more likely to receive enthusiastic
protection.300 Similarly, scholars have argued that troops who receive economic or political
benefits from the regime are less likely to defect. 301 However, as an important qualification,
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even the most underprivileged troops are unlikely to defect if they believe that the state is strong
enough to withstand a major civilian uprising.302
Hypothesis 1: If the military is well integrated into the political economy of the state, then it will
be less likely to defect.
Political Power School
Philippe Droz-Vincent explains that transitions are very specific moments in the political
development of a given polity.303 Additional scholars contend that such moments represent
critical junctures,304 or watershed events that destabilize existing political order and produce
tremendous moments of uncertainty that are distinct from preceding authoritarian politics.305
Droz-Vincent further argues that whatever the institutional weight of the military, the massive
political void left by the collapse of authoritarian regimes cannot be entirely filled by the
military. After decades of authoritarian stasis, regime collapses are complex processes that aim
to reinstate political life, and in the context of uncertainty and historical legacies of repression,
“the very context of transition is highly inhospitable to military rule.”306
Hypothesis 2: If the military perceives it is not losing political power, then it will be less likely to
defect.
Military Cleavage School
Political Science literature focuses much attention on sectarian cleavages with regards to
political competition and political conflict.307 On the one hand, scholars argue that the political
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salience of sectarian cleavage (particularly with regards to cultural differences) depends not on
the nature of the cleavage itself, but rather on the size of the groups it defines and whether or not
it will be an asset for political competition.308 In this structural perspective, political leaders
attempt to mobilize sectarian groups once they are large enough to constitute viable coalitions in
the competition for political power.309
Other approaches to understanding sectarianism in the Middle East emphasize the
cultural and historical dimensions of sectarianism and contend that sectarianism is the enduring
default option in many Middle Eastern countries.310 This analysis suggests a certain immutability
of sectarianism, and that Shiite-Sunni tensions, for example, are here to stay, although their
relevance appears to rise and fall with the vicissitudes of the region’s politics.311 Recent
uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa have shed new light on the importance of
sectarianism in Arab militaries, and whether or not the presence of sectarianism impacts military
behavior during periods of widespread political upheaval. Indeed, support is building for the
hypothesis that militaries that are free from internal cleavages (e.g., sectarian or class-based
divisions, or over regime performance) should defend the established political order.312
A brief example not utilized in this chapter is Syria in which sectarian identity figured
into the military’s decision to stand firm behind Assad’s Ba’th Party dictatorship.313 Members of
the minority Alawite sect have long dominated the Syrian office corps, at least since 1955, when
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Alawites increased control over the military section of the Ba’th Party.314 Currently, the Alawiteled regime faces a vast insurgency that stems primarily from the Sunni majority. In the wake of
the Arab uprisings, Syria has arguably suffered the worst violence with President Bashar alAssad empowering his own Alawite community and other minority groups in order to
marginalize the Sunni majority.315 Syrian military decision-making appears to be highly sensitive
to sectarian factors both domestically, and the military is highly unlikely to defect from the
regime for a number of reasons.316 The primarily Alawite military leadership benefits from a
privileged position in Syrian politics and society while the officers largely consider the Assad
regime and Ba’th Party to be legitimate.317
Sectarianism in the Syrian military is further complicated by Assad’s use of irregular
military forces. Berti and Paris aver that Assad has dangerously strengthened the sectarian
dimension of the conflict by relying on paramilitary “self-defense” groups that primarily
originate from Alawite communities.318 These paramilitary forces (referred to as shabiha by the
opposition)319 have reportedly perpetrated massacres and atrocities to “defend” the regime,
which has resulted in greater Sunni resentment against the regime and the larger Alawite
community. Syria stands out as a strong example that sectarian cleavages within the military
heavily factor into how military leaders select to remain loyal to, or defect from, a regime under
pressure.
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Hypothesis 3: If the military lacks internal sectarian cleavages (e.g., ethnic, religious, or classbased differences), then it will be less likely to defect.
Methodology and Case Selection
This chapter will utilize comparative case studies and process tracing to determine the
causal mechanism between the independent variables (political economy, perception of power,
and cleavages) and the dependent variable (defection). Scott Sagan noted his use of case studies
was to answer the question: “Which theory provides better predictions of what happened and
more compelling explanations of why it happened?”320 Case studies are appropriate tools for
testing theories if the theories are already well developed, and this chapter will test already wellestablished theories in civil military relations to understand “why defection happens.” Therefore,
the point of testing the civil-military relations theories is to broaden their applicability beyond
Latin American countries. In addition, Barbara Geddes argued scholars can make valid
inferences from a smaller sample size, and with specific research objectives and appropriate
theoretical focus, case studies contribute to theory development.321
Comparative political research typically does not draw upon grand theories and research
programs as is often the case in international relations research.322 Rather, comparative politics
typically requires different research orientations and approaches to formulate theories, such as
strategic choice models, state-centric approaches, patron-client models, and theories of
international dependency, among others.323 In this respect, comparative case studies are useful in
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deriving new hypotheses and refining theoretical approaches to research programs. Alexander
George and Andrew Bennett argue that case studies provide “powerful advantages in the
heuristic identification of new variables and hypotheses through the study of deviant or outlier
cases and in the course of field work—such as archival research and interviews with participants,
area experts, and historians.”324 In essence, when a case study researcher asks a participant “were
you thinking X when you did Y,” and gets the response, “No, I was thinking Z,” then the
researcher may have a new causally relevant variable that should be considered.325 Thus, if a
researcher asks the same question of various participants and gets entirely different responses,
there may be an opportunity to “develop new theories that can be tested through previously
unexamined evidence.”326 For example, the relevant literature on civil-military relations first
used case studies to develop the proposition that the economic integration of armed forces
increases the likelihood of loyalty and stability. Then the researchers empirically tested the
previously unconsidered variable (economic integration) to affirm the proposition (integration
leading to loyalty). Robert Springborg’s 2011 study of the economic involvements of militaries
and Hicham Bou Nassif’s 2013 study of Egypt did just this.
One methodological problem with comparative case studies is equifinality, i.e., “the
possibility that there may be multiple pathways leading to the same outcome.”327 However,
process tracing mitigates this problem by drawing a line between the cause and effect.328 The
political reality of countries—influenced by history, culture, and economics—means there are
potentially a vast array of possible independent variables. Therefore, causal inferences from
324
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small-n comparative case studies can become problematic. However, process tracing reduces this
problem because it entails assessing and identifying the causal chain that links the independent
variable and the dependent variable. Methodologically, process tracing works by establishing a
detailed narrative of historical and contemporary events from which the researcher may identify
causal links between events and develop a causal explanation.329 This means to test the
hypotheses in the chapter, the analysis will both compare the cases available and show in each
case how the independent variable(s) lead to defection or non-defection. In addition, through
comparative analysis and process tracing, a typology will emerge that describes how the
independent variable(s) lead to defection or loyalty.
Interviews are a key tool used in process tracing. After testable hypotheses for theory
building are established, quantitative methods can be used. Yet studying civil-military relations
in the MENA region with a large-n quantitative methodology is almost impossible. There is a
lack of cross-national quantitative data, paucity of data within countries, and data that is
available is not reliable when it comes to the Middle East and North Africa. These limitations
obstruct the utility of quantitative analysis. To overcome such obstacles, interviews provide
substantial amounts of data that can be used to test hypotheses and identity potential causal
mechanisms. Julia Lynch explains that researchers engaged in process tracing “ideally would
like to be able to make the argument that they have interviewed individuals who can inform them
about the full range of relevant events that happened in the world.”330 When people make
decisions, typically only the outcome is known to other people or society, but the “why” of a
decision is what matters. Individuals will often have different identities and motivations that
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color how they make decisions. By interviewing multiple people from differing socio-economic
backgrounds, professions, and ideologies, this chapter aims to ascertain the factors that shaped
decision-making during the Arab Spring.
Choosing the appropriate case studies for comparative analysis and process tracing can be
problematic due to biases of histories and restricted available information. However, despite
these limitations case studies still elucidate causal mechanisms applicable to policy problems and
other cases.331 The best comparative cases would have all variables in common except for one,
but the real-world cases available prevent the ideal scenario. Differences also allow the test to
follow Harry Eckstein’s understanding of “tough tests” in which most likely and least likely
cases to determine outcomes are included.332 Such an approach is methodologically sound when
focusing on a singular phenomenon, in this instance defection of the military,333 and the chosen
cases should explain the causal conditions and factors of the outcome in order to test the
hypotheses.334 Finally, comparative case studies are an important tool for testing hypotheses
regarding macropolitical phenomena coterminous with the nation-state, which in the MENA
region includes the military. With these issues in mind, this chapter will use the cases of Jordan,
Tunisia, Oman, and Egypt that offer similar circumstances to curb variation while having enough
differences to cover the variety of countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Certain
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structural, social, and economic differences between the four countries make defection more and
less plausible for each country, which establishes the framework to test the hypotheses.
Tunisia and Egypt experienced revolutionary forces that would ultimately remove the
authoritarian ruler and install a democratic government. Of Arab militaries, Egypt has the largest
and most powerful, primarily because of backing from the United States and the size of its
population. Furthermore, the peace deal between Israel and Egypt keeps interstate conflict
limited, so the loyalty of the military to the political regime that maintains that peace makes
Egypt’s civil-military relations more important. Other country cases experienced the Arab Spring
differently. Tunisia represents the only successful case of democratic transition stemming from
the Arab Spring. The country had tangible democratic gains and has not descended into
internecine conflict like its neighbors. In addition, Tunisia has a connection to European history
and culture that incorporates French conceptualizations of politics and governance. This makes
Tunisia an important case for civil-military relations.
Oman and Jordan are both monarchies, but the dynasties differ in their governance
histories. The current Sultanate of Oman dates to 1861, although the larger sultanate from which
it came goes back centuries. On the other hand, Jordan’s emirate was a 20th century creation, and
the Hashemites only really gained control of the state in 1946. Another key difference between
Oman and the other cases is that its economy is almost exclusively dependent upon
hydrocarbons. The other states all have diverse economies. Jordan is also the most important
choice as a case study because if stability is sought after by governments, then it is representative
of the direction other countries in the region are likely to take. There are multiple factors that
contribute to this as the primary case study which include: political legitimacy, the nature of
Hashemite rule, the lack of natural resources while still having economic growth, support from
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the international community, and social cleavages that did not spread into the military
organization. Oman and Jordan’s militaries remained loyal to the political leadership, unlike
Tunisia and Egypt.
There are many differences between republics and monarchies, but these differences are
typically about governance and policy making. The strand of thought that connects most regimes
in the Middle East and North Africa is authoritarianism in a variety of ways, including
monarchical, sultanistic, republican, and dictatorial governments.335 Because these regimes,
especially the ones discussed in this chapter, are all authoritarian by their nature. These
differences can matter for social and security policies. For example, the anti-austerity protests
that started in early June 2018 were limited because Kind Abdullah II was able to blame the
prime minister for the policy changes, which moved criticism away from the monarchy.
President Mubarak or President Ali were unlikely to have this capacity to shift blame because
they are the policy makers. However, this is ultimately irrelevant for military loyalty and
defection based on economic integration, political power, and cleavages. Philosophical and
policy-making differences are not pertinent variables for understanding integration of the
military in economies or loyalty to regimes. Other studies have looked at the differences between
monarchies and republics, and the research largely finds that this distinction provides only
limited explanatory power for the outcomes of complex socio-political and economic events.336
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Another difference in these cases are the size and scale of the protests, but this difference
is also not a relevant explanatory variable for loyalty to regimes. Any protest against an
authoritarian regime threatens the stability of the country and power of the sovereign. If any
group of citizens in an authoritarian regime mobilizes against the government, then the regime
will lose credibility and/or power. This is why even small protests must be neutralized as quickly
as possible. For example, the Arab Spring started with the protest of a single individual engaging
in self-immolation, or the smaller protests in Bahrain almost brought down the regime until
Saudi Arabia’s intervention. There are other such examples in the modern history Europe and
Latin American.337 Because of the relatively fragile nature of authoritarian regimes, the monarch,
president, or dictator cannot tolerate smaller protests. As such, the cases are comparable because
authoritarian regimes often worry about any dissent within their political system and will attempt
to handle the problem.
Besides the availability of current information and relevant variables for each selected
case, the other possible cases for selection have too many factors that would prevent effective
comparison. David Collier and James Mahoney contend that case study researchers sometimes
have good reasons to narrow the range of cases studied, particularly when attempting to identify
heterogeneous causal relations.338 Similar to Nepstad’s approach to studying defection during the
Arab Spring, this chapter excludes a number of cases because “one cannot capture the complex
dynamics of civil resistance and mutiny in all these countries.”339 Focusing on country cases that
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lack overly complex intervening variables allows for a more systematic evaluation of potential
causal relationships.

Case Studies
Analyzing pro-reform movements in the Middle East and North Africa requires a
systematic evaluation of the potential factors that undermine or contribute to the loyalty of armed
forces toward a given regime. In a previous section of this paper I presented three hypotheses
that are associated with distinct schools of thought: (1) Political-economic; (2) Political power;
and (3) Military cleavage. As such, this section evaluates the chapter’s three hypotheses
regarding military loyalty in Jordan, Tunisia, Oman, and Egypt. Depending on the context, the
following analysis assumes that each hypothesis may be at least partially correct. Military
defection and non-defection likely occur for a multiplicity of reasons and a military’s economic
standing, political power, and ethnic composition may all play a role in decision-making.
Therefore, in order to evaluate the veracity of each hypothesis, this section assesses the strengths
and weaknesses of each claim relative to each country and its respective context. Ultimately, this
section hopes to identify the strongest hypothesis in order to explain military loyalty and
defection across the four country cases.

Case Study: Jordan
This section examines Jordan as the central case study to assess the three hypotheses and
determine the explanatory power of the variables. To do so, the section includes historical
information and original interview data from fieldwork in Jordan. Interview material offers
detailed information on the nature of Jordan’s economy, direct benefits of military service, and
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post-career or retirement perks of working for the security apparatus. Evidence suggests that
economic rewards and incentives play a key role in actors’ calculations about whether or not to
remain loyal to or defect from a regime. To assess the impact of material rewards and incentives
on military loyalty, the following section draws upon relevant literature and interviews
conducted in Jordan from April—October 2017.340

Social and Economic Foundations of Monarchy
A brief survey of Jordan’s social and economic development helps bring into focus
military integration into Jordan’s modern economy. Since gaining independence in 1946, Jordan
has confronted a number of unique and sustained challenges to its stability. Various conflicts the
country was connected to or participated in include the Arab-Israel wars (1948, 1956, 1967, and
1973) Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), Gulf War I (1991),341 Gulf War II (2003-2011), the Arab
uprisings (2010-ongoing), and the Syrian Civil War (2011-ongoing). In many cases, Jordan
absorbed refugees, addressed quickly-moving diplomatic crises and shifting alliances, and
adjusted economic policy to respond to uncertain security and investment conditions. Under such
pressures, how has Jordan’s monarchy managed to retain power in a highly volatile region?
Historically, consistent unrest directly affected Jordan’s economic security and led prominent
scholars to question how Hashemite Jordan was “able to weather the high tide of Arab
Radicalism, despite its lack of oil-wealth or independent financial means, and its location in the
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very vortex of the Arab-Israeli conflict?”342 To “weather the high tide,” King Hussein drew upon
the institutional and economic resources that were inherited from colonial rule, or a product of
active reform.343 This approach stands in contrast to other historical analyses that attribute
Jordan’s stability to King Hussein’s famed intelligence, ideological appeal, and diplomatic skills.
In assessing the durability of Hashemite Jordan, Tariq Tell argues that the “received wisdom on
Hussein’s kingdom neglects the political economy that underpins Hashemite rule....”344
The historical evolution of Jordan’s entitlement programs also sheds light on Jordan’s
current political economy. Tell asserts that the “Hashemite Compact” lies at the center of the
monarchy’s resilience. The “Hashemite Compact” is a monarchical social pact that exchanged
political loyalty for the material resources required for the “survival strategies” of the Bedouin
(literally, dwellers of the steppe) and fellahin (cultivators) of Trans-Jordan.345 The resources
offered by the monarchy include an assortment of “extended entitlements” such as “economic
assets, social claims, and productive resources, whose utility is gauged by the tenets of riskaverse moral economists concerned, above all, with socioeconomic security.”346
Therefore, it is misleading to interpret Jordanian society and Jordan’s economic
development through outdated dualities of modernization theory that misrepresent East Bank
society as “a timeless mosaic, subdivided along ethnic, religious, and tribal lines.”347 Instead, the
monarchy’s ability to allocate resources to key political constituencies, balance the interests of
different tribes, and protect vulnerable segments of the population from conflict and harsh
environmental conditions ultimately structured Jordan’s economic development. The monarchy’s
342
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system of patronage was dynamic, responsive to shifting alliances, and negotiated between the
regime and the people with few intermediaries. This historical background helps to frame
Jordan’s economic development and the integration of Jordan’s military into the state economy.
Although Hashemite rule boasts a history of sophisticated patronage, the disbursement of
material incentives for continued loyalty is changing as result of globalization and neoliberalism.
Similar to many developing country militaries, the Jordanian Armed Forces’ original
responsibility was to identify and undercut potential rivals to the regime.348 This role later
expanded as the Jordanian Armed Forces became a main source of employment in Jordan’s
economy.349 In the 1950s, the Jordanian military was the second largest employer after the
agricultural sector. Between 1961 and 1975, military employees increased threefold and made up
one-fourth of the domestic labor force.350 More recently, Shana Marshall argues that as global
development and neoliberal policies resulted in decreased state-led investment and
industrialization, the Jordanian government increased support for the military to maintain its
prestige (and the loyalty of its officers). During the early 1990s, Marshall explains that patronage
policies grew to include salary increases for defense and security personnel, larger pensions,
housing subsidies, retiree benefits, and the consolidation of existing benefits related to public
health insurance, higher education, and subsidized military co-ops.351 Moreover, the proliferation
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of state-funded benefits for military personnel mirrors the diversification of private-sector
benefits for military retirees. Interview responses clarify the complexity and expansion of such
benefits and add detail to the range of perks that lie at the heart of military loyalty.

Jordanian Security Forces and the National Economy
The size of the Jordanian Armed Forces and its relationship to the Jordanian economy is
well known to security professionals and civilians alike. A respondent for this study, who is a
former credit analyst, characterized the military as a “foundation” of the economy with “a lot of
manpower, equipment, and free time that allows the military to make a lot of projects…[the
military] gets special treatment.”352 A former junior officer in the Jordanian Army echoed this
sentiment and affirmed that the “Army is one of the largest employers in Jordan.”353 However,
because the Jordanian Armed Forces’ budgets are secret, it is difficult to discern the extent to
which the government directly subsidizes the military.354 Still, interview responses confirm the
strength of the civil-military relationship in economic terms. A former surveillance and cyber
security expert explained that the “army and government work well together but that this
distinction is blurry in Jordan. They’re not that distinct and separate; the lines blur.”355
Moreover, there is a “co-dependence between the regime and status quo socio-economic
structure of the country. They work together because they have to; they’re part of a whole.”356
Other respondents verify the symbiotic relationship between the armed forces and
government. Regarding the intelligence sector, a former intelligence officer stated that
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“Jordanian Intelligence has a good relationship with the king” and that intelligence officers
“work 24 hours, love the king, and the employees are not bored.” Furthermore, Jordanian
Intelligence officials “give a lot to the country” and that “all the safety and security is because of
Jordanian Intelligence.”357 This statement reflects a broader trend in interview responses that
often stress high levels of worker satisfaction despite a widespread acknowledgement that
salaries are relatively low. In this context, other respondents frame military involvement in the
economy differently. A retired military officer in the Jordanian Army explained that the military
“does not have direct role in the economy. The army is a separate entity. The army’s budget
doesn’t even come from the government.”358 Instead, the respondent said that the army is “only
focused on defense of the borders” unless a disaster strikes and then the army responds to assist
the population with food, supplies, and medical care. Such assistance is considered the “hand of
the king.”359
Given the secrecy surrounding the armed forces’ budget, scholars look to other economic
indicators to trace the contours of the military-industrial sector. Marshall argues that although the
armed forces’ budgets are secret, there remain “a handful of highly visible commercial
enterprises and key export deals [that] might help us determine whether these business
operations are a smokescreen for continued subsidies.”360 Such subsidies reveal not only how
governments are altering their patronage policies to address budgetary pressures but also indicate
a broader diversification of patronage mechanisms.361 Multiple interview respondents referred to
“special projects” where military integration into the economy becomes difficult to evaluate. For
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example, a former journalist affirmed the existence of “lots of special projects” and that one
particular construction project may have been directed at generating profits for the military.362
Although unconfirmed, the journalist recounted a large plot of land that was originally intended
for development as an intelligence compound but instead was converted to $300 million
luxurious mall and hotel complex in the Abdali neighborhood in Amman. The respondent said
that the military may have been involved with the acquisition and development of the land, and
therefore the profits as well.363
Other military projects are more visible and verifiable. For instance, many defense
projects are funneled through the King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau (KADDB),
an independent government entity within the Jordan Armed Forces. According to the
organization’s website, KADDB aims to become a global defense and security research and
development hub in the Middle East region.364 According to promotional literature and recent
research, the Jordanian Armed Forces have engaged in partnerships with at least twenty-six
foreign defense companies to produce a range of products such as prepackaged field rations,
boots, backpack-portable drones, armored vehicles, and modified light gunships.365 Marshall
categorizes the range of KADDB’s operations into five business clusters, including automotive
and industrial, troop products, electronics, arms and ammunition, and supplementary. 366 At the
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national level, the government directly integrates the Jordanian Armed Forces into the economy
through organizations like KADDB. These efforts are supported by King Abdullah II and reflect
the continued expansion into international defense contracts and private-sector partnerships.

Direct Benefits of Military Service
The efforts of the Jordanian government to integrate the military into the national
economy parallel efforts to satisfy the economic expectations and needs of individual service
members. A former intelligence officer stated that military benefits apply to two kinds of people.
First, wealthy and/or well-connected service members may assist their relatives in gaining
promotions or prestigious positions in the government. The respondent cited the transfer of
Prime Minster positions from father to son. For example, although not discussed during the
interview, Samir Al-Rifai, his son Zaid Al-Rifai, and grandson Samir Zaid al-Rifai, all served as
Jordan’s Prime Minister at various points from 1944-2011, with the elder two serving multiple
terms, respectively. The respondent cited instances where “generations pass along power to
younger generations” as examples of military benefits.367 Second, military benefits apply to
poorer segments of the Jordanian population. For instance, “a passport department employees
who makes a maximum of $500 USD per month and has a low level of education may not
receive a large salary, but the medical benefits are big and important.”368 In addition, “lowerclass” military personnel may share “fatigues, clothing, and food with his family.” Such
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individuals “might work for the military for 16 years and then retire and work another job; for
example, private sector security, mall security, etc.”369
The benefits of military service also extend to housing, cars, travel perks, loan privileges,
access to healthcare, and non-material incentives such as respect from one’s community.
Regarding high-ranking officials, a former intelligence officer remarked that if an individual
becomes a lieutenant benefits begin to open up. Salaries increase, and cars can be purchased with
reduced or no taxation. For example, “a coronel gets two cars, housing, benefits from specialized
training courses, and a per diem if he goes abroad. Plus reputation is big; people respect you,
which can help with marriage.”370 Another former intelligence officer commented that working
for Jordanian Intelligence is better than any other government or security department, stating “it
is a good life working with intelligence.”371 This same interviewee acknowledged the limitations
of intelligence service but overall characterized the benefits in a positive light. The respondent
explained that the salary for the military is low and military personnel deserve more
compensation. For example, “military salary is 300 JD [Jordanian Dinar] per month but they
deserve 600 JD.” Still, “King Hussein put Abdullah II as a soldier so that people know he is one
of them. In the end, the military has a good relationship with the people. The Military watches
out for us. We like them. We support them. We know they will never be against us.”372
Armed forces service members also benefit from special access to loans and finance
opportunities. A former credit analyst commented that the military receives “very special
treatment” and that “if a member of the military wants a loan, he gets it.”373 The interviewee
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clarified that military loans (i.e., loans to military personnel) are backed by the government. As a
result, military members have special approval criteria unavailable to Jordanian civilians. That is,
a member of the military may be approved for a loan with lower capital requirements than a
civilian with similar financial assets. Moreover, the former credit analyst explained that there are
“special products we can market and sell to the military. Not just my bank, every bank.”374 The
respondent concluded that these benefits, along with opportunities to travel, get education, and
receive special treatment make the army the “best public-sector job.”375
A retired police officer expanded on the loan benefits available to security service
members and added details to the process. Concerning housing, the respondent explained
Police members’ names are online and when it’s your turn you get a loan. Loans are repaid over
20 years. The amount used to be 20,000 JD but now it’s 30,000 JD. For example, I pay 56 JD per
month on my loan. This is for officers. For non-officers it is less because they have lower salaries
and can’t pay that amount back. For non-officers, the amount is a little more than half that
allowed for officers (roughly 15,000 JD).376

The retired police officer gave additional details regarding healthcare benefits. For instance, “if a
policeman begins service with a 100% physical health exam, but then retires with only 40%, then
his children have additional education benefits because the father can no longer work at the same
rate.”377 The respondent explained a unique dimension of this benefit from a personal
perspective. The respondent stated that “my [child] got an 80% on [their] Tawjihi” (or General
Secondary Educational Certification Exam)378 and that “ordinarily, [they] would not be eligible
to enter the Engineering major with this score.” However, because of the respondent’s retirement
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status from the Jordanian police, the child was able to “study engineering, finish the semester,
and then get reimbursed for the tuition.”379 Lastly, the respondent credited the promptness of
payment as a clear benefit of security-related service, stating “salaries for police and military are
never late. This is a big benefit because even in good private-sector companies the salaries can
often be late.”380

Retirement, Post-Career, and Private-Sector Benefits
The direct benefits of service for active duty personnel are paired with post-career or
retirement perks that reinforce and expand the monarchy’s system of patronage. A former credit
analyst explained that there are two options for military personnel who are facing retirement:
“One, stay with the Army until full retirement; or two, work for a private security company.
Only a few people have other technical training and therefore other [career] options.”381
Furthermore, a soldier’s rank shapes post-military professional opportunities. The respondent
commented that “it depends on rank your when you retire. Average people get compensated
really well; families are medically insured for life.”382 In addition, retirees are “still on a
retirement payroll and education is free up through a PhD. Higher ranks have a tax-free car and
driver.”383 Other respondents confirmed the importance of medical and educational benefits for
retirees. A former military officer in the Jordanian Army stated that “healthcare is free for
soldiers and employees of any other security agency, which is very important. Healthcare is not a
problem like it is in the US.”384 In addition, children of active duty or retired personnel can get
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“special acceptance into universities,” which is considered a “gift from the king.” If accepted, the
government pays for the student’s university costs.385
Many respondents referred to a retiree’s education level as an important determinate for
future career prospects. A retired police officer remarked that “most retired police officers get
post-retirement jobs according to their educational level.”386 Retirees with lower levels of
education often go into private security. Others use the money from their housing loans and use
it for investment. Retirees with higher levels of education can attempt to secure positions in
private companies. For instance, “most go into law and administration and many (or some) go
work in the Gulf. Many have good opportunities.” The retired police officer emphasized that
working for the United Nations is the “bingo” or “lotto” because “they have the best salary.”387
A former junior officer in the Jordanian Army disagreed with this assessment slightly, arguing
that “military officers aren’t marketable. There is only one market: privatized security and you
can’t dictate your career there either.”388 Offering a different perspective, a former cyber security
expert observed that “the more educated and ambitious Jordanians are moving into the private
sector where there are better opportunities.”389 In short, security personnel are aware of both the
challenges and opportunities related to post-service career prospects. Interviewee responses
suggest that the Jordanian monarchy and government continue to offer privileged access to such
perks in order to incentivize continued loyalty from members of the security apparatus.
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Analysis
Initiated in earnest by King Hussein, Jordan’s legacy of economic patronage to secure
loyalty to the regime continues under King Abdullah II. This patronage not only extends to the
broader Jordanian society but increasingly to the Jordanian Armed Forces as well. The military’s
integration into the economy is strong in both the public and private sectors. Armed forces
personnel benefit from a range of government perks, including health, education, taxation, and
finance privileges. In the private sector, retirees gain access to unique employment opportunities
related to law, corporate ventures, international NGO positions, and private security firms.
KADDB stands as a stark example of how King Abdullah II merges active-duty personnel and
retirees to increase the economic standing of the armed forces in the context of broader
liberalization policies intended to grow Jordan’s economy. Evidence suggests that the Jordanian
Armed Forces are well integrated into the national economy.
Interview responses confirm the comprehensive nature of military integration into
Jordan’s national economy. However, while respondents acknowledge the importance of
material benefits of military service they also express loyalty to King Abdullah II is a manner
that extends beyond financial reward. Most interviewees de-emphasized service-related benefits
and instead underscored a broader commitment to the welfare of Jordan. Service to King
Abdullah II, one’s family, and one’s community were recurrent themes throughout the
interviews. These sentiments typically accompanied carefully calibrated realism about the
precarious position of Jordan in relation to the MENA region. Respondents have wide-ranging
experience protecting Jordan’s borders, identifying and neutralizing terrorist threats, and
safeguarding Jordan’s population. This combination of idealism for the monarchy and realism
about the country’s position in a volatile region lead many Jordanians to not only accept limited
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political reforms and democratic openings but also acknowledge (with varying degrees of
enthusiasm) King Abdullah’s skillful navigation through a perilous period in Jordan’s recent
history. For instance, most Jordanian citizens, like most Arabs, lament Jordan’s close
relationship with Israel.390 However, participants for this study point to such alliances as
necessary partnerships to ensure Jordan’s access to military and economic aid, which in turn
reinforce Jordan’s security and political stability. Although love for one’s country may undergird
loyalty to the monarchy, such loyalty first requires that military personnel can provide security
and prosperity for themselves and their respective families. Essentially, members of the
Jordanian Armed Forces express a belief that King Abdullah II is meeting the security and
economic needs of the state. That the regime is able to meet these needs, though imperfectly,
portends the continued loyalty of the armed forces to the monarchy even in the face of political
unrest.
In Jordan, while King Abdullah II retains final say on all matters of state, interview data
reveals the monarchy’s deep sensitivity to military preferences on policy. The military prioritizes
border security, intelligence services focus on internal and external threats to the regime, and the
police take pride in service to the nation through public security. Each branch is aware of its
responsibilities and appears to trust that King Abdullah II supports their mission. While other
autocrats in the Arab world may work to weaken or undermine one branch of the armed forces to
minimize internal threats to the regime, King Abdullah II actively assures security personnel of
their value to Jordan’s lasting stability.

390

Most citizens of Arab countries tend to bristle at any cooperation with Israel. For example, the Egyptian
government faces mounting public disapproval over a recent $15 billion gas deal with Israel, which has “long been
considered by Egyptians to be ‘an enemy state.’” See Shahira Amin, “Egypt Faces Public Backlash After Signing
$15 Billion Gas Deal with Israel,” Al-Monitor, February 23, 2018, accessed February 23, 2018, https://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/02/egypt-gas-deal-israel-public-anger-sisi.html.

130

Important to note, little political power resides outside of the royal family. Although the
Parliament’s House of Representatives is elected, the Senate is directly appointed by King
Abdullah II. All major policy decisions must acquire the king’s approval and the Jordanian
Armed Forces have little formal political power. However, respondents for this study describe a
professional but intense battle for influence with the king. For example, within Jordan’s
intelligence community, specific agencies and representatives vie for direct access to, and
communication with, King Abdullah II. The aim of such interactions is to influence critical
decisions on matters of national security. Unsurprisingly, though, national security and public
policy issues often overlap, e.g., the management of refugees. In such cases, King Abdullah’s
word is final, and the political influence of the armed forces remains limited. Despite this
limitation, interviewees consistently report professional interactions and a good working
relationship with the king and his royal advisors. During the 2011 uprisings, the monarchy
assured the armed forces of their firm position and influence in Jordanian society. The political
power of the Jordanian Armed Forces is curtailed by King Abdullah II, but its foundational
importance to the regime’s survival is readily apparent.
The privileged economic status of the Jordanian Armed Forces parallels its secure but
limited position in the political realm. These combined privileges may also help to quell military
cleavages that potentially contribute to a willingness to defect from the regime. As noted
previously, Jordan’s large Palestinian population has historically posed problems for King
Hussein and King Abdullah II. One the one hand, Palestinian terrorists were accused of
attempting to assassinate King Hussein on multiple occasions for his willingness to negotiate
with Israel. On the other hand, King Abdullah II continues to manage a burgeoning refugee
population (Palestinian, Iraqi, and Syrian) that is sometimes blamed by Jordanian nationals as a
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threat to Jordan’s employment opportunities and economic prosperity. As such, the monarchy
has long endeavored to integrate Palestinians into Jordanian society. For instance, King Abdullah
II has articulated a “Jordan first”391 approach to foreign policy that seeks to minimize internal
cleavages and prioritize Jordan’s leadership role in the MENA region.
Aside from attempts to assimilate Palestinians into the larger population, these efforts
may be reinforced by Jordan’s relative lack of ethnic and religious diversity. The development of
Jordan’s national identity and shared vision for the future is often couched in an inclusive
discourse responsive to Jordan’s large Palestinian population. From this perspective, interview
data suggests that the Jordanian Armed Forces do not suffer from internal cleavages. Rather, the
monarchy successfully incorporates Jordan’s large Palestinian population into the military,
police, and intelligence services. Interview respondents affirm that Jordanian citizens of
Palestinian descent are commonly promoted to leadership positions as part of a larger effort to
solidify loyalty to the regime. Within the armed forces, loyalty to King Abdullah II and to the
nation supersedes any ethnic, religious, or sectarian cleavages that may otherwise lead to
defection.
The case study of Jordan shows a country that has high economic integration, political
power from the military is medium but increasing, and the level of cleavages is medium. The
result of these factors is loyalty to the regime. Jordan represents the strongest evidence for
Hypothesis 1, but only moderate evidence for Hypothesis 2. There were enough cleavages in the
military that Hypothesis 3 lacks support. Jordan’s military is significantly integrated into the
economy through interconnectedness and direct benefits, which is a sufficient factor for their
loyalty.
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Case Study: Tunisia
Roughly seven years after the uprisings that began in late 2010, Tunisia stands as the only
example of a successful democratic transition in the MENA region. By 2015, Tunisia adopted a
progressive constitution, conducted fair parliamentary elections, and elected the country’s firstever democratically elected president, Mohamed Beji Caid Essebsi.392 In assessing the reasons
for Tunisia’s success, Safwan Masri argues that Tunisia is predisposed to democracy because of
characteristics that are uniquely indigenous to the country.393 Masri contends that understanding
Tunisia’s progress requires an examination of the relationship between religion, society,
constitutionalism, politics, and education. At this intersection, Masri argues that “there is a
visibly respectful and tolerant coexistence of religiosity and secularism that is remarkable.”394
From this perspective, a unique brand of tolerance allowed Tunisia to make the necessary
political compromises that fostered effective elections and power-sharing arrangements in
Tunisia’s constitution-drafting process.
Scholars also point to a number of factors relevant to Tunisia’s post-revolutionary
success. These factors include a robust tradition of civil society engagement, high levels of
women’s participation in political and civic spheres, the presence of strong and active labor
unions, and educational reforms that cultivated skills of critical and analytical thinking.395
Demographically, Tunisia is relatively homogenous with respect to religion and ethnicity, which
potentially spares the country from the type of sectarian conflict that grips other parts of the
MENA region. Tunisia’s population is roughly 11 million, with approximately 99% Sunni
Muslim. Christian, Jewish, Shia Muslim, and Baha’i total less than 1% of the population. Ethnic
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demographics bear similar majorities, with Tunisia’s population at 98% Arab.396 Whether
attributable to a culture of tolerance, social characteristics, or demographic makeup, few
observers analyze Tunisia’s democratic gains without acknowledging the importance of the
political sphere.
Following the downfall of autocratic president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in 2011, the early
stages of Tunisia’s peaceful transition to democracy relied upon political compromise. For
example, Tunisia’s largest Islamist political party, Ennahda (Renaissance Party), willingly ceded
power during the constitutional drafting process and formed cross-ideological alliances with
other parliamentary political parties. Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone explain that for the
30 years preceding Ben Ali’s departure, Ennahda’s leaders were heavily repressed, exiled, jailed,
or otherwise marginalized.397 However, Ennahda became a legal political party on March 1,
2011, and won Tunisia’s first free election with 89 seats out of 217 in the Constituent
Assembly.398 In addition to following through on promises of political compromise, in May 2016
Ennahda became the first Islamist political party of an Arab country to drop its Islamist label and
redefine itself as a party of Muslim democrats. Although the name change reflected a political
shift that prioritized the country’s economy, it also paralleled internal changes in policy that
barred “party leadership from participating in religious or charitable organizations or preaching
in mosques.”399 Through such actions, Ennahda is emblematic of Tunisia’s larger culture of
political compromise and civil society engagement.
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Despite a healthy environment of political contestation and compromise, Tunisia faces a
number of challenges to the continuation of its democratic consolidation. Tunisia is one of the
largest exporters of foreign fighters who wish to join ISIS in Iraq and Syria.400 Attacks against
tourists and members of the Tunisian presidential guard confirm Tunisia’s ongoing battle to
manage terrorism within its borders.401 With such challenges, Tunisia’s armed forces remain at
the center of protecting hard-won political gains and ensuring continued stability. Although
Tunisia’s unique composition may undergird its political successes, the Tunisian military
provided the initial security that created space for political compromise and democratization. Yet
the question remains, why did the Tunisian military defect from Ben Ali?
Evidence suggests the uneven treatment of police and military forces played a role in
military defection. More than other autocratic regimes in the region, Ben Ali privileged the
police force while disempowering the military. To protect against threats to the regime, Ben Ali
relied upon the police, which grew during his presidency to between 130,000 and 200,000, or
approximately 2% of the population.402 The exact size of the police force under Ben Ali is
unknown. However, Ben Ali tasked the police with identifying and neutralizing domestic
extremists and Islamists as a critical component of guarding against internal threats to the
regime.403 In contrast, the armed forces remained comparatively small in size, with only 35,000
members in 1985 under President Habib Bourguiba.404 Although Ben Ali expanded the military
in the post-Bourguiba era, he purposefully kept the army separate from political affairs. In
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addition, military expenditures rarely exceeded 2% of Tunisia’s gross domestic product
(GDP).405 Ben Ali’s suspicion of military officers, paired with low levels of military
expenditures, shaped military decision-making during the Tunisian uprisings.
For instance, in contrasting Tunisia with Egypt, the privileged status that Egyptian
military leaders worked hard to preserve simply did not exist. In fact, the Ben Ali regime sought
to keep the armed forces out of politics as much as possible, for example, by banning any
political activity by its members, and by removing officers who were thought to harbor political
ambitions.406 Moreover, Ben Ali, who rose through the military ranks from the intelligence
services rather than the regular army, favored the intelligence apparatus throughout his tenure.
The numbers support this view. Building upon the statistics listed above, while the Tunisian
armed forces count a total of only 35,000 soldiers, the country employees approximately 130,000
to 150,000 police officers – making the Tunisian armed forces by far the smallest in North
Africa.407
Policies that aimed to weaken the military presence in Tunisian politics predated Ben
Ali’s rule. Habib Bourguiba, Ben Ali’s predecessor, had deliberately kept soldiers out of politics
for roughly three decades as president (1957-1987), even banning them from the ruling party.408
This pattern, as mentioned above, continued under Ben Ali. Similar to other sultanistic regimes,
the Tunisian regular military was routinely overshadowed by much larger, better funded, and
more politically influential security agencies run by the Interior Ministry. Despite comparatively
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small budgets, the Tunisian military eventually earned a reputation as one of the most
professional armed forces in the Arab world.409
Thus, military’s role during the Tunisian uprisings occupies a unique role as a key
determinant of the demonstration’s outcomes. While many analysts have focused on the Tunisian
protests and the economic and political grievances that fueled them, other scholars have
examined the equally important decision of military leadership to forgo using force to actively
suppress the protesters. Risa Brooks argues that contrary to arguments that stress the reflexively
apolitical or professional nature of the armed forces, or its leaders’ normative commitment to
supporting the demonstrators, the decision made by military reflected political calculations and
served the military’s organizational interests.410 In particular, the defection of the armed forces
can at least partially be explained by the notion that not only did the military lack a substantial
vested interest in keeping Ben Ali in power, but there may also have been clear benefits in
sidelining him.411 Similar to Egypt, Tunisia’s armed forces were not pleased to see the regime
cutting additional privileges while maintaining high levels of funding and material support to
police forces.412
As Bou Nassif succinctly argues, the conclusion from both Egypt and Tunisia is
straightforward: when civilian uprisings threaten autocratic rulers, military leaders can only
preserve the status-quo as long as their “subordinates in the officer corps are ready to slaughter
their own countrymen in order to prevent political change.” 413 Absent the willingness to turn on
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civilians, the loyalty of the military leadership may not suffice to avoid regime breakdown.414
Yet, as Brooks aptly points out, the decision not to fire upon protestors cannot simply be
attributed to genuine democratic inclinations on behalf of the armed forces, particularly because
of the economic incentives for military leaders to defect from regimes under duress.

Analysis
Béatrice Hibou, in the Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in
Tunisia, investigates the relationship between domination and repression in Tunisian daily life.
As the base of this analysis, Hibou places economic apparatuses and everyday economic
operations as central to mechanisms of domination.415 In particular, Hibou shows how Tunisia’s
debt economy and the systems of social welfare created forms of mutual dependence between the
rulers and the ruled. In such an economic system, corruption, nepotism, and clientelism
potentially constitute one of the main means of political control – if not the main one.416
In this context, the military’s role in Tunisia’s political economy provided a crucial link
to authoritarianism under President Ben Ali. One interpretation of Tunisia’s political outcome
following the revolution centers upon military rivalries. Bou Nassif contends that while the
republican ethos of the Tunisian armed forces is often stressed to explain their traditional
political quiescence, the active hostility of the military’s rivals within the Ben Ali regime
prevented Tunisian generals from playing a greater role in their country’s public life, despite Ben
Ali’s intelligence background.417 Bou Nassif disaggregates Ben Ali’s regime into its fundamental
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institutional components – namely, the presidency, the party, the police, and the military – and
investigates rivalries and alliances structuring the struggle for influence and power from the rise
of Ben Ali to the presidency in 1987 until his downfall. Ultimately, Bou Nassif argues that there
is a direct and causal relation between inter- and intra-institutional dynamics at play within the
regime and the unfolding of events in the 2010-2011 uprising, and that the breakdown of Ben
Ali’s regime is a function of civil-military relations in contemporary Tunisia.418
This breakdown of civil-military relations should be viewed within the context of
Tunisia’s declining economic standing following the 2008 global economic decline, a decline
that put additional pressure on Ben Ali to successfully maintain high levels of military
involvement in the economy. Prior to the 2008 economic collapse, Tunisia had performed well in
comparison to other countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Bradford Dillman analyzes
the economic reform programs launched in Tunisia and Algeria from the late 1980s and seeks to
account for their divergent outcomes. Whereas Tunisian economic policies were largely
successful, Algeria’s resulted in less economic growth. Dillman explains that Tunisia was better
able to pursue policies aimed at stabilizing the economy, reforming the public sector,
encouraging market growth, restructuring banking, boosting foreign and domestic private
investment, and bolstering exports while loosening restrictions on trade.419
Sonia Naccache provides further evidence of Tunisia’s economic strength and describes
that from roughly the mid-1950s to the mid-2000s, Tunisia managed to achieve robust long-term
GDP growth of about 5% per year, against 3.5% only, for the MENA region as a whole.420
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However, Tunisia failed to reduce obvious inefficiencies such as high protection, financial
repression, and a highly regulated economy in general.421 These problems were compounded
with the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis. As a result, Tunisia’s military, historically
weak under Habib Bourguiba and essentially “placed on ice” by Ben Ali,422 had additional
incentives to challenge the military’s existing levels of integration into the political economy.
Not only did the Tunisian military lack access to significant financial resources, but even those
of a strictly military variety.423 More broadly, evidence suggests that a negative correlation exists
between military involvement in a state’s political economy and levels of military
professionalism and civilian control. That is, higher levels of military integration into state
political economy indicate military professionalism and deference to civilian leadership.424 By
the same logic, military defection appears more likely when a military is dissatisfied with its role
in a state’s political economy.
Arab militaries are undoubtedly aware that inhospitable revolutionary circumstances and
a lack of political influence, or the threat of losing existing political influence, can potentially
increase the likelihood of military defection from a regime under duress. In the Tunisian case,
some reports indicate that when Ben Ali ordered the armed forces to shoot pro-reform
demonstrators, the Army’s chief of staff, Rashid Ammar, refused to obey, effectively “saving the
revolution.”425 Although Ben Ali instructed the Tunisian armed forces to deploy to the streets in
order to quell protests, there is little evidence that he ordered the military to fire upon civilians.
Still, significant scholarly attention has been afforded to Ammar’s refusal to align with Ben Ali
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by emphasizing Ammar’s agency and choices to explain how the military was not responsible for
thwarting the uprising.426 More recent analysis, however, de-emphasizes Ammar’s preferences as
well as the traditional apolitical ethos of the Tunisian military, and instead argues that Tunisia’s
revolution succeeded not because of the political quiescence of the military elite, as much as
their frustration over their lack of political influence, which determined the armed forces’ agency
in 2011.427 In other words, the perceived lack of political power, and the potential to lose
additional political power, played a role in military elite calculations concerning whether or not
to defect from Ben Ali’s regime.
Tunisia’s is the only case in which economic integration, perceptions of political power,
and military cleavages were low. Defection by the military during the Arab Spring was
connected to the lack of economic integration and perceptions of political power. Therefore, the
case of Tunisia offers support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. As there were few cleavages, this was not
necessary or sufficient factor for defection, and there is little support for Hypothesis 3 as the
military nevertheless defected.

Case Study: Oman
Following the 2011 uprisings, Oman has experienced uneven economic and political
progress. Since 2015, economic growth has slowed,428 political reforms have been curtailed, and
criticisms of Sultan Qaboos are now more common. Marc Valeri explains that the Omani model
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of political legitimacy is intimately linked to the country’s leader, Sultan Qaboos.429 However,
Oman’s youth feel less indebted to the leader than the previous generations and are increasingly
vocalizing their respective grievances. In 2011 and 2012, Omanis demanded higher salaries,
improved living conditions, political reforms, and the elimination of corruption. Valeri contends
that while the regime met some of these demands, “repressive measures have become more
prominent, with new investments in the security sector and crackdowns on dissident voices.”430
Moreover, political parties are banned in Oman and Sultan Qaboos retains nearly all power on
matters of state.431 These recent developments help to bring into focus Sultan Qaboos’ initial
management of the 2011 uprisings.
The monarchy in Oman dealt successfully with relatively small, yet intense protests in
2011. At the center of these successful efforts were state-directed policies and programs that
helped to ensure contentment among the military ranks during periods of political upheaval.
Sultan Qaboos quickly increased the allocation of property, allowances, and pensions to quiet
potential restiveness. The sultan also perpetuated the bureaucratic role played by various tribal
groups in the military to retain support among key segments of society.
In 2014, Oman faced a unique period of potential transition, as Sultan Qaboos received
treatment for an undisclosed medical condition. Recent reports suggest that Sultan Qaboos has
suffered from colon cancer since at least 2014.432 Moreover, should the 77 year-old Sultan
Qaboos relinquish power, it is unclear who would succeed him.433 After overthrowing his father
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in a palace coup, Qaboos came to power in 1970 and aimed to move away from his father’s
inward-looking and reclusive policies and toward a more open economy that would improve
living standards.434 Qaboos is largely viewed as achieving these objectives. Some estimates show
that Oman has increased its gross domestic product (GDP) from $256 million in 1970 to roughly
$80 billion in 2013. The GDP per capita in the same period rose from $343 to $13,000.435
Such progress is attributed to Qaboos’ decisions as Oman’s absolute monarch, as he
holds nearly all the important titles in the Omani government – foreign minister, defense
minister, finance minister, and governor of the central bank. Not only is Qaboos credited with
growing the economy, but also guiding Oman through periods of rebellion in the 1970s and
resolving the brief but intense uprising in 2011.436 During this initial period, protests in Oman
began surprisingly with the first small-scale demonstration occurring on January 17, 2011, just a
short time after Tunisian President Zine ben Ali had absconded to Saudi Arabia.437 Not unlike
the larger Arab world, the impetus for the protests was popular discontent with the rising prices
of basic goods, widespread corruption, and low working wages. Yet, from this comparatively
innocuous beginning, protests in Oman soon began to grow, with significant escalations taking
place following the resignation of Hosni Mubarak on February 11th and the spread of the Arab
Spring to Bahrain on February 14th.438 To be sure, the relationship between Qaboos and the
military lies at the heart of Oman’s ability to swiftly navigate the wave of uprisings that occurred
at the outset of this decade.

434

Ibid.
“Celebrating a True Vision,” Business Today, March 11, 2014, http://www.businesstoday.co.om/COVERSTORY.
436
Kenyon, “In Oman, The Man Who Has Defined The Country Is Now Rarely Seen.”
437
Worrall, “Oman: The “Forgotten” Corner of the Arab Spring.” p. 98.
438
Ibid.
435

143

Qaboos’ ability to quickly maneuver through political protests may reside in the nature of
Oman’s monarchy. One interpretation of variation in political stability in the MENA region
centers upon regime type. The region’s monarchies, for example, Oman, Morocco, Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have largely avoided widespread
violence and managed to quell political protests with relative ease.439 In contrast, the region’s
Republics such as Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen have suffered the most serious
political instability and violence, with three out of eleven non-monarchical incumbent regimes
overthrown.440 From this perspective, Oman’s monarchical system more effectively allows it to
act quickly and decisively in the face of popular revolt.
This may be especially true when it comes to implementing concrete policies aimed at
thwarting political challengers and ensuring loyalty among regime supporters. Chief among such
supporters are military elites as well as members of the larger armed forces. Moreover, key areas
of patronage concern the allocation of property, allowances, and pensions, all of which Sultan
Qaboos quickly provided during the 2011 protests. At the general level, evidence suggests that
monarchic autocracies protect property rights more effectively when compared to other types of
dictatorships, and even when compared to democracies.441 In monarchies, dynastic succession
and direct influence over the composition of the future elite provide rulers with relatively longtime horizons for their dynasties, thus reducing incentives to expropriate property for short-term
gain.442 In March of 2011, the sultan announced that additional allowances would be given to all
military and security staff. The Social Insurance Pension was also raised by 100 percent and
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pensions were increased by 50 percent.443 In general, Oman’s military expenditures were (and
remain) among the highest in the MENA region at 16.08% of GDP (2012) and 13.73% of GDP
(2016).444
In addition to policies related to allocation of property, allowances, and pensions, Sultan
Qaboos aimed to keep the military content by privileging certain tribal lineages with highranking military positions. For decades, Sultan Qaboos perpetuated the bureaucratic role played
by various tribal groups.445 In particular, the “noble clans of the al-Ma‘amari tribe” retained
powerful influence in the Omani Armed Forces until March 2011, when General ‘Ali bin Majid
al-Ma‘amari, Minister of the Royal Office since 1989 and head of the office of the Sultan’s
Armed Forces Chief of Staff, along with Lieutenant-General Malik bin Sulaiman, Inspector
General of Police and Customs, with ministerial rank, were both removed from their respective
positions.446 In order to deliver meaningful concessions to protestors, Sultan Qaboos purged a
number of high-ranking military officials from their positions while simultaneously safeguarding
his ability to promote loyal members of key tribes – a policy that has been effective for decades.
In 2018, Sultan Qaboos continues to manage delicate and complex tribal dynamics within
the broader context of Omani nationalism. Demographically, immigrants make up almost 45% of
Oman’s total population of 3.5 million.447 Ethnic groups include Arab, Baluchi, South Asian
(Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, and Bangladeshi). Arabic is Oman’s official language, with
segments of the population that speak English, Baluchi, Urdu, and Indian dialects. Religiously,
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Oman is 89.5% Muslim, 6.5% Christian, 5.5% Hindu, 0.8% Buddhist, and roughly 1.2% other or
unaffiliated. Important to note, Omani citizens make up roughly 60% of the population and are
primarily Muslim (Ibadhi and Sunni sects each constitute about 45% and Shia about 5%);
Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists account for approximately 5% of Omani citizens.448
Partly due to this demographic complexity, Marc Valeri contends that Oman is
experiencing a “re-polarisation” of society and a significant revival of communal prejudices.449
Valeri explains that solidarity groups are challenging old notions of Omani nationalism deeply
tied to Sultan Qaboos. On the one hand, solidarity groups stem from “traditional” ties (tribal,
clan, etc.). On the other hand, new groups are forming on the basis of language, community,
geographical or regional origin. Valeri acknowledges that this polarization has long occurred in
the economic realm through clientelism or “wasta.” However, the competition is shifting as
solidarity groups engage in “genealogical and historiographical re-writing in order to calm
suspicions about these groups’ loyalty to the nation and even to overbid in reassurances of
belonging to the nation.”450 Valeri questions the political consequences of such developments on
national identities as well as the potential threat these emerging identities pose to the Omani
national identity constructed by Sultan Qaboos.451 The Omani military is not immune from
demographic shifts or emerging fields of identity contestation. Still, the extent to which Oman’s
civilian demographic composition affects military behavior remains difficult to determine. What
is clear, however, is that at the time of the 2011 uprisings, Sultan Qaboos successfully navigated
Oman’s complex demographics and retained the loyalty of the Omani military.
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Analysis
In the Gulf, Marc Valeri holds that the 2011 “Oman Spring” has shown how the longpracticed technique of “buying-off” tribal references with the aim of preventing any social claim
or the emergence of alternative discourses has reached its limits.452 Still, Valeri contends that the
key element of the new regime’s strategy of legitimization rests upon the nation-building process
implemented since 1970. On the one hand, Oman’s economic and social development is directly
linked to the state (as the administrator of the oil rent). On the other hand, Oman’s development
is linked to the Sultan who embodies the state and has become the subject of a personality cult.
Valeri argues that by initiating a process of nation-building within the framework of a
homogenizing central state, which has unified cultural and religious references, Sultan Qaboos
has worked to legitimize his paternalistic authority as well as cultivate social development
through an extensive redistribution system.453 Despite these insights regarding Oman’s system of
domestic coercion, Worrall and Valeri’s work pays less attention to the central role of the
military in quelling the 2011 protests. More importantly, any discussion of military nondefection in Oman lacks empirical data related to military integration into the state’s political
economy.
Oman’s military, in contrast to Tunisia’s armed forces, has a more stable role in the
country’s political system. Along with international support, scholars have identified domestic
coercion as one of two primary political components to the durability of authoritarianism.454
Oman stands out as a powerful example of effective domestic coercion, both historically and in
the context of recent protests. James Worrall explains that the initial protests in Oman did not
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appear to represent a threat to the regime and were largely brought under control after just four
days before briefly reigniting a month later in early April 2011. However, according to Worrall,
the protests nevertheless had a profound impact on Oman and spurred Sultan Qaboos to action
on a number of fronts — economic, social, and political — restarting a neglected political reform
process.455
Much of this stability is directly tied to the Omani military’s strength. By Gulf standards,
Oman is a significant military power, although its strength lies more in the quality of its military
manpower and training than its equipment strength and quality.456 Oman is also positioned in a
unique strategic location in the lower Gulf and is the largest military spender in the Gulf in
proportion to its GDP. Its military budgets have also steadily increased since 1990. According to
the CIA World Fact Book (2005), it is estimated that in 1990 Oman’s defense budget was $1.39
billion (or 13.1% of its GDP), then $1.59 billion by 1995 (13.0%), $1.75 billion by 2000
(13.0%), $2.4 billion in 2001 (12.0%), $2.5 billion in 2002 (12.5%), $2.46 billion in 2003
(11.3%), $2.56 billion in 2004 (10.6%), and $3.02 billion in 2005 (7.3%).457 However, Oman’s
large military budgets do not necessarily imply formal military ties to corporate economic
interests. Instead, Oman’s individual military officers often receive shares in privatized
companies, serve on boards and state committees, and benefit financially in other ways for their
service and loyalty.458
The broader picture that Oman helps to illustrate is that stable political systems with
predictable and consistent military budgets convey to military leaders that the armed forces face
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less political risk if the regime stays in power. The military’s status in the political sphere is
determined and revolutionary movements that seek to re-establish the political order must
convince military leaders that the military’s respective political status will in fact improve should
the pro-reform movement succeed. This bar is harder to reach in countries where militaries enjoy
established political power, either symbolic or actual.
In comparison to the other cases, Oman has a diverse population with significant ethnic,
religious, and socio-economic variations. According to the third hypothesis, such demographics
would suggest a higher likelihood of military defection, an event which never materialized
following the 2011 uprisings. Important to note, Sultan Qaboos has well-documented history of
promoting members of different tribes to influential, high-ranking positions within the military.
However, these promotions appear to bolster Qaboos’ image as a fair and responsive leader to
Omani citizens rather than indicate a concerted effort to undermine potential cleavage-driven
military defections. Military loyalty to the regime is likely rooted in economic patronage and a
larger societal commitment to the personality cult of Sultan Qaboos. Considering the four
country cases, the third hypothesis offers the weakest explanation of military defection and nondefection during the 2011 uprisings.
Oman’s military has a medium level of economic integration, perception of political
power, and cleavages, which is in distinction from Tunisia and Egypt. As Oman’s military
remained loyal, the higher level of cleavages again limits support for Hypothesis 3. However, the
medium level of economic integration and political power indicates support for Hypotheses 1
and 2. In this case, unlike the others, the perceptions of political power likely were as important
as economic integration. Oman has large defense budget that provide significant funding for the
armed forces, but the military is an active part of Qaboos’s regime.
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Case Study: Egypt
The extent of the Egyptian military’s engagement in, or withdrawal from, the political
arena has always reflected the nature of the regime it served.459 During the 1950s and 1960s, the
military was the preeminent institution in the political process. From the 1970s to late 2010, the
military accepted a subordinate role in a presidential system that protected its interests while also
limiting the direct political power of the armed forces.460 Since the 1952 Revolution, Egypt has
been a state of mutual accommodation between regimes and executive leadership and the armed
forces. The foundation for this arrangement resides in the tacit agreement that the military’s
privileges would be vigorously defended in exchange for the institution’s professionalism,
discipline, and loyalty.461 Following the 2010 uprisings, this long-standing foundation crumbled,
and the military defected from the Mubarak regime.
Why, then, were the programs and policies that successfully allayed the concerns of the
militaries in Jordan and Oman threatened in Egypt during the protest movements? Given Egypt’s
well-documented history of close ties between the military and executive leadership, it might be
expected that Egypt would be less likely to defect from a regime under duress. Yet, subsequent
events ultimately revealed the military’s willingness to abandon Mubarak despite the history of
patronage and benefits bestowed upon the military during his tenure.
One possible explanation is that the military increasingly believed its privileged status
was under threat, even prior to the onset of the 2010 demonstrations. While Egypt’s public
expenditures allocated for the military rose sharply in the 1980s, by the 1990s military spending
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was in decline.462 From 1982 to 1987, military spending as a percent of total public expenditures
fluctuated between 13% and 19%. From approximately 1990 to 1996, military spending
amounted to roughly 7% to 8% of total public expenditures.463
Scholars suggest a number of reasons for the reduced expenditures allocated for the
Egyptian armed forces in the 1990s. One view is that Sadat had actively tried to curtail the
political influence of the military in the 1970s by cutting its budget, among other tactics.464 Thus,
upon assuming office in 1981, Hosni Mubarak felt the need to secure the loyalty of the armed
forces, and increasing military outlays was an effective strategy for accomplishing such a task.
By the 1990s, however, Egypt’s economy was faltering, and opportune conditions allowed
Mubarak to cut military funding. Still, the armed forces had recently begun to invest in various
civilian commercial sectors, which had delivered to the military significant financial
independence from Egypt’s national budget.465
Yet, during the 1990s, the diversification of funding sources for the Egyptian military
could not prevent the potentially devastating consequences of economic liberalization. Under
pressure from the US government, Egypt was considering a host of liberalization policies, such
as increasing fiscal discipline, reducing government expenditures, growing tax revenues,
liberalizing interest rates, liberalizing exchange rates, liberalizing trade, promoting foreign direct
investment (FDI), deregulating the public sector, and safeguarding property rights.466
To accomplish these neo-liberal reforms, the United States and Egypt established a binational consultative council. The partnership created a joint private sector Presidents’ Council,
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including one in Egypt and another in the United States, to advise each government on
opportunities to further integrate bilateral economic ties and advance Egyptian economic
liberalization.467 Ultimately, the Council became an important instrument of policymaking
regarding economic issues affecting both countries.468 Many of the financial corporations
associated with the Presidents’ Council (e.g., Motorola, Citibank, General Electric, Egyptian
British Bank, Fine Foods Group, Nile Clothing Company) had well-established connections with
Egyptian elites as well as deep ties to President Mubarak. Moreover, these crony capitalists were
associated with the President’s son, Gamal Mubarak, who was acting chair of the Egyptian
Presidents’ Council. This fact provides support for the suggestion that Egypt had changed its
domestic base of support from public employees to business elites.469
From a policy standpoint, Gamal Mubarak’s deep and personal commitment to
liberalization reforms threatened the political and social status of the Egyptian armed forces.
These types of liberalization policies would not only directly impact the financial holdings of
military elites, but also undermine the overall political power of the military establishment.
Faced with this threat, defection from the Mubarak regime in 2011 can reasonably be linked to
the declining level of economic integration of the military into Egypt’s political economy. As
discussed above, the level of such integration was diminishing due to neo-liberal reforms and
economic liberalization – policies explicitly endorsed and pursued by Gamal Mubarak.
Following the downfall Hosni Mubarak, Egypt held what were largely considered free
and fair elections. In June 2012, Egypt elected Mohamed Morsi, a member of Egypt’s largest
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Islamist party, the Muslim Brotherhood. Morsi won 51.7% of the runoff votes in the second
round of presidential elections.470 Two weeks prior to the June 30 election, the date Egypt’s
military agreed to hand over power, the generals reneged on their promises and closed down the
Islamist-led parliament. Although the parliament was democratically elected, the military
assumed the powers to make laws, set budgets, and decreed an interim constitution that removed
most of the powers of the incoming president. The military also imposed martial law and
asserted its authority to veto provisions of the forthcoming permanent constitution.471 Before it
even began in earnest, the military contested Morsi’s tenure as president.
While Islamist parties had been routinely repressed, harassed, and jailed under Mubarak,
the post-revolutionary period witnessed a brief moment of democratic opening. That window
quickly closed as Morsi made a number of decisions that appeared to his opponents as blatant
power grabs. According to his critics, Morsi failed on his promises to form an inclusive
government and demonized his opponents as traitors. Against the backdrop of fuel and electricity
shortages, anger at Morsi’s government grew.472 These factors ultimately antagonized Morsi’s
detractors and led to another round of mass protests. Two years after Mubarak’s removal, the
second round of mass protests against Morsi created a path for a military coup that took place on
July 3, 2013. Neil Ketchley argues that the military coup represented “an ongoing process of
elite reconstitution that has since seen Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, a field marshal and former defense
minister, installed as president in an elliptical return to Mubarak-style authoritarianism.”473
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The movement toward, and then away from democracy, signals two revealing
characteristics of military rule in Egypt. First, the military will intervene to preserve its interests,
whether political or economic. Both in 2011 and 2013, the military rode mass protests to
pressure Mubarak to step down as well as justify a coup to remove Morsi from power. Second,
the military is acutely aware of the demographic, social, and religious dynamics that pose a
threat to its long-standing privileged position in Egypt’s political system. Dictators throughout
the MENA region have long feared the power of the “Arab Street,” i.e., mass demonstrations,
and Egypt’s military is no different. As a result, the Egyptian military prioritizes public relations
and consistently receives approval ratings above 80% from the Egyptian public.474 Part of the
reason for these high approval ratings is that the military works hard to respect and identify with
the larger Egyptian society, at least in appearance. Despite evidence of atrocities committed by
the military against protesters,475 the military aims to cultivate an image of responsivity to
protesters’ demands and professionalism as an institution. Egypt’s relatively homogenous
demographics may assist the military in its effort to bolster its image as loyal to the nation.
Ethnically, Egypt is roughly 99.6% Egyptian; religiously, Egypt is 90% Sunni Muslim and 10%
Christian (majority Coptic Orthodox).476 This demographic composition may allow the military
to present itself as loyal to Egyptian society, identify with widespread grievances, and thus
intervene in political affairs in a manner not typically witnessed in the Middle East, with Turkey
and Tunisia as notable exceptions.
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Analysis
In Egypt, Hosni Mubarak had allowed the military to acquire lucrative government
contracts, positions, and business holdings as a way to keep officers loyal.477 As long as Hosni
Mubarak was in power, the military would retain its privileged status, officers would continue to
protect the regimes, and defection would be less likely. However, Sharon Nepstad rightly points
out that all of this was likely to change if Gamal Mubarak took office and implemented
privatization policies that would compromise the militaries business holdings. As a result, there
was a strong economic incentive for the military to side with pro-reform protesters attempting to
force Mubarak out of power.478
Despite Mubarak’s inability to facilitate economic development, in the post-Mubarak era
Egyptian military leaders have nevertheless found a way to keep the lucrative system of
postretirement appointments and financial rewards intact. One reason, as Jason Brownlee argues,
is that US financial and military support has helped to maintain an autocratic security state in
which the 2011 protesters “replaced a ruler but not a regime.”479 Theoretically, then, military
loyalty or defection during periods of political upheaval must account for the presence of foreign
patrons. Indeed, revolution outcomes may be partially explained by the presence of what
Brownlee terms “transnational authoritarianism,” i.e., the notion that authoritarianism is coconstituted by actors from different governments and that officials collaborate to advance
common interests and act upon shared objectives.480 Of course, the degree to which foreign
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economic and material support exists in Arab countries varies widely and therefore cannot
reliably explain why some militaries defect from a regime while others remain loyal.
The extent of military involvement in Egypt’s political economy is revealing. While it is
difficult to know with any precision what calculations Egyptian military leaders considered
during the onset of large-scale protests, it is clear that the decision to defect was partially shaped
by financial concerns. The military stood to lose significant assets if Mubarak remained in power
and successfully transferred power to his son and successor, Gamal.481 Numerous accounts detail
the extent to which the Egyptian military acquired valuable real estate and various industries.482
James Gelvin and Joshua Hammer estimate that the military commands up to 40% of the
Egyptian economy.483 Indeed, the military has, over time, consolidated an industrial complex that
is efficient, well-funded, and produces not only manufactured goods such as televisions,
refrigerators, and cars, but also manages petroleum stations.484 Thus, when the Egyptian
military’s privileged economic status became threatened, the likelihood of defecting from the
Mubarak regime increased.
Perhaps more revealing, the two country cases that experienced defection (Egypt and
Tunisia) have relatively homogenous populations. In the inverse, the third hypothesis posits that
homogenous militaries are more likely to remain loyal to a regime. Within both countries, the
respective populations are ethnically, religiously, and socio-economically similar. While there
are stark divides between rich and poor, Egypt and Tunisia contain majority populations that
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share common class characteristics. These commonalities are reflected in the militaries as well.
Thus, the absence of major ethnic, religious, or class-based cleavages fails to explain military
defection in both Egypt and Tunisia. Because of Mubarak’s failed economic policies the national
strength of the economy is poor, and defection happened even though the military was integrated
through economic benefits. The medium level of perception of political power, therefore, does
not explain defection. There are sufficient factors to support Hypothesis 1 while Hypothesis 2
only has limited support and Hypothesis 3 little to none.

Case Summaries
This section provides a synopsis of the findings of the case studies by summarizing the
conditions and outcomes of each country case according to this chapter’s hypotheses (economic
integration, political power, and military cleavage). As noted previously, depending on the
context, this chapter assumes that each hypothesis may be partially correct. Sedition may stem
from a military’s economic standing, political power, ethnic composition, or combination of
these factors. However, this chapter’s case-study data supports Hypothesis 1, moderately
supports Hypothesis 2, and refutes Hypothesis 3.
Jordan’s military is the most economically integrated into the national economy and is
therefore rated as high on this dimension. In addition to state-managed economic projects such as
KADDB, Jordan combines direct benefits of military service with post-career retirement perks to
sustain and advance the monarchy’s system of patronage. To a lesser extent, both the Omani and
Egyptian militaries retained a medium level of integration into the national economy. However,
Oman’s military expenditures are among the highest in the MENA region and Sultan Qaboos has
a strong record of privileging military personnel in the economic sector. Although widespread,
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the Egyptian military saw its economic privileges decline under presidents Mubarak and Morsi.
In contrast, both historically and during the Arab uprisings, Tunisia’s military has achieved only
a low level of economic integration. This indicates some support for Hypothesis 1, as the
military in the country with the highest levels of integration into the national economy (Jordan)
remained loyal, while the military in the country with the lowest level of integration (Tunisia)
defected from the regime. The two cases with a moderate level of integration (Egypt and Oman)
respectively defected and remained loyal. As such, the evidence for the importance of military
integration into the economy appears clear at the extremes, but less of a basis for predicting
outcomes where the level of integration is moderate.
Jordan and Oman offer only moderate support for Hypothesis 2. Both militaries had
medium levels of political power at the time of the Arab uprisings. However, the militaries
lacked more formal political power in legislative or security-related matters. Such formal powers
ultimately rested with King Abdullah II and Sultan Qaboos. In the Egyptian case, the military
had medium and declining levels of political power at the time of the Arab uprisings. The
potential transfer of power from Hosni to Gamal Mubarak threatened the Egyptian military’s
formal political power, which offers some support for Hypothesis 2. Similarly, the Tunisian
military, which was historically marginalized from the political realm, only had a low-level of
political power during the Arab uprisings. Together the cases offer moderate support for
Hypothesis 2 because each military’s perception of its power and the trajectory of its power
contributed to defection. Perception of political power, actual political power, and projections of
political power all matter. In Egypt, the perception that Gamal and Morsi would alter the
military’s power (through liberalization and appointments, respectfully) was an accurate
assessment of the downward trajectory of military political power. In Jordan and Oman, although
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they lacked formal political power, the militaries appeared to trust that the regimes would
continue to support their political interests, e.g., retaining important cabinet and ministerial posts,
influencing political decisions on defense budgets, and helping to define the broader national
interest. Although political power played a role in facilitating military loyalty, political power
alone does not appear to explain defection across the four country cases.
Concerning Hypothesis 3, military cleavages were low in both Tunisia and Egypt.
Despite their relatively homogenous compositions, both militaries defected. Even more
revealing, both the Jordanian and Omani militaries remained loyal to their regimes despite
having medium levels of ethnic, religious, or sectarian cleavages. In theoretical terms, cleavages
should matter because of their relation to unit cohesion, which is required for militaries to fulfill
their national security responsibilities. Ethnic, religious, and sectarian cleavages can undermine
such cohesion. In this context, the Jordan and Oman cases yielded outcomes that went in the
opposite direction from what Hypothesis 3 would predict. For example, the Jordanian monarchy
incorporated the different tribes into the socio-political structure and the military, and this led
each tribe to prioritize loyalty to the monarchy and the nation-state. Oman has a similar
experience in that loyalty to Sultan Qaboos is prioritized over tribal or sectarian cleavages.
Despite having few cleavages, the Egyptian and Tunisian regimes could not produce military
loyalty because the states did not give enough economic incentives or political power to their
militaries. Therefore, cleavages do not appear to be the driving factor in loyalty and defection
because in Jordan and Oman there were cleavages present, but both of those countries’ militaries
remained loyal. Accordingly, this chapter’s case-study analysis offers little support for
Hypothesis 3.
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In sum, each of the four country cases offer strong support for Hypothesis 1. There is less
support for Hypothesis 2 and even less for Hypothesis 3. Table 1 below shows the conditions
that each military confronted during the Arab uprisings.
Table 1: Case Conditions and Outcomes
Country
Jordan
Tunisia
Egypt
Oman

H1
Economic
Integration
High

H2
Political Power

H3
Military Cleavage

Result

Medium

Loyal

Low
Medium
Medium (high
military
expenditures;
limited evidence of
private sector)

Low
Medium (declining)
Medium

Medium
(Palestinians)
Low
Low
Medium (but loyal
to Qaboos state)

Defection
Defection
Loyal

Scale: None, low, medium, high. Note: This chart ranks the conditions that each military
confronted during the Arab uprisings.
Conclusion
Recent studies of civil resistance suggest that military defections heavily influence the
outcome of uprisings against authoritarian regimes. Yet scholars increasingly acknowledge that
we know little about why, when, and how mutiny occurs.485 This study attempts to make a small
contribution to this field of inquiry by testing theories of civil-military relations. In the study
three hypotheses were tested:

•
•
•

If the military is well integrated into the political economy of the state, then it will be less
likely to defect.
If the military is not losing political power, then it will be less likely to defect.
If the military lacks internal sectarian cleavages, then it will be less likely to defect.
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Comparative case study analysis provides evidence that military loyalty to monarchies in Jordan
and Oman largely stem from specific economic programs and policies aimed at maintaining high
levels of military contentment as opposed to perceptions of power or cleavages. Defection in
Egypt and Tunisia happened because the militaries were less integrated and had fewer economic
benefits. Therefore, the primary explanatory variable for military loyalty to civil authority is the
level of integration into the political economy of the state.
In Jordan, King Abdullah II increased patronage to the military while defending its
powerful role in Jordanian society. Similarly, Sultan Qaboos perpetuated the bureaucratic role
played by various tribal groups in the Omani military to retain support among key segments of
society. Perhaps equally important, Qaboos pursued policies that preserved military financial
privileges, pensions, real estate holdings, retirement benefits, and elevated economic status. In
Oman and Jordan, these policies contributed to the overall contentment of military elites and
larger armed forces, thus reducing the likelihood of defection. In contrast, such privileges were
under threat in Egypt. Gamal Mubarak’s liberalization policies, such as increasing fiscal
discipline, reducing government expenditures, growing tax revenues, and deregulating the public
sector, among other policies, threatened the established safeguards of military status and power.
The absence of similar safeguards is even more pronounced in Tunisia. President Ben Ali, and
Bourguiba before him, sought to keep the armed forces out of politics as much as possible, for
example, by banning any political activity by its members, and by removing officers who were
thought to harbor political ambitions.
In this context, the political-economic hypothesis offers the strongest explanation of
military defection and non-defection during the Arab uprisings. The comprehensive integration
of the Jordanian Armed Forces into the national economy underlies larger symbolic expressions
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of loyalty to the monarchy rooted in Jordanian nationalism. Security personnel view King
Abdullah II as competent in his management of Jordan’s economy and national security amidst
regional war and civil unrest. Given Oman’s demographic diversity and Sultan Qaboos’
reclusive nature, the Omani military could have reasonably been expected to consider defecting
from the regime during the uprisings. However, Qaboos experienced only limited threats to his
power. This combined with the fact the Oman consistently ranks among the MENA region’s
largest military spenders suggests that the political-economic school provides the best
explanation of non-defection.
In practical terms, what does this study mean for states that are struggling with and
suffering from instability? If those states are to become more stable, what does this thesis say
about which state they will model governance after? The most likely option is that of Jordan,
which attempts both to liberalize its economy in order to allocate more resources for defense
while giving generous forms of compensation to its security personnel. States like Iraq, Libya,
Egypt, and Yemen will have to attempt to model their security policies after Jordan to mitigate
instability and keep military loyalty. Iraq and Libya both currently have irredentist movements
that seek greater autonomy without leaving the state, but this has created consternation with the
central governments. To prevent further divisions, each central government would need to
incorporate members from different territories into the armed forces and give generous monetary
benefits that would encourage loyalty to the regime. The reason this would likely work is that
each territory wants economic benefits that they are not currently receiving, which is why
economic liberalization would likely become part of the model.
In Egypt, Hosni’ Mubarak’s son, Gamal, attempted to implement privatization and
liberalization policies that threatened the military’s privileged status. Threats to the military’s
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integration into the national economy provided the incentive for defection. Likewise, Mohamed
Morsi’s brief tenure as president again undermined long-established military economic
privileges, ending with a coup to prevent further threats to military preeminence. However,
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi is a military leader that has given extensive control of the political economy
to members of the security apparatus. Unlike Mubarak and Morsi, the military will likely remain
loyal based on this model because it serves their economic interests. Yemen is a unique case that
faces a multiplicity of complicated and interconnected factors that would prevent it from
following the Jordanian model. Yemen is currently experiencing an internecine conflict, an
ethno-religious divide between the north and south, a proxy war by regional powers, intervention
by the US in the form of drones, famine, drained water resources because of qat cultivation,486
and no legitimate central government. Mentioning Yemen is important because the Jordanian
model for economic integration of the military to promote stability is only one of several factors.
Countries like Syria and Lebanon will find following the model difficult for similar reasons.
However, a number of countries (e.g., Iraq, Libya, and Egypt) can apply the Jordanian model to
their security forces as a means to augment internal stability.
Contrary to Jordan, Tunisia presents a more difficult model for conflict-ridden states to
emulate. More than other states in the region, Tunisia’s military was marginalized under Ben Ali
in both economic and political terms. President Ben Ali, and Bourguiba before him, sought to
keep the armed forces out of politics as much as possible by banning any political activity by its
members, and by removing officers who were thought to harbor political ambitions. In addition,
French colonial influence dramatically shaped Tunisia’s civil society and democratic culture.
While conditions were ripe for military defection during the uprising period, Tunisia also
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retained unique social and historical characteristics that lent themselves to political reconciliation
and democratic gains.
Based on available evidence, Tunisia stands as an unlikely model for war-torn and
volatile states to replicate. Jordan, however, offers a more plausible route to stability depending
on the socio-political context of the state in question. Because states can neither create natural
resources where none exist, nor quickly formulate alliances with powerful states, Oman and
Egypt remain difficult models for unstable states to follow. If stability is the goal, this chapter
provides limited yet meaningful evidence that high levels of military integration into state-level
political economy reduce the likelihood of military defection during periods of political revolt.
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CHAPTER FOUR
FOUNDATIONS OF REGIME DURABILITY:
JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE AND TRIBALISM
Introduction
In democracies and non-democracies alike, intelligence services lie at the center of
national security strategies and operations. To execute national defense priorities, intelligence
services typically perform five primary functions: information collection, analysis,
counterintelligence, internal security, and covert action.487 In this context, national security
intelligence is an expansive and complex topic with both technical and human dimensions –
made all the more difficult to study and understand because of the “thick veils of secrecy that
surround every nation’s spy apparatus.”488 Despite the hidden dimensions of intelligence work,
scholars, defense experts, and civilians are increasingly pursuing intelligence studies as a means
to more fully understand the intricacies of national defense, civil-military relations, and global
security. Such widespread interest is both warranted and necessary because intelligence services
form the basis of state and international security.
The following chapter is divided into three main sections: Structure of Jordanian
Intelligence (JI); Relevant Factors for Efficiency; and The Arab Uprisings and the Efficiency of
Jordanian Intelligence. The first section briefly reviews the structure and formation of Jordanian
Intelligence. The second section analyzes the factors that contribute to JI’s success. The third
section focuses on the Arab uprisings and how Jordanian Intelligence effectively contributed to
the containment of the 2011 protests. The chapter also draws upon relevant literature and
interviews conducted in Jordan from April—October 2017. Interviewees include high and low-
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ranking members of the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF), police, and intelligence services as well
as retired US military personnel. Respondents also include cyber security experts, academics,
lawyers, journalists, and banking and finance specialists.
Ultimately, this chapter puts forth a two-part argument: (1) Jordanian Intelligence is
efficient at meeting its national security responsibilities because of the degree of its
professionalization, meaning as an institution it established a hierarchy, meritocracy, and
specialization of subject matters and skillsets. Therefore, through the different aspects of
professionalization, JI creates a deep connection to different tribal and Islamist groups.
Concerning tribes, Jordanian Intelligence works actively to recruit and assimilate members of the
disparate tribes while embedding itself into tribal networks, creating a consistent flow of
information about possible dissent against the monarchy. In order to deal with Islamists, JI will
integrate itself into Islamist networks through a strategy of non-confrontation and de-escalation,
which allows JI to collect intelligence and appropriately deal with each individual group by
disrupting lines of communication, appeasing and co-opting leadership, or neutralizing targets.
Furthermore, as such threats from Islamist terrorism and civil unrest have changed from
internecine to transnational, JI also cooperates with foreign intelligence services in order to work
with and learn from outside agencies on how best to collect and use intelligence.
(2) The efficiency derived from professionalization, integration into tribal and Islamist
networks, and foreign cooperation leads to Jordan’s security and stability as JI successfully
safeguards the monarchy from the widespread and violent protests evident in much of the region.
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Geopolitics, International Security, and Intelligence Agencies
Modern challenges to global security are proliferating and growing in complexity. To
combat climate change, human and weapons smuggling, cyber-attacks, nuclear proliferation,
terrorism, and a host of other global security challenges, states’ intelligence services are
increasingly cooperating at the international level.489 The implications of such cooperation are
far from understood. Questions about the application of international law, the occurrence of
human rights abuses, and privacy issues persist in the minds of those concerned with potentially
unchecked and ill-defined powers of intelligence agencies. Yet the secretive nature of national
security intelligence precludes real-time, clear-eyed, and effective evaluations of intelligence
agencies’ mandates and conduct. This is especially true for intelligence work conducted in the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), one of the world’s most anti-democratic, volatile, and
violent regions.
Such dynamics leave proponents of greater transparency concerning intelligence services
with difficult questions. Should Europe outsource anti-migration operations to Sudanese secret
police with questionable human rights records to combat human trafficking?490 Should the
United States conduct, or assist in the execution of, covert operations in Syria, Yemen, or parts
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of North Africa without a clearly defined or at least publicly stated strategy?491 How can MENAbased intelligences services be held accountable for human rights abuses, particularly when such
abuses are known to their Western counterparts?492 More ominously, would Western
democracies be willing to accept increased violence, larger humanitarian disasters, or additional
state collapse in the MENA region if they were to pull or reduce intelligence support for Arab
agencies?
There are no easy answers to these questions. What is clear, however, is that when
Western democracies or authoritarian regimes in the Middle East pursue national security
objectives, Arab intelligence services reside at the core of such efforts.493 For example, in 2005,
a CIA deputy director of operations told a US congressional committee that virtually every
capture or killing of a suspected terrorist outside of Iraq since the September 11, 2001 attacks
(more than 3,000 total suspects) was the result of CIA collaboration with foreign intelligence
agencies.494 Although these collaborative efforts almost certainly involved non-Arab intelligence
services, such a claim is remarkable. Narrowing in on the MENA region, this chapter will argue
that no institution matters more to state stability than the intelligence services. Moreover, it is
nearly impossible to understand MENA security dynamics without accounting for the central
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roles played by intelligence services dating back to at least the beginning of the Cold War.495
Intelligence services attract foreign investment and security cooperation, identify and combat
internal threats, and perhaps most importantly for their continued preeminence, safeguard
autocratic leaders and their families.
To be sure, one of the enduring puzzles surrounding the persistence of authoritarianism in
the Middle East concerns the role of intelligence services in supporting repressive regimes. Even
before the Arab uprisings seemed to portend a range of democratic openings, authoritarian
leaders manipulated voting mechanisms, controlled political participation, and restricted the
actions of rivals who offered dissenting views on a country’s political and economic trajectories.
At the center of these efforts to manage greater political diversity within a nation’s governing
apparatus, leaders often relied upon their intelligence services to quiet, marginalize, and repress
the most serious threats to the status quo. Although a combination of factors led to the reemergence of authoritarianism in the MENA region, intelligence services remain a critical
component of regime durability. This is especially true in Jordan where the monarchy has
depended on its intelligence services to weather regional instability, large influxes of refugees,
terrorist threats, and domestic discontent. In this respect, Jordanian Intelligence is representative
of the requisite qualities of intelligence services in the MENA region regarding maintaining state
stability and meeting national security challenges. Therefore, studying the case of Jordanian
Intelligence will ideally yield important insights pertaining to the nature of regional intelligence
services, such as professionalization and the utility of human intelligence operations. To that end,
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this chapter asks the following question: How has Jordanian Intelligence facilitated the
maintenance of Hashemite Rule?
Scholars and security experts generally attribute Jordan’s political stability to a three-part
relationship. This “triangle” includes: (1) the monarchy and royal court; (2) Prime Minister and
Cabinet; and (3) Jordanian intelligence services.496 This chapter will focus on Jordanian
Intelligence (JI) as the central pillar of the Jordanian state. Although all final decisions on
matters of state rest with the monarchy, Jordanian Intelligence identifies threats to the regime
and state, advises the king on crucial security issues, and carries out critical operations to
preserve Hashemite power.
While scholarly attention to the role of militaries in protecting regimes has increased
since the Arab uprisings, scholars have directed less research at the specific structures, functions,
and priorities of intelligence services. To understand these dynamics, Erik Dahl argues that case
studies can help improve the quality of intelligence analysis and help policymakers as they strive
to identify and apprehend an evolving range of global security challenges.497 Moreover, Dahl
contends that examining events through the lens of the case study method can clarify the broader
significance of specific situations, such as terrorist attacks or intelligence failures, while also
elucidating the effects of government or intelligence policies, such as the targeting of leaders of
terrorist organizations.498 This chapter builds upon Dahl’s understanding of case study research
to examine the effectiveness of Jordanian Intelligence in safeguarding the Hashemite regime
during the Arab Spring.
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Notions of Professionalism
As noted above, this chapter defines the professionalization of security services in terms
of their ability as institutions to establish a hierarchy, meritocracy, and specialization of subject
matters and skillsets. This definition draws upon previous literature that identifies the critical
components of professionalism that can then be applied to the case of Jordan. For example,
Samuel Huntington classifies a “profession” as a “peculiar type of functional group with highly
specialized characteristics.”499 For Huntington, professionalism includes expertise,
responsibility, and corporateness, i.e., “members of a profession share a sense of organic unity
and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen.”500 This sense of unity stems
from the rigorous training and discipline required for professional competence.501
Similarly, Morris Janowitz builds upon Huntington’s notion of professionalism by
arguing that a profession extends beyond a group with specialized skills developed through
intensive training.502 Not only do professional organizations acquire specialized skills through
training, such groups also cultivate “a sense of group identity and a system of internal
administration.”503 These processes lead to a system of internal administration that “implies the
growth of a body of ethics and standards of performance.”504 In the context of the above
conceptualizations of professionalism, this section serves as a reference point and basis for
discussing professionalism as it applies to security services in Jordan.
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Structure of Jordanian Intelligence Services
Jordanian Intelligence (JI) is the security collective that is the country’s primary
clandestine organization that gathers intelligence in order to neutralize internal and external
threats to the state. Four branches makeup Jordan’s intelligence services, referred to as Jordanian
Intelligence: The General Intelligence Directorate (GID; Dairat al-Mukhabarat al-Ammah) is the
largest and most powerful agency;505 military intelligence (al-Istikhbarat al-Askariya) forwards
all intelligence threats to the GID; military security (al-Amn al-Askari) is responsible for
preventing hostile activity from within the army; and the Jordanian police or general security (alAmn al-Amm).506 According to its website, the GID’s duties and responsibilities are to
“safeguard the security of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan domestically and abroad by means
of carrying out necessary intelligence operations.”507 Under this directive, the GID retains a
wide-ranging mandate to collect information on individuals and organizations both in Jordan and
abroad to uncover and thwart subversive activities, espionage, and terrorism.508 The GID also has
serval departments to guard against various threats and facilitate relationships with foreign
intelligence agencies. These include the department of the interior, which monitors Palestinian
and Islamist terrorist groups, university and college students, and the inhabitants of refugee
camps in Palestine and along the Syrian border. Additional departments administer Arab
relations in foreign countries, intelligence cooperation with foreign agencies, and house other
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specialized units that conduct “analysis, special operations, investigations, administration,
logistics, finance, training, and public relations.”509
Ronen Yitzhak explains that the Jordanian intelligence services were initially organized
during the 1930s in TransJordan, a British protectorate established in 1921. The British formed a
small intelligence unit in the Arab Legion in order to support the Hashemite regime, and later, to
guard against a growing Palestinian population that opposed Jordan’s support of Britain during
WWII.510 During the 1950s and 1960s, rising Arab nationalism and a concern about pro-Nasser
agents in Jordan led to the founding of the GID in 1964.511 John Gentry characterizes the GID as
Jordan’s most important intelligence agency, but that unlike most external intelligence services,
this military organization also has major internal responsibilities, such as regime protection and
internal security as well as a specialized counterterrorism unit.512 Gentry contends that because
the organization is composed primarily of East Bank Jordanians who are not Palestinians, the
GID is regarded as more politically reliable and loyal to the monarchy.513 Jordanian Intelligence
as a collective is the most important apparatus in maintaining stability within the country because
of the disparate threats that exist. Nation-states like Israel and Syria, sub-state actors like the
Muslim Brotherhood and ISIS, and internal tribal divisions require JI to operate as the
quintessential group of organizations protecting the Jordanian Homeland.
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Relevant Factors for Efficiency
Jordanian Intelligence is uniquely efficient in accomplishing its national security
objectives. The key factors that contribute to this efficiency are high levels of
professionalization, responsiveness to tribal dynamics, capacity to understand, exploit, and
manipulate the complexity of Islamist politics, and well-established partnerships with foreign
intelligence services. It is difficult to overstate the importance of these core competencies in the
context of regional instability. Jordan is surrounded by severe and arguably intractable conflicts
in Iraq and Syria where turmoil often spills over Jordan’s borders in the form of refugees,
weapons smuggling, and terrorist infiltration. Moreover, perhaps more than any other country in
the region, Jordan has been vulnerable to the instability and violence stemming from decades of
conflict between Israel and Palestine. For example, when Israel announces new settlements or
kills or injures Palestinian protesters, demonstrations commonly occur in Amman and throughout
the country.514 Jordanian intelligence services routinely monitor and attempt to contain such
events. Jordan also suffers from the lack of a robust economy, limited natural resources, and the
presence (often interference) of foreign actors within failed or struggling neighboring states.
Given these obstacles, the fact that Jordanian Intelligence remains one of the most well-regarded
and respected intelligences services in the MENA region is striking. The following section
details how JI has been able to achieve and sustain remarkable efficiency in fulfilling its national
security responsibilities.
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Professionalization
Given its multifaceted mandate, the GID follows specific guidelines when recruiting and
training new operatives and conducting operations. According to the GID website, King
Abdullah II appoints the Director and Officers of the GID by Royal Decree upon the
recommendation of the Director General. GID applicants must possess sufficient “educational
qualifications and need to pass a security check.”515 Apart from these formal guidelines,
respondents for this study provide a number of insights regarding recruitment, training, and
operations procedures. At the center of these procedures is a strong sensitivity toward Jordan’s
tribal composition.
Concerning recruitment, a former intelligence officer interviewed for this study explained
that “Jordan is built from families” and that from an intelligence perspective recruiting, training,
and then returning operatives to their home cities is effective because the intimate ties of agents
to their communities improves information gathering.516 The respondent detailed JI procedure by
describing a web of intelligence operatives, stating that Jordanian Intelligence sends officers
back to their home cities and that “I worked with and employed maybe 20 other people
[operatives, informants, and other informal personnel]; for example, 6,000 intelligence officers
would each have ten other people working for him [i.e., 60,000 total]. All intelligence gathering
in the world uses this method, and this is a good way.”517 The respondent claimed that their518
first-hand knowledge of their city and its tribal makeup allowed them to conduct operations with
greater efficiency.
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This intimate understanding of Jordan’s cities and communities allows Jordanian
Intelligence to more accurately direct limited financial and human resources toward confronting
legitimate threats. When intelligence operatives are deeply familiar with the communities they
are charged with investigating, they are more effective at identifying the individuals and groups
that may seek to undermine the state, e.g., by launching attacks against military or civilian
targets, fomenting protests, criticizing the royal family, or directly challenging King Abdullah
II’s authority. Although criticism of government officials is generally tolerated in Jordanian
society, criticizing King Abdullah II is off limits.519 Thus, Jordanian Intelligence relies on its
embedded agents to differentiate between acceptable public expressions of grievance versus
deliberate attempts to challenge the monarchy and destabilize the state.
Domestic intelligence missions of this nature are strengthened by collaboration with
foreign intelligence agencies. Domestically, Jordanian Intelligence boasts a high degree of
expertise in recruitment, training, and operational dimensions. This professionalism allows JI to
cooperate effectively with other states’ intelligence services and accomplish a broad range of
security objectives in service to the monarchy and the state. A former senior intelligence officer
explained that during the early 1990s JI worked domestically and abroad, often in conjunction
with UK and US intelligence (MI6, CIA, FBI), among others. JI worked with foreign intelligence
services “in and outside of Jordan and helped each other.”520 The respondent attributed JI’s
success to “smart and hardworking” intelligence personnel as well as JI’s prioritization of
“human” and not “technological” intelligence. According to the respondent, Jordanian
Intelligence is effective at gathering human intelligence and conducting covert operations
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because JI has a ratio of “one officer to every five to six Jordanian citizens.”521 In the post-9/11
era, the respondent believed that the US overly relied on signals intelligence and that human
intelligence is more critical because it provides a “full picture” of security threats.522
From this perspective, the ability of intelligence agencies to identify, disrupt, and
neutralize threats is proportional to how well intelligence personnel understand the human
dimensions of terrorist or anti-regime organizations. Although subversive groups are
increasingly leveraging the power of technology to complete their objectives, such organizations
are keenly aware of the benefits and drawbacks of technology.523 On the one hand, terrorists may
recruit, communicate, or plan attacks through the use of a variety of technologies, e.g., radio and
radar signals, cell phones, social media, or other Internet-based platforms. On the other hand,
these technological tools are susceptible to infiltration by government intelligence agencies. To
avoid such infiltration, terrorist groups may discourage the use of technology and work only with
individuals who are trusted and well-known to other members or organizational leadership. In an
effort to penetrate such networks, Jordanian Intelligence cultivates personal connections with
potential threats. Respondents for this study stated that they would regularly attempt to talk with
suspected terrorists to determine their interests, needs, and motivations.524 This knowledge
provided a “fuller picture” of terrorist strategies, tactics, and objectives, which was then used to
disrupt terrorist plots, follow up on potential leads, and develop further connections with
potentially hostile networks.
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Human intelligence and international cooperation is central to gathering, interpreting,
sharing, and funneling intelligence to decision-makers in order to thwart threats to the regime. A
former intelligence officer explained that Jordanian Intelligence “cancels problems before they
become problems. For example, [if a] Syrian wants to attack a mall. We stop him. We have
connections will all intelligence services, CIA, KGB, Mossad. We work on terrorist issues.”525
The intelligence officer clarified that “the threat does not come from the US or Israel, but from
Islamists. We [the international intelligence community] work together to be safe.
Geographically, we’re in the middle of many problems.”526 Although the respondent could not
discuss the details of individual cases for security purposes, such collaboration typically involves
foreign intelligence agencies notifying Jordanian Intelligence of a potential threat crossing into
Jordanian territory, establishing informal residence, communicating with known terrorist
networks, and attempting to plan an attack. Once an attack is in the planning stage, JI and foreign
intelligence agencies share evidence, logistical information, and attempt to intercept the attacker.
In addition to cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies, Jordanian citizens recognize
JI’s professionalism domestically. During the Arab uprisings, a former surveillance and cyber
security expert commented that JI conducted operations with a “distinct lack of brutality,” such
as the violent and repressive tactics undertaken in Syria by Bashar al-Assad.527 Instead, the
security sector organized “counter protesters” and the government made sure “the protesters
didn’t clash.” Thus, the regime followed a strategy of “absorption rather than collision, which is
characteristic of other times as well. The Hashemites are not known for being bloody.”528 In
stark contrast to Syria where Bashar al-Assad ordered his security forces to repress
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demonstrators through mass arrest, torture, and execution,529 King Abdullah II directed Jordanian
Intelligence to avoid violent confrontation with protesters. This strategy of minimal
confrontation bolstered JI’s reputation as not only loyal to the monarchy but also to the larger
citizenry. Respondents for this study generally agreed that King Abdullah II lacked the brutality
of other regional dictators and instead showed an authentic concern for Jordan’s population. This
concern filtered down to Jordan’s intelligence services during the 2011 protests. Respondents
typically credited the strategy of minimal confrontation with protesters for the relatively low
levels of violence produced by the uprisings.
More broadly, Jordanian Intelligence has developed its professionalism in order to
manage security and political crises. Specifically, the structure of Jordanian Intelligence is
hierarchical, meritocratic, and specialized. Similar to other well-developed international
intelligence agencies, JI personnel show deference to the chain of command, earn promotions
based upon skill and ability rather than personal connections, and receive training that is specific,
advanced, and highly technical. When combined with a belief in the value of human intelligence,
this professionalism allows Jordanian Intelligence to quickly identify threats and respond to
crises in a manner that is measured, proportional, and strategic. Such capabilities form the basis
of stability because both the monarchy and wider citizenry trust (to a sufficient degree) that the
intelligence services are working in the interest of the state.
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Tribalism
Jordanian Intelligence’s success at managing domestic threats is deeply rooted in its
ability to balance competing tribal interests within Jordanian society. Both in Jordan and the
larger MENA region, few studies appreciate how intelligence agencies manage tribal dynamics.
Such dynamics are important because tribalism often forms the basis of family structure, political
loyalties, and in conflict settings, competition over resources and political influence.530
Responding effectively to the legitimate economic, political, and security interests of tribes
presents challenges for intelligence services that seek to maintain state security. Absent a
sensitivity to tribalism, intelligence services risk alienating powerful segments of society and
increasing the likelihood of social discontent, protest, or violent revolt. Although Jordanian
Intelligence works hard to avoid these outcomes, only a limited number of studies examine how
JI accomplishes these objectives.
In Jordan, Tariq Tell explains that there have been few attempts to examine the social
foundations of the monarchy “from below” or to trace the expansion of “material interests that
bound a loyalist Trans-Jordanian core of support in the army and security services to the
Hashemite throne.”531 Problematically, then, scholars have mistakenly presented an overly
simplistic view of a personalized and patrimonial “royal military dictatorship” that draws its
power from a “soldiery that gives unquestioning loyalty to a Hashemite King on account of his
personal charisma and the religious aura that stems from his descent from the Prophet
Muhammad.”532 This chapter aims to avoid this mistake by arguing that Jordanian Intelligence’s
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responsiveness to tribalism is a cornerstone of its professionalism. JI’s ability to work within
Jordan’s tribal structure allows it to distinguish between authentic security threats and nonradical Jordanian citizens who aim to pressure the monarchy for political, religious, or economic
reforms, but not regime removal.
Respondents offered a number of operational examples that highlight the importance of
tribalism. A former senior intelligence officer explained that from 1996 to 2006 Jordanian
Intelligence succeeded in thwarting “more than 200 terrorist operations and attacks,” although
these successes were “not announced to the media.” The attacks were planned by organizations
like Hamas, Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, and Palestinian groups.”533 Each group has disparate
objectives in Jordan, and while signals intelligence played a role, the respondent emphasized the
importance of human intelligence in successfully stopping many of the aforementioned attacks.
Understanding the domestic manifestations of subversive organizations enables Jordanian
Intelligence to determine whether or not their goals are political, religious, or military. In
general, JI prioritizes security threats that have the potential to inflict violence. Deep familiarity
with opposition groups that have the desire and operational capacity to accomplish such a feat
helps JI direct crucial resources to intercept threats in real time. In managing non-imminent
threats, Jordanian Intelligence may monitor, track, and infiltrate politically-subversive groups
over the medium and long term in an effort to undermine messaging, recruitment, and
organizational growth. In essence, the professionalism to differentiate between low, medium, and
high threat levels reduces the likelihood that Jordanian Intelligence will overreact to moderate
threats, e.g., through the arrest, interrogation, or execution of dissidents. When members of a
particular tribe are subjected to such overreactions by intelligence services, it has the potential to
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provoke social backlash or accusations of unfair treatment among the tribes, both of which can
lead to violence and state instability.
Relatedly, many of the intelligence professionals interviewed for this study began their
careers investigating students and student unions where tribal dynamics factored into political
movements. For example, following the ratification of Jordan’s 1994 peace treaty with Israel,
some Palestinian groups aimed to assassinate King Hussein and force the abrogation of the peace
agreement.534 Universities provided Palestinian dissidents with a platform for intellectual debate
and member recruitment, as the peace treaty was received with varying degrees of hostility in
Jordanian society. Accordingly, Jordanian Intelligence monitored university settings and
combined its knowledge of Palestinian grievances with its ability to identify and neutralize the
more radical elements of PLO leadership.535 Importantly, JI viewed Palestinian hostility to King
Hussein as distinct from the reactions of other Jordanian tribes to the peace treaty, reactions that
were generally less aggressive toward the monarchy.536 This balanced approach helped to
insulate King Hussein from broader social criticism because the regime allowed the expression
of some negative reactions to the peace treaty. Jordanian Intelligence was therefore better able to
focus on stopping the more immediate threat of Palestinian radicalism.
Prior to the 1994 period, Jordanian Intelligence demonstrated similar selectivity when
dealing with other competing factions within Jordan. The above respondent characterized Jordan
in 1985 as a period of “low democracy” where anyone who demonstrated against the regime was
arrested.537 According to the respondent, there were two parts of the opposition: Islamists and
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Communists and “both groups were fighting to control student unions at universities. We
investigated and recruited these protesters and we succeeded in intelligence gathering.”538 With
limited financial and human resources available to Jordanian Intelligence, such discernment is
critical to separating the most grave threats to state security from students pursuing more
mainstream political agendas.
Both historically and currently, Jordan’s intelligence services lie at the center of Jordan’s
stability. Crucially, Jordanian Intelligence is effective because of its proximity to the Jordanian
people and its tribes. Jordanian Intelligence operatives carry out clandestine operations in
universities, mosques, commercial centers, and at political meetings and social gatherings. The
intelligence personnel who perform these functions are often from the communities where such
activities and interactions take place. This gives JI an intimate knowledge of the motivations,
intent, and aims of potentially subversive groups, which allows for quicker and more accurate
threat assessments. This is approach is all the more effective because of Jordan’s relatively small
population of roughly ten million people. Although respondents for this study could not offer
specific details because of security reasons, there was broad consensus that Jordanian
Intelligence monitors each family, if not each individual citizen, in Jordan. Similarly, all foreign
nationals in Jordan, including tourists, students, business personnel, suspected terrorists, etc., are
likely monitored by Jordanian security services. Following the trajectory of other well-developed
international intelligence agencies, this brand of comprehensive surveillance and monitoring is
not without precedent.539
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Building from King Hussein’s approach, King Abdullah II balances Jordan’s tribal
interests, recruits operatives from specific tribes, and maintains security in a manner that
reinforces shared identity among Jordan’s security personnel. Intelligence operatives are
selected, trained, and socialized into an institutional culture in a way that minimizes tribal
differences. First and foremost, JI personnel serve the monarchy and the state as opposed to a
specific tribe. Like most forms of military indoctrination, individual identities are subverted for
institutional norms and values. In the Jordanian context, tribal identity, religious affiliation (e.g.,
Sunni or Shia), or family connections matter less than an individual’s capacity to effectively
serve in the intelligence apparatus. Respondents routinely expressed pride in service to the nation
and highlighted the non-sectarian nature of intelligence work—a seemingly unique characteristic
of intelligence operatives in the MENA region.
To further evaluate this perspective, this chapter examines the structure of Jordanian
intelligence, cooperation and rivalry within Jordanian intelligence sectors, international
cooperation on intelligence matters, and the primary threats to Jordan’s security, including
border control, political unrest, and terrorist infiltration into refugee camps. Evidence suggests
that Jordanian Intelligence has achieved remarkable levels of success because of its prioritization
of human intelligence over signal intelligence (i.e., technology-based intelligence that intercepts
electronic signals used in direct or indirect communications). Understanding the above dynamics
produces a more informed account of how Jordanian Intelligence forms the foundation of
Hashemite resilience.
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Tribalism and Identity
Few researchers investigate the connections between the organizational evolution of the
Jordanian security and larger historical developments on the East Bank, namely the integration of
Palestinians into the Jordanian security apparatus.540 As a consequence, the persistence of
Hashemite rule is overly attributed to the “personal charisma” and “religious aura” of King
Hussein.541 This section attempts to move beyond myopic notions of loyalty to the
monarchy by arguing that the regime seeks to balance the way in which the different tribes
benefit from Hashemite rule. This strategy has two primary components. First, the regime fosters
loyalty by defending the honor of the tribes and the institution of the monarchy. Second, the
regime utilizes rewards and incentives to ensure the loyalty of the tribes. In security matters, this
strategy is then carried out by Jordanian Intelligence as part of a larger effort to manage
competing tribal interests and maintain Jordan’s broader stability.
Dale Eickelman explains that the first thing to emphasize when examining tribal identity,
like other forms of social identity such as kinship, citizenship, or national identity, is that it is
created, either by a region’s indigenous population or those attempting to describe it.542 Notions
of the tribe (‘ashirah ), or tribal identity, do not exist outside of their cultural and social contexts.
Moreover, tribal identities change over time and whether or not they develop in the context of
strong versus weak state institutions or in a colonial society matters greatly.543 This section
narrowly focuses on tribal identities to the extent they played a role in the development of
Jordanian Intelligence.

540

Tell, The Social and Economic Origins of Monarchy in Jordan, p. 9.
Ibid.
542
Dale F. Eickelman, The Middle East and Central Asia: An Anthropological Approach. Fourth Edition (Prentice
Hall, 1998), p. 116.
543
Ibid.
541

185

Eickelman outlines four principal forms of tribal identity in the Middle East:
(1) the elaboration and use of explicit ‘native’ ethnopolitical ideologies by the people themselves
to explain their sociopolitical organization; (2) concepts used by state authorities for
administrative purposes; (3) implicit, practical notions held by people that are not elaborated into
formal ideologies; and (4) anthropological concepts.544

Although scholars can distinguish between these notions of tribal identity for analytical
purposes, Eickelman stresses that they are not mutually exclusive, and frequently overlap. In
addition, indigenous, or locally held, notions of tribal identity vary across the Middle East, but
they are typically “based on a concept of political identity formed through patrilineal descent.”545
In the Jordanian context, historians generally agree that tribalism is a central theme in the
country’s development. Yoav Alon contends that unlike other countries in the region founded on
urban elites and cultures, Jordan explicitly incorporated tribalism into its political structure and
relied upon it for its own legitimacy and survival.546 Dating back to the 1916 Arab Revolt,
Jordan’s founding stems from a coalition of tribes led by the Hashemite family against Ottoman
rule. The late King Hussein bin Talal (1935-1999), considered the father of modern Jordan,
emphasized his descent from the Quraysh, the tribe of the Prophet Muhammad. Hussein’s broad
authority, and his success in forming a loyal base of support among the Bedouin tribes, can
partially be traced to the religious legitimacy attributed to his family because of its Sharifian (i.e.,
“noble” or “highborn”) lineage.547 Despite various transformations, tribal identities played an
essential role in early state formation and continue to influence Jordan’s political, social, and
cultural life.548
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In contemporary Jordan, Mohammed Ali Al Oudat and Ayman Alshboul argue that tribal
identity maintains its relevance and importance in society and can best be understood through the
prism of Jordanian nationalism.549 Unlike other forms of Western and Arab nationalism,
Jordanian nationalism prioritizes tribal identity, which makes Jordanian nationalism a
combination of loyalty to tribe and king rather than the idea of the nation-state. Oudat and
Alshboul argue that the existence of traditional political authority (derived from tribal loyalties)
and a state system of political authority have produced a system of incompatibility. That is, the
regime “promotes loyalties based on the desire to defend both the honour of the tribes and the
institution of the monarchy rather than to defend the notion of the nation-state.”550 As such,
problems of political legitimacy arise because of the unfulfilled process of nation-building.
Throughout Jordan’s modern history, a variety of legitimizing ideologies have been used to
justify the right of Hashemite rule, including socialism, nationalism, pan-Arabism, Islam, and
“Jordan First.” As a slogan, “Jordan First” represents an ideal of unity amidst diversity as well as
loyalty to Jordan above other affiliations, including ethnic, religious, ideological, or tribal.551
However, Oudat and Alshboul contend that these ideologies do not include a notion of the
Jordanian nation and instead have created confusion at the local and national levels about how
the state system and its institutions should function.552 From this perspective, the monarchy
continues to rely upon a system of rewards and incentives directed at key tribes and segments of
support to ensure their continued loyalty. In this sense, the regime’s strategy to preserve its
power is distinct from a broader program to develop and defend Jordan as a nation-state.
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Scaled down from the national level, interview responses bear out the importance of
tribal dynamics when maintaining the strength of Jordan’s intelligence services. Regarding
intelligence recruitment, a former senior intelligence officer remarked that Jordanian Intelligence
“always took from different tribes.”553 For example, one-year recruitment officers would select
one candidate from one tribe and two from another. The following year JI would reverse the ratio
in order to “Keep things balanced.” The respondent commented that it was not easy to recruit for
the intelligence department because in addition to selecting highly qualified candidates it was
charged with recruiting Jordanians, Bedouins, and Jordanians of Palestinian descent.554 What the
respondent emphasized is the importance of gathering a diverse group of intelligence recruits
while demonstrating the complexity of pulling them from a plethora of sub-national groups,
including tribes and ethnic minorities. A former surveillance and cyber security expert affirmed
the importance of tribal dynamics within Jordan’s security apparatus. The interviewee stated that
“tribalism is an integral part of not just the structure [of Jordanian society] but also the general
strategy that the regime uses to maintain a delicate stability…Loyalty is first to the tribe, then to
the king. The concept of citizenship is very skewed because of tribalism.”555 This comment
aligns with Oudat and Alshboul’s claim that while tribalism remains a central feature of Jordan’s
political and security structure it also contributes to an uneven playing field concerning the
development of Jordan as a nation-state. Intelligence personnel are not only selected and
promoted because of their qualifications but their tribal affiliation as well.
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Tribalism and Security
Much of the literature referenced thus far outlines Jordan’s complex tribal composition.
Persuasive arguments describe how Jordan’s internal stability is linked to the idea of
‘citizenship,’ which “presupposes the transformation of tribal and paternal ties into a national
identity.”556 However, while historical and anthropological approaches to tribalism offer detailed
accounts of tribalism in Jordan, less attention is directed at how tribalism shapes and affects
Jordan’s security structure. A security-centric view of tribalism recognizes meaningful historical
connections between the regime and tribal leaders. Such connections continue to form the basis
of intelligence recruitment, training, and operations.
Historically, King Hussein’s survival depended upon the support of “royalist officers and
[a] tribal” army to suppress a number of threats to his power.557 These threats included the
demonstrations that opposed Jordan’s entry into the Baghdad Pact558 in 1955 and the protests that
rejected unification talks between Iraq, Egypt, and Syria in 1963. In addition, the cohesion of the
military and its relative lack of tribal cleavages reinforced Hussein’s ability to stifle the leftleaning Nabulsi government and military conspirators between 1956 and 1959 as well as
overcome the threat of Palestinian nationalism and the PLO between 1964 and 1971.559 By
managing tribal differences within the military and intelligence services and securing their
loyalty, King Hussein crafted the military foundations of Hashemite power.
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Hashemite authority and legitimacy among the Bedouin tribes dates back to the formation
of the Arab Legion in the early part of the 20th century. Active from 1920 to 1956, the Arab
Legion was the regular army of Transjordan and later Jordan when it gained independence in
1946. Originally, the Bedouin entered the Arab Army for “collective security and responsibility
in the tribe, clan and family.”560 In this sense, tribal cooperation extended into the careers of
military personnel, which formed the basis of military loyalty to the monarchy.561 Such loyalty
was rooted in a desire to defend the honor of the family, tribe, and king, rather than the state or
“some abstract notion of Jordanian patriotism”562 Symbolic references highlight Jordan’s tribal
legacy in maintaining Jordan’s security, such as the ceremonial yet visible Arab Legion and its
Bedouin-like uniforms that can still be found in museums or cultural sites.563
The codification of tribal loyalty to the monarchy occurred under King Hussein who
cultivated strong relationships with the “traditionalists,” i.e., tribal and clan leaders.564 To
achieve strong relationships with Jordan’s tribes, King Hussein merged a number of different
images in order to appeal to a diverse range of actors. These images included “civil
libertarian, dynast, leader of the tribes, protector of Palestinians (and Circassians and Chechens
and Christians), custodian of Jerusalem’s holy places, descendant the Prophet, cosmopolitan,
anglophile, [and] supporter of secularist trends.”565 The amalgamation of identities allowed King
Hussein to construct a modern image abroad while establishing a traditionalist political culture
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domestically.566 Despite his ability to successfully navigate the demands of various
constituencies, King Hussein faced accusations of favoritism. For example, some Palestinians
argued that King Hussein privileged the tribes in security and political affairs and that his
political identity was one of “‘divide and rule’ (farriq tasud).”567 While King Hussein delivered
different rewards to various segments of support, the reality of patronage is more complex. King
Hussein’s military, public security, and intelligence services were dominated by Bedouin tribes,
but Palestinians benefited under Hussein as well. Many Palestinians were granted citizenship and
“now predominate in the kingdom’s business, professional, media, and educational sectors.”568
Given the volatility of this historical context, the modern development and
professionalization of the Jordanian intelligence services was never a foregone conclusion. First
King Hussein and later King Abdullah II worked hard to contain tribal rivalries, balance
competing interests, and cultivate institutional unity within the intelligence services. The
monarchy was able to overcome polarizing historical events, such as the growth of Palestinian
nationalism while also creating a sense of national identity during decades of domestic and
regional turmoil. Although tribal leaders have long expressed concerns over favoritism, the
monarchy has been effective at minimizing such grievances and advancing an image as impartial
and dedicated to the national interest. Tribal buy-in to the state thus forms the foundation of
Jordan’s security apparatus because diverse segments of Jordanian society remain loyal to the
monarchy, work in the intelligence services, and serve the nation.
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Islamists and the Hashemite Regime
The monarchy’s ability to maintain a functional relationship with Jordan’s Islamists
parallels its success in carefully balancing and managing tribal dynamics. As early as 1991,
Jordan had to confront an increasing terrorist threat stemming from the end of the Soviet-Afghan
War. Philip Robins explains that roughly 1,000 Jordanian ‘Afghans’ fought alongside the
mujahideen in Afghanistan, and upon returning to Jordan, tended to gravitate toward extremist
Islamist politics.569 In July 1991, Jordanian security services arrested approximately 100
suspected militants linked to the military wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Prophet
Muhammad’s Army.570 From a security standpoint, such incidents magnified the monarchy’s
fear of extremist Islamist threats within Jordan.
Despite concerns over emerging radicalism in the early 1990s, Islamist movements in
Jordan have a history and heritage as old as the Hashemite regime itself.571 Curtis Ryan explains
that although Jordan’s main Islamist political party—the Islamic Action Front (Jabha al-Amal
al-Islami or IAF)—was not legalized until the early 1990s, Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood (alIkhwan al-Muslimun or MB) cultivated a working relationship with King Hussein and was
largely viewed as loyal opposition. Even before King Hussein’s tenure, the Hashemite regime
tolerated Islamist activism in Jordanian politics because of its emphasis on “reform, moderation,
and democratic participation, rather than revolution, radicalism, and militancy.”572 In this
context, Ryan concludes that Jordan’s Islamist movement has been overwhelmingly reformist
and democratically-minded as opposed to militant and revolutionary.573

569

Philip Robins, A History of Jordan (Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 187-188.
Robins, A History of Jordan, p. 188.
571
Curtis R. Ryan, “Islamist Political Activism in Jordan: Moderation, Militancy, and Democracy.” Middle East
Review of International Affairs 12, no. 2 (2008), p. 1.
572
Ibid.
573
Ibid.
570

192

Politically, scholars credit Islamist movements with democratic advances in Jordan and
the wider Middle East. Glenn Robinson argues that Jordan’s Islamist movement played a role in
democratic expansion because greater democratization served its interests in easing political
restrictions and pursuing policy objectives.574 For example, the 1989 Program of the Muslim
Brothers called for fiscal conservatism but with a populist orientation. The Program advocated
for the protection of private property and measures to reduce public debt, government spending,
and inflation. Socially, the MB platform espoused conservative values that rejected “corruption
in all its forms” as well as alcohol, gambling, drugs, and dance halls.575 The Muslim Brotherhood
and the broader Islamist movement in Jordan succeeded in many of their policy objectives by
obeying democratic rules and working from within the political system.
The behavior and willingness of Islamists to participate in Jordanian politics reflects a
larger debate between democratization and political Islam in the Middle East. On the one hand,
the inclusion-moderation hypothesis contends that “political groups and individuals may become
more moderate as a result of their inclusion in pluralist political processes.”576 Jillian Schwedler
explains that three dimensions form the basis of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis: (1) the
behavioral moderation of groups; (2) the ideological moderation of groups; and (3) the
ideological moderation of individuals.577 In an early version of the inclusion-moderation
hypothesis, Samuel Huntington contends that political inclusion provides incentives for
opposition groups to compromise and negotiate with regimes to achieve policy objectives as part
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of a “democratic bargain.”578 Scholars differ in the level of emphasis they place on whether or
not individuals or groups change behavior or ideological positions, but share a unifying focus on
the extent to which inclusion leads to some form of moderation.
A former intelligence officer framed intelligence work dealing with Islamists in a similar
fashion. That is, by understanding and directly engaging the tribal, religious, or linguistic aspects
of opposition members, Jordanian Intelligence could more effectively complete its missions. The
interviewee stated that “Jordanian Intelligence is smart. They don’t hate Islamists. Instead they
make them feel safe. If Jordanian Intelligence intimidates Islamists, they [Islamists] will close
up.”579 As a result, JI operatives attempt to cultivate a “personal connection” with Islamists. The
interviewee concluded by stating “we have to learn their languages; literal and figurative but
mostly literal, for example, Turkish.”580
On the other hand, scholars contend that regime-initiated democratic openings are not
simply survival strategies but instead a form of political system. Daniel Brumberg articulates the
concept of “liberalized autocracy” and argues that a combination of guided pluralism, controlled
elections, and selective repression in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, and Kuwait is not merely
a “survival strategy” utilized by authoritarian regimes, but rather a “type of political system
whose institutions, rules, and logic defy any linear model of democratization.”581 Similarly,
Glenn Robinson puts forth the notion of “defensive democratization” in which the Hashemite
regime pursued a political-liberalization program to assure its political longevity.582 In order to
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avert deepening economic and political crises in 1989, Robinson outlines how Jordan’s politicalliberalization program advanced a set of policies intended to maintain elite privilege without
ushering in fundamental political change.583 As part of the program, Jordan held three national
parliamentary elections, enacted multiple liberalizing laws, allowed greater press freedoms, and
reduced the role of intelligence services in repressing opposition.584 These interpretations of
democratization contend that liberalization programs are not merely intended to encourage
Islamist parties to participate in political processes and thus moderate. Instead, “liberalized
autocracy” and “defensive democratization” hold that regimes construct political systems that
create and dismantle democratic openings according to the security needs of the state.
Rather than viewing these intellectual approaches (inclusion-moderation hypothesis and
liberalized autocracy/defensive democratization) in diametric opposition, it is more reasonable to
interpret the differences on a spectrum. Regimes pursue liberalization policies for a number of
reasons, such as relieving social pressures or seeking economic growth while also attempting to
incorporate Islamist parties into the existing political system, thus lending it legitimacy. In such
scenarios, authentic democratization efforts may be the goal. Alternatively, regimes may
implement liberalization policies only to quell dissent with the intention of closing democratic
windows once social or economic pressures decline. The above perspectives on democratization
are not mutually exclusive. Depending on the threat, regimes may allow greater political
participation (e.g., legalizing opposition parties or enacting constitutional reforms) while
protecting essential power structures (e.g., the royal appointment of not only cabinet ministers
but entire chambers of parliament as well).
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In the Jordanian context, the regime’s handling of Islamist opposition during the late
1980s and early 1990s is instructive. Historically, the Islamist movement in Jordan is perhaps the
most integrated, pro-political establishment in the MENA region.585 King Abdullah II legalized
the Muslim Brotherhood and allowed its participation in Jordanian politics. However, the
monarchy demonstrated a willingness to contain Islamists when they opposed important national
policies. For example, the Islamist movement opposed the two most significant policies of the
liberalization program: “the IMF-mandated austerity measures (including the initiation of a sales
tax) and the normalization of relations with Israel.”586 The regime took legal action to contain
Islamist influence, including a change in voting laws that privileged tribe over party candidates
and the crafting of electoral districts that favored central and southern rural districts as opposed
to urban centers where the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence was strongest.587
Both historically and currently, Jordan’s intelligence services lie at the center of
confronting Islamist threats and enforcing the monarchy’s security priorities. A former
intelligence officer stated that Jordanian Intelligence considers Islamists as threats and that “we
[JI] followed them [and] these things from the 1980s until now. We collected all of this
information. In the 1980s we would ask people with beards to explain what they think [and]
believe.”588 Jordanian Intelligence remains focused on the potential threat of Islamists, especially
those groups that have the potential to affiliate with or support the Islamic State (IS). Interview
data suggests that Jordanian citizens share this concern as well. A former enlisted soldier in the
US Army described the social reaction that followed the Islamic State’s killing of a Jordanian
Air Force pilot in January 2015. The interviewee explained that after the pilot’s death “there was
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a great burst in Jordan of national pride. The day after [the incident] I went to Ajloun [northern
Jordan] and the street was blocked by demonstrators that were pro-King and pro-soldier.”589 This
event demonstrates the broader public support of Jordanian Intelligence for confronting extremist
Islamist elements domestically and in the MENA region. A retired police officer captured this
sentiment when he stated that although “sleeping cells, terrorist, and ISIS” are threats, ISIS is
“horrific and their atrocities make me think of my family, my brother, my sister. ISIS is making
religion dirty. There is a far distance between ISIS and Muslims.”590
Successfully managing Islamist threats to regime power is a difficult task in the MENA
region. In 2013, the Egyptian military removed the democratically elected Mohammad Morsi
from office out of fear that the Muslim Brotherhood would fundamentally alter the balance of
power in Egyptian society. During the 2011 revolution, many Tunisians expressed concern over
the potentially outsized role of Tunisia’s leading Islamist party, Ennahda, in the emerging
political system. Before being removed from power and executed, Saddam Hussein embarked on
a widespread “Islamization” program in the 1990s aimed at co-opting and thus controlling
Islamists in Iraq. Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Saudi Arabia has worried about the
potential “export” of Iranian-brand Islamism and propagated and funded Wahhabism as part of
its strategy to deter Iranian influence. In each case, regimes typically rely upon their intelligence
services to contain Islamist influence in social, political, and economic matters. Often more than
their neighboring counterparts, Jordanian intelligence services have accurately identified the
level of threat posed by Islamists and managed to limit disruptions to Hashemite rule.
The successes achieved by Jordanian Intelligence in mitigating Islamist threats in Jordan
parallel its high degree professionalization, its expertise in responding to tribalism, and its ability
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to effectively forge productive relationships with foreign intelligence agencies. The skill and
efficiency with which JI operates warrants consideration. Many neighboring states are struggling
to quell warring tribal or Islamist-oriented factions, e.g., Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. These
states also lack the type of effective collaboration with foreign intelligence services that may
minimize instability. In stark contrast, Jordanian Intelligence has earned a reputation as highly
competent and professional, both domestically and abroad. This level of professionalism
undergirds Hashemite rule and state stability.

Globalization and “Foreign Liaison”
On multiple levels, the activities of intelligence agencies are essential for understanding
international relations.591 Intelligence agencies identify and guard against threats and therefore
dramatically shape states’ national defense strategies and policies. The most critical intelligence
mission is to “gather reliable, timely information about the world, as well as to assess its
meaning accurately.”592 Evaluating the efficacy of Jordanian Intelligence requires an
examination of its expanding role in global security. As with Jordanian Intelligence, other welldeveloped international intelligence agencies are increasingly collaborating on mutual security
concerns. On this topic, contemporary literature analyzing national security intelligence
problematizes the shifting nature of liaison relationships in the context of globalization. Loch
Johnson distinguishes between internal and foreign liaison connections within and among
democracies. Internal liaison describes the cultivation of improved professional (non-political)
ties between policymakers and the intelligence specialists who provide them with information
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and analysis.593 Foreign liaison refers to collaboration of intelligences officials between two or
more states, which must account for the security and cultural barriers that are inherent in
relations between states. For Johnson, globalization ushered in an unparalleled integration of
nations through new communications and transportation technologies. With such advancements,
intelligence communities must contend with the potential rapid spread of threats that can affect
security well beyond their local origins. In essence, “what used to be someone else’s problem is
now everybody’s problem.”594 Although Johnson focuses on collaboration between democratic
states, this chapter argues that intelligence sharing, joint operations, and strategic planning are
increasing among Western intelligence services and those of Middle East non-democracies.
The relevance of studying both the internal dynamics of Jordanian Intelligence and its
relationship with foreign intelligence services is evident in the ongoing war on terrorism. Just as
the United States and its European allies are attempting to thwart terrorist threats to or within
their own countries, Middle East governments are working to curtail the influence of extremist
forces within their borders. In many cases, these security goals overlap and the distinction
between democracies and non-democracies become less significant. Referencing the United
States and Jordan, Ken Silverstein argues that “Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate, or
GID, has surpassed Israel’s Mossad as America’s most effective allied counter-terrorism agency
in the Middle East.”595 Moreover, since the September 11 attacks, GID cooperation with the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has expanded significantly.596 US collaboration with the
Jordanian intelligence services has only continued to increase since 2001.597 Such cooperation is
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a critical reason for the success of Jordanian Intelligence. In exchange for partnering with the
United States, JI receives financial, logistical, training, operational, and strategic support. Such
support only enhances JI’s capabilities and overall effectiveness.
Jordan’s foreign liaisons helped the security institutions standardize their intelligence
services through cooperation and education. A former senior intelligence officer characterized
their extensive experience working abroad and explained that as a desk officer and liaison for
other countries, they worked with the CIA, FBI, and Israelis as well as in countries ranging from
the Philippines to France. The respondent stated that training occurred “all over [the world]” and
that they took “26 courses related to money laundering, crisis management, communications,
etc.”598 In addition, “it put me in close proximity to decision-makers and I gained experience
with policy matters. As my rank rose, my influence often rose above my rank.”599 The
respondent intimated that this range of training assisted both their skills as an intelligence
operative, which helped to advance their career. A former military officer confirmed the
importance of comprehensive training when describing their career trajectory in the intelligence
field, stating “Army personnel are well-trained and have high [academic] degrees. Current NCOs
[non-commissioned officers] hold more degrees than I did.”600 The interviewee described a
range of training in which they “took over 56 courses, mainly in the US” and worked as a liaison
officer in “Afghanistan, Iraq, [the] West Bank, Israel, Africa, etc.”601 This brand of international
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training reinforces the competences required to work successfully in Jordan by providing the
knowledge, standardization, and critical skills for intelligence gathering and analysis.
More broadly, the MENA region is well known for its secret police (mukhabarat).
Depending on the context, these forces impose state security with varying degrees of brutality.
Prior to the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, secret police in Iraq and Syria under the command of
Saddam Hussein and Bashar al-Assad earned a reputation for extreme violence against suspected
threats. Yet even in Tunisia and Egypt, states that experienced comparatively less domestic
repression, presidents Ben Ali and Mubarak were similarly known for directing their intelligence
services to treat suspected threats harshly, e.g., through arbitrary arrest, solitary confinement,
torture, and execution. Jordan, however, continues to move in the opposite direction. Rather than
perpetrate violence indiscriminately, Jordanian Intelligence is building a long and thorough track
record of engagement with other professionalized intelligence agencies. The aforementioned
trainings that range from money laundering to counterterrorism to cyber security underscore the
breadth and depth of JI’s commitment to developing skilled personnel. International cooperation
therefore augments institutional professionalism, capacity, and effectiveness, which together
strengthen Jordanian Intelligence’s ability to maintain state security.

The Arab Uprisings and the Efficiency of Jordanian Intelligence
In order to contain the 2011 protests, King Abdullah II relied heavily on the military,
police force, and intelligence services to collectively manage demonstrations. However, the
military by and large avoided direct contact with the protesters and instead stood ready to
intervene should tension and violence escalate, which it did not. In general, the police were more
responsible for interacting with protesters and allowing them to express their respective
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grievances so long as they did not demand the removal of the regime. In contrast, the Jordanian
intelligence services focused on the leaders of protest movements and attempted to disrupt lines
of communication, undermine efforts to grow demonstrations, and ultimately quell larger threats
to state stability. Jordanian Intelligence’s high degree of professionalization, sensitivity to tribal
dynamics, non-confrontational relationship with Islamists, and its collaborative efforts with
foreign intelligence services all played a significant role in undercutting widespread and violent
protests witnessed elsewhere in the MENA region.

Arab Uprisings
The professionalism displayed by Jordanian Intelligence during the uprisings attributed to
de-escalatory tactics in dealing with protesters. As long as Jordanian citizens called only for
reforms and not the removal of the monarchy, Jordanian Intelligence refrained from utilizing
more aggressive approaches to quiet dissent, such as mass arrests, torture, or the killing of protest
leaders. Such restraint is a hallmark of professionalism because it shows both faith in the
monarchy’s approach to dealing with social upheaval as well as sophisticated institutionalization
of procedure and deference to chain of command. In other words, the lack of panic exhibited by
Jordanian Intelligence in the face of protests revealed skill, good judgment, and commitment to a
strategy of containment rather than direct confrontation. Judging by the excessive use of force
exhibited by other regional intelligence services in dealing with mass demonstrations, JI’s
approach almost certainly contributed to lower levels of violence and fewer casualties. In
avoiding such outcomes, Jordanian Intelligence helped to preserve a delicate equilibrium
between allowing protesters to express their grievances and maintaining state stability.
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In Jordan, the monarchy aimed to strike the appropriate balance between rewards and
punishments when dealing with protesters. King Abdullah II was willing to offer some
concessions on legal reform while also instructing Jordanian Intelligence to investigate, infiltrate,
and undermine potential anti-regime elements. Similar to protests in other MENA monarchies,
the cautious, muted tenor of the demonstrations is revealing, as protestors in Jordan called for
some reforms, but not the overthrow of King Abdullah II’s regime.602 Like the surrounding
region, negative perceptions of government corruption, rising commodity prices, and lack of a
fair legal system resulted in protests that went beyond Jordan’s youth demographic to include
people of all ages: nurses, teachers, and accountants, among others.603 However, Jordanian
Intelligence pursued a strategy of minimal engagement when addressing protesters’ more general
demands rooted in economic grievances.
Irrespective of the pervasive discontent, the Jordanian protests proceeded with hesitation.
Part of this hesitation is understandably attributed to the chaos and violence that surrounded
Jordan at the time. The dire situation on the northern border with Syria, the uncertain outcome of
Egypt’s revolutionary efforts, and the subsequent fears of civil war-like-unrest certainly helped
to prevent massive outrage directed at the Jordanian government.604 However, the manner in
which King Abdullah II managed the potential 2011 uprisings, and in particular, how he dealt
with the Jordanian intelligences services played a significant role as well. For example, King
Abdullah II not only instructed JI to exercise restraint with protesters but also worked to ensure
intelligence agencies of their continued preeminence in the country’s larger political apparatus.
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In Jordan’s political system, a crucial policy area that undergirds the powerful influence
of military, police, and intelligence services concerns the country’s legal system.605 Jordan has a
clear precedent and practice of holding civilian trials in state security courts, which fall under the
direct control of the government and the military.606 In response to the January 2011 protests,
King Abdullah II promised judicial reform in the form of amendments to the constitution that
would have established a genuine constitutional court system and done away with state security
courts. Instead, the amendments came with several caveats. In order to keep the state security
courts intact, the Jordanian government claimed they were constitutional, and that civilians
would be tried in these special courts when cases involved “committing terrorist acts against the
state, smuggling weapons, trafficking drugs, or insulting the King – which has long been a crime
in Jordan.”607 Such crimes are under the often under the jurisdiction of Jordanian Intelligence
and therefore a key area of influence in matters of state security. By preserving these areas of
influence, King Abdullah II signaled his commitment to JI authority. This, in turn, incentivized
Jordan’s intelligence services to remain loyal to the monarchy, follow orders, and prioritize the
preservation of Jordan’s existing state structure.
In addition to preserving a prominent role for the intelligence services in Jordanian
politics through an extensive presence in Jordan’s legal system, King Abdullah II, like other
monarchs in Oman and Morocco, dispersed large amounts of patronage to the wider armed
forces. This patronage primarily took the form of intermittent, discretionary funds or other
material support that was distributed among officers by monarch’s who were anxious to retain
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their loyalty.608 Dispersing patronage to security elites is consistent with broader strategies to
maintain internal stability. Over the past several decades, such strategies have involved relying in
part upon the heritage-based legitimacy of the monarchy, the ability of the government to
marginalize opposition parties, suppress dissent, and keep its parliament weak by
gerrymandering electoral laws.609 Such comprehensive efforts to appease the Jordanian security
apparatus through outsized legal influence in state security courts and direct patronage provided
the policy basis for larger anti-reform measures. This strategy successfully thwarted the type of
large-scale political transformation sought by protestors during the 2011 period.
Intelligence professionals interviewed for this study typically viewed this outcome in
terms of a tradeoff. While Jordanian citizens saw only minimal political and economic reforms,
the Jordanian state remained intact and relatively stable. Jordanian intelligence officials took
pride in maintaining public security and low levels of violence. Respondents for this study also
acknowledged the widespread political and economic grievances expressed by protesters but
viewed such demands in the context of potential violence, instability, and state collapse. In other
words, preserving the Jordanian state was a necessary objective that outweighed the potential
instability that may have accompanied comprehensive democratization efforts. In a region where
reform often comes at exorbitant cost, Jordanian Intelligence viewed their efforts to manage
demonstrations as the best of less-than-ideal options to contain potential violence.
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Professionalization and Human Intelligence
When questioned about their specific security responsibilities during the Arab uprisings,
many respondents emphasized the non-material aspects of dealing with sedition and protests. A
former intelligence officer explained that the initial protests began in southern Jordan and then
extended north. The respondent claimed that many of the protesting youth “wanted jobs and
equality of life.”610 In response, Jordanian intelligence agencies “started to control these
groups.”611 Based on other aspects of the interview, this statement can be interpreted as
Jordanian Intelligence actively investigating members of the protest movements and attempting
to undermine and thwart any lasting damage to the regime. The intelligence officer also credited
King Abdullah II with relieving some of the political pressure by saying, in essence, “I am with
you [the protesters],” which the respondent believed “took the air out of the balloon” of the
protests.612 In policy terms, this was the application of human intelligence to the problem of civil
unrest, which the intelligence services learned from engagement with foreign services. They
effectively did this because of the professionalization of the forces.
The monarchy’s ability to build and sustain relationships with the Jordanian citizenry
parallels deliberate attempts to solidify nationalism and shared identity amongst security
personnel, which is a key part of professionalization. Individuals must set aside parochial
interests and particularist identities in order to serve the state. Similar to most professionalized
security forces around the world, a firm commitment to the nation and head of state is evident in
participant responses. A former military officer in the Jordanian Army declared that “I joined for
the prestige. I used to make triple my salary outside of the military. I didn’t join for the
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money.”613 During the time of the Arab uprisings in Jordan, other respondents referenced similar
non-material benefits of service. A former police officer stated that “police and security make
people proud. Police are free to move and you [Jordanian citizens and foreign visitors] have the
power of mobility. We are proud of our uniforms. Police are role models and people respect you.
Police is a service; we are serving our country.”614 The former police officer applied this
perspective when dealing with the protestors and their demands. According to the interviewee,
the protestors called the police directly on cell phones during the demonstrations and expressed
that “we [the protestors] provide bread, gas, etc., and if the prices rise for us, then the price will
rise for the police as well, and they knew police salaries were low.”615
The respondent viewed these declarations as “rumors” aimed at exploiting a potential
shared economic grievance between the police and the demonstrators, and therefore a legitimate
reason to protest or let the protests proceed.616 However, it demonstrates that the Jordanian
people understood that the security services were not operating as secret police capriciously
arresting, detaining, or neutralizing targets. Citizens instead generally accept that the security
services are dedicated to the Jordanian state and would not attempt at an institutional level to
punish them arbitrarily.617 Without the professionalization of Jordanian intelligence through
appropriate recruitment and training, this would not have occurred.
Another dimension to this professionalization is the level and skill of human intelligence,
particularly concerning different tribes and Islamists, that allowed the intelligence services to
surreptitiously handle the protests. The intelligence services understood the structure, leadership,
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and demand of the tribes and Islamist organizations. Their demands were relatively limited, and
they did not seek the elimination of the monarchy. This allowed Jordanian Intelligence to
accommodate the tribes and Islamist organizations, and it also aided in the disruption of
communication networks that could potentially threaten the regime. Furthermore, the
amalgamation of professionalization and human intelligence on tribes and Islamist allowed
Jordanian Intelligence to read the demonstrations quickly and offer real-time analysis on their
direction. By having a professional intelligence service already embedded, connected, and
informed with the tribes and Islamist organizations, the intelligence services successfully
contained with only minor violence the protests and civil unrest.

Contributing Factors to Continued Unrest
Grievances publicly expressed by demonstrators during the Arab uprisings reflect lasting
economic concerns currently shared by security personnel and civilians alike. In many ways, the
underlying economic conditions that motivated the 2011 protests remain highly visible and
worrisome to most segments of the Jordanian population. What receives less attention, in part
because active duty security personnel are barred from commenting on political or security
affairs, is the perspectives of security officials or those knowledgeable about security dynamics
at the time of the demonstrations. One respondent pointed out that “Syrians are now uniting
Jordanians and Palestinians because Syrians are taking their jobs [in Jordan].”618 Based on the
context of the interview, this statement is responsibly interpreted as a recognition of the longterm economic challenges facing Jordanian society and that the current influx of Syrian refugees
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is altering old fault lines of competition while also presenting new challenges of economically
integrating quickly growing refugee populations into an already limited economy.
Other respondents highlighted additional economic challenges that are linked to past civil
unrest during the uprisings and potential future conflicts between the regime and Jordan’s
citizens. A former lawyer and doctor of philosophy explained that “the Jordanian government is
in trouble but [is] trying to solve the economic problems of today and are leaving the problems
of tomorrow for tomorrow.”619 The respondent stated that “the Jordanian people are sick of
hearing about the issue of security and instead want to live their lives. Jordanians aren’t buying
that security is the only important thing. What is important is the economy. People hate if the
government is a ‘scavenger’ with the Gulf states.”620 Although Jordanian Intelligence subdued
the protests during the Arab Spring, the fundamental socio-political and economic concerns of
the citizens remain.
Lessons of Jordanian Intelligence
Although this chapter outlines the dimensions where Jordanian Intelligence is uniquely
effective, there are a number of lessons that can be applied to other states in the MENA region.
As such, this section reflects upon the relative success of JI in accomplishing its security
objectives and considers how these lessons might be adopted by other states seeking to develop
and advance their intelligence services. For instance, how might regional security agencies
import JI strategies and tactics regarding professionalization, engaging tribal and Islamist
elements, and interacting with foreign intelligence agencies? In answering these questions, the
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Jordanian case offers relevant lessons for intelligence services in the MENA region that may
attempt to replicate the successes of Jordanian Intelligence.
At the core of Jordanian Intelligence effectiveness is its commitment to professionalism,
i.e., a system that is hierarchical, highly specialized, and meritocratic. The structure of Jordanian
Intelligence is divided between civilian and military intelligence agencies with clear roles and
responsibilities.621 Moreover, the intelligence services are largely meritocratic where the most
skilled personnel typically receive promotions rather than individuals with familial or tribal
connections.622 While there are certainly individual and inter-agency rivalries, the Jordanian
intelligence services have avoided attempts at usurping Hashemite rule or sidelining rival
defense agencies in an attempt to win favor with the monarchy or dominate the state security
agenda. This high degree of professionalism has helped institutionalize Jordanian Intelligence
procedures, which in turn has allowed JI to focus on its security priorities and contribute to state
stability. In this context, what lessons might be applied to other states seeking to achieve similar
levels of success?
Regarding professionalism, Egypt and Iraq may be able to draw upon JI characteristics to
improve their respective intelligence capacities and outcomes. Egypt’s intelligence services are
widely regarded as powerful and effective. However, Egypt’s intelligence services do not enjoy
the same level of respect domestically and abroad as Jordanian Intelligence.623 Egyptian
intelligence services have a reputation for brutality, torture, human rights violations, and at
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times, political unreliability to the ruling regime.624 In contrast, Jordanian Intelligence, despite its
flaws or the public perceptions of its flaws, does not have a reputation for capricious violence.
This aids in JI’s ability work in concert with both the monarchy and the larger political
apparatus. Such a lesson is similarly valuable in Iraq where the (partial) defeat of ISIS and
country-wide political reconciliation appears to be taking place.625 It would be in Iraq’s national
security interests to cultivate apolitical, non-sectarian, meritocratic intelligence services that
would serve the state over particularistic interests.
In terms of managing tribal and Islamist dynamics, Jordanian Intelligence provides
guidance to other MENA states as well. The Jordanian case is instructive because it highlights
the importance of human intelligence. In practical terms, human intelligence cannot be
conducted in the same manner in every context because each state (or conflict zone) has unique
socio-political, religious, and economic dimensions. Still, in principle, JI human intelligence
techniques can apply to multiple MENA cases because states share common characteristics. For
example, Jordanian Intelligence has been able to manage tribal dynamics and neutralize Islamist
threats to the state by cultivating a deep understanding of these communities.626 Jordanian
intelligence services recruit candidates from specific tribes and reinsert these operatives back
into their communities where they can then relay information back to the monarchy. This
intimate knowledge of Jordan’s tribes helps to ensure the monarchy and security services will not
be blindsided by simmering discontent or well-developed efforts to undermine the state.
Similarly, with Islamist threats, JI has a long history of talking to Islamist leaders and assessing
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their interests, motivations, and intent. With this information, Jordanian Intelligence then
attempts to find non-confrontational ways to redirect Islamist demands toward more formal
mechanisms of political participation, e.g., participating in elections, fielding candidates for
political office, developing policy platforms, etc.
These lessons are especially valuable for Libya where disparate Islamist groups continue
to jockey for social influence and political power. This competition stems from the 2011 capture
of Moammar Qaddafi where Islamists who were imprisoned, forced underground, or fled into
exile quickly re-emerged from the post-Qaddafi power vacuum.627 Islamist groups ranged from
pro-democracy moderates to militias expressing a global agenda similar to that of al Qaeda. The
various Islamist groups included militias that were both apolitical and affiliated with political
groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and smaller Salafi organizations. Moreover, with the
rise and decline of the Islamic State in 2015 and 2016, Islamist groups have further splintered
into rival factions, often supported by loose coalitions of tribes and militias.628
Despite these challenges, analysts contend that Libya—as the only one of 22 Arab
nations—has the right assets (a small population and vast oil reserves) to facilitate both
reconstruction and an inclusive political transition.629 In this context, Libya could adopt the
Jordanian Intelligence model related to professionalization, dealing with diverse tribal and
Islamist groups, and collaborating with international intelligence agencies. Especially in statebuilding enterprises, political reconciliation must be balanced with identifying and thwarting
legitimate threats to state security. Combining the above intelligence capabilities with an
emphasis on human intelligence could afford Libya the opportunity to integrate non-radical
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elements into its political system. Ideally, such inclusivity would bolster the political legitimacy
of leaders and reinforce political participation as a viable alternative to violence. Few other states
have managed this delicate task better than Jordan. Libya, with US, European, and United
Nations assistance may be able to accomplish such a feat.
Moving from instability or government collapse to a functioning state requires immense
resources, expertise, and diligence on behalf of domestic populations and international
supporters. Also required is a well-developed security apparatus to form the basis of state
security.630 International cooperation on the development of intelligence agencies provides a
window of opportunity for emerging, or re-emerging, intelligence services to get a foothold on
their security responsibilities. As noted previously, international cooperation on intelligence
matters appears to be proliferating among formal allies and states with mutual security concerns
alike. Jordan’s partnership with US intelligence agencies highlights the potential benefits of such
collaboration. At the time of this writing, the United States and Jordan are expanding their fiveyear, $1.275 billion-a-year “memorandum of understanding” to fight ISIS and protect mutual
security interests in the region.631
To put this agreement in perspective, Egypt, with a population of roughly 97 million, has
received approximately $1.6 billion per year in US defense assistance since 1979.632 With
Jordan’s population of roughly 10 million, US defense support for Jordan and Egypt is
comparable even though Egypt’s population is nearly 10 times that of Jordan. What remains

630

Johan Galtung, “After Violence, Reconstruction, Reconciliation, and Resolution,” in Reconciliation, Justice and
Coexistence: Theory and practice (Lexington Books: New York, 2001): 3-23.
631
Jack Detsch, “Pentagon Set To Enhance Jordan’s Countertenor Troops,” al-Monitor, May 29, 2018, accessed
May 31, 2018, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/05/pentagon-enhance-jordan-counterterrortroops.html#ixzz5H44JXfwt.
632
Farah Najjar, “Why US Aid to Egypt is Never Under Threat: Despite Concerns Over Recent Secret Arms Deal
with North Korea and Human Rights Abuses, US Aid to Egypt Seen Continuing,” Al Jazeera, Oct 2, 2017, accessed
May 31, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/aid-egypt-threat-171002093316209.html.

213

striking is the joint US/Jordan focus on the development of special forces, which typically fall
under the command of Jordanian Intelligence.633 Meaning, of the vast amount of US defense
support, the development of intelligence capabilities stands as a primary objective of existing
security agreements between the United States and Jordan.
Iraq, Egypt, and Libya could learn from this type of collaboration in an effort to
strengthen their security services while also managing tribal and Islamist groups in the context of
state security. Following the Jordan model of intelligence would require states to professionalize
their security services in a way that avoids politicization, emphasizing personal connections, or
allowing sectarian affiliations to undermine commitment to the nation. In the context of
interview responses for this study, human intelligence resides at the core of disrupting the most
dangerous and eminent security threats. Intelligence services wishing to emulate the Jordanian
example should give hard consideration to this area of expertise when evaluating how best to
build threat-stopping capabilities. Just as Jordan has embedded intelligence operatives into tribal
and Islamist communities, other MENA states could adopt this approach to better differentiate
between mainstream political dissidents and violent extremists.
Conclusion
This chapter uses Jordanian Intelligence as a case study to understand the role of
intelligence services in the security of Middle Eastern states and locates the organization within
the context of global intelligence operations. In addition, the chapter explores the application of
JI’s efficiency by focusing on the Arab uprisings and how security professionals engaged and
dealt with protesters. Most importantly for the successful resolution was human intelligence by
JI; human intelligence gained pre-uprising translated to an accurate threat assessment of tribes
633

Detsch, “Pentagon Set To Enhance Jordan’s Countertenor Troops.”

214

and Islamists. When tribes and Islamist did not pursue extreme objectives, i.e., regime removal,
JI was able to exercise a proportional and measured response that formed the cornerstone of
King Abdullah II’s non-confrontational strategy. This was essential to maintaining stability in
Jordan. Key to this measured response was the professionalization of Jordanian Intelligence that
occurred through domestic recruitment and operational style along with foreign liaisons that gave
intelligence professionals the requisite education, training, and skills. In other words,
understanding the full picture of security threats makes Jordanian Intelligence efficient in times
of crisis.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
Introduction
Each chapter of this study analyzes a critical component of military decision-making and
regime survival in the MENA region, and Jordan is the central case study for each chapter.
Through the collection of data from interviews with security personnel in Jordan, this study has
given an in-depth investigation of civil-military relations in the Middle East and North Africa.
There is a dearth of research on this topic, and this study sought to fill the gaps in important
places in the political science literature. In order to fill these gaps, this study started by
establishing a new and alternative approach to understanding security decision-making called the
identity-rationalist model. This new model incorporates notions of identity into cost-benefit
analysis. Then the study tests hypotheses on military loyalty, finding that integration of the
military into the political economy of a country has the greatest explanatory power for defection.
Finally, the study gives a detailed exploration Jordanian Intelligence to understand why the
institutions are effective at maintaining state stability despite the volatility of the MENA region.
Together the three chapters each contribute to the literature on civil-military relations and
understanding the complexity of security forces in the Arab world.

Chapter One Summary
Chapter One established a new model to allow researchers to understand security
decision-making by members of the armed forces that incorporates notions of identity into
established rationalist approaches. This novel model fills significant gaps in the current
approaches used by scholars to understand civil-military relations in the MENA region.
Rationalist approaches focus on utility maximization and cost-benefit analysis that primary, if
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not exclusively, deals with material wealth and physical security. Structuralist approaches focus
on institutions, organizations, and procedures while culturalist approaches largely focus on the
individual level (e.g., individual’s beliefs, ideas, and attitudes). Although each approach has
merit, they are limited in their ability to fully explain military decision making. Therefore,
Chapter One develops the identity-rationalist model and then highlights how the model
compliments recent civil-military relations research and fills important gaps in the literature’s
understanding of security personnel decision-making. The identity-rationalist model contends
that there is a strategic interaction between self-interest and identity during decision-making
processes. This means that an individual will assess the costs and benefits of an action (how it
will impact their material standing and physical security), but an important part of this reasoning
is the impact to the individual’s identity.
Using the case study of Jordan, Chapter One developed the model for further testing and
generalizability. While conducting interviews in Jordan, multiple respondents pointed to the
importance of identity in deciding who and what were threats, which shaped the actions of
security personnel. Because identity is important, threats develop from social movements that are
seen as deviant. For example, threats that offer radical interpretations of Islam that would
undermine the political order or any dissent that challenges the legitimacy of the monarchy. The
identity-rationalist model contributes to the literature on civil-military relations as it fills in
several gaps on understanding decision-making. Rationalist approaches, and others like the
security dilemma, explain to a certain extent how individuals and states will form conceptions of
threats. However, these are put in almost exclusively material and physical security terms; the
literature as such misses the important role a person’s identity plays into such calculations. In
Jordan, for example, the Islamists did not threaten the state per se in their political advocacy, but
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by wanting to change the nature of Jordanian society, the Islamists would undermine security
personnel’s understanding of what it means to be Jordanian. Therefore, Islamists became threats
to the state. The identity-rationalist model partially explains how this reasoning takes place.

Chapter Two Summary
Chapter Two explored why some militaries remained loyal to regimes during times of
political turmoil such as mass protests against the government. During the Arab Spring,
militaries in different countries behaved disparately, which leads to the question: under what
conditions do militaries defect from authoritarian regimes? Chapter Two tested three hypotheses
on civil-military relations and loyalty to regimes to answer this question. The hypotheses are:
•
•
•

If the military is well integrated into the political economy of the state, then it will be less
likely to defect.
If the military is not losing political power, then it will be less likely to defect.
If the military lacks internal sectarian cleavages, then it will be less likely to defect.
Based upon the relevant data from comparative case studies of Jordan, Tunisia, Egypt,

and Oman, the hypothesis with the most validity is Hypothesis One: militaries that are well
integrated in the political economy of the state are more likely to remain loyal to a given regime.
Integration in the political economy comes in two forms: general economic growth through
liberalization of the economy and direct economic benefits to soldiers (pensions, income, etc.).
Regarding the latter two hypotheses, there was support that perceptions of political power also
played a role in military decision-making and loyalty. However, Hypothesis Two provides less
explanatory power considering the evidence. In comparison, Hypothesis Three pertaining to
cleavages has very little support from the evidence. See below for each case conditions and
outcomes. The primary contribution of this chapter is expanding the civil-military relations
literature beyond its current focus on Latin America. There has been extensive work on this topic
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in the 20th century defections of militaries in Latin America, but there is a dearth of research that
applies these theories to the Middle East. This chapter fills that gap in the literature by applying
established theories to new regions of the world, which demonstrates their generalizability
beyond Latin America. Table 2 below shows the conditions that each military confronted during
the Arab uprisings.

Table 2. Summary of Military Conditions During the Arab Uprisings
Country
H1
H2
H3
Result
Economic
Political Power Military
Integration
Cleavage
Jordan
High
Medium
Medium
Loyal
(Palestinians)
Tunisia
Low
Low
Low
Defection
Egypt
Medium
Medium
Low
Defection
(declining)
Oman
Medium (high
Medium
Medium (but
Loyal
military
loyal to Qaboos
expenditures;
state)
limited evidence
of private sector)
Scale: None, low, medium, high. Note: This chart ranks the conditions that each military
confronted during the Arab uprisings.
Chapter Three Summary
Jordan’s intelligence services have played an important role in keeping the country stable
despite the tempestuous geopolitical conflicts surrounding the small state. These conflicts
include the Iraqi and Syrian civil wars, threats of terrorism from ISIS and al-Qaeda, and the
perennial issue of Palestinian statehood. Chapter Three explored the reasons that Jordan’s
intelligence services were able to achieve this stability efficiently and effectively. Ultimately, the
chapter argues that Jordanian Intelligence (JI) has focused on professionalization, which led to its
efficiency and effectiveness. Professionalization in this context includes an established formal
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hierarchy, using meritocracy to put the best personnel in the right positions, and the
specialization of subject matters and skillsets. As JI worked with foreign entities like the US and
European allies, security personnel furthered their professionalization through cooperation and
education. This professionalization would allow JI to effectively eliminate threats from
dissenting tribes and Islamist because the organization understood the sub-state groups. In
addition, by creating fully professionalized intelligence services, JI could integrate itself into
tribal networks and collect the requisite information to prevent further dissention. When it came
to Islamists, JI’s professionalization allowed them to successfully disrupt lines of
communication, appease and co-opt leadership, or neutralize targets when necessary. The
combination of professionalization, cooperation with foreign entities, and integration into tribal
and Islamist networks is why JI has efficiently and effectively maintained the stability of Jordan.

Future Research and Real-World Relevancy
As Zeinab Abul-Magd and Elke Grawert argue, prominent conceptualizations of civilmilitary relations have developed through empirical studies of Latin America and Western
democracies. However, these approaches have not always fit well with the realities of the Middle
East and North Africa. Recent historical events “have made it abundantly clear that the region’s
empirical realities have bulged so far out of existing theoretical frameworks that new tailoring is
required.”634 This study has attempted to craft theoretical frameworks that are responsive to
MENA’s reality. Each chapter of this study can form the basis for future research, especially if
researchers focus on the diversification of methodological approaches to further test relevant

634

Zeinab Abul-Magd and Elke Grawert. “Forward.” In Businessmen in Arms: How the Military and Other Armed
Groups Profit in the MENA Region. Edited by Zeinab Abul-Magd and Elke Grawert, xi-xv (Lanham: Rowman and
Littlefield, 2016), p. xi.
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hypotheses and theories. In this pursuit, case studies are a useful tool for understanding
complicated subjects, and they are often complimentary to quantitative work.
For Chapter One, future research can focus on crafting interviews with security personnel
in order to test the identity-rationalist model. The interviews collected for this study indicated the
importance of identity in decision-making, but this was only apparent after collecting the initial
interviews. As such, the next stage of research would need to ask questions specifically on how
subjects think about their identity and how that understanding is applied to security policy
making. Chapter Two’s testing of the economic integration hypothesis can further develop
through the collection of quantitative data related to MENA states’ economies. The available
data is limited and not necessarily trustworthy, but empirically testing the economic integration
hypothesis with rigorous statistical modeling will compliment the case study research conducted
on these countries. Chapter Three explores Jordan’s intelligence services and shows why the
organizations are effective at eliminating threats. Yet this is only an in-depth case study of one
country. Future research could explore, compare, and contrast Jordan’s intelligence services with
other successful or failed intelligence organizations in MENA to more fully understand why JI is
successful while other agencies fail. Another aspect of future research should also include a
further exploration of how cooperation with foreign countries can help or hurt the success of
intelligence services.
Each section of this dissertation is directly applicable to policy makers in the US and
beyond. At a minimum, the goal of international relations is to create to stability within and
between countries, and militaries are quintessential to this stability. If policy makers can
understand the reasoning of militaries’ behavior, they can then create policies to achieve their
operational and strategic objectives. Understanding notions of identity can potentially allow US
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policy makers to cooperate better with militaries in the MENA region. Furthermore, knowing the
level of economic integration necessary to maintain military loyalty can influence the direction
of foreign aid. For instance, examining Egypt on this topic would likely produce a fascinating
study pertaining to the legal, moral, and security dimensions of continued US financial and
military support for a non-democratic regime. More broadly, the eternal pursuit of the national
interest by nation-states requires them to engage with countries in volatile regions that often have
obfuscated and opaque political and security institutions. To better interpret and analyze these
intricacies, this study’s explication of the identity-rationalist model, importance of economic
integration, and professionalization of intelligence services can inform policy makers on how to
navigate this complexity.

Conclusion
Each chapter of this study utilizes case studies to build a theory, test hypotheses, or
explore key elements of civil-military relations and security. During the Arab uprisings, armed
forces directly shaped regime survival within the MENA region’s authoritarian political systems.
Despite the significant amount of research directed at this and related topics in the aftermath of
the uprising period, the specific outcomes of each state lack clear explanation. Although the
MENA region seems to have entered a period of re-stabilization either through legitimate
democratization (as in Tunisia) or through the re-codification of authoritarian regimes (as in
Egypt, Oman, and Bahrain), informed observers continue to face immense obstacles in
accurately describing, analyzing, and understanding the Arab world. In recent years, scholars
have been monitored, intimidated, and even killed in pursuit of academic inquiry. Irrespective of
the empirical or theoretical contributions this study aims to make, it will hopefully encourage
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scholars, government and security personnel, and ordinary citizens to continue to visit the
MENA region, experience its cultures, and talk to the people most knowledgeable about its
complexities.
However, such efforts must be viewed within the context of continuing violence and
instability in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and other regions in which governments largely fail to
meet the basic needs of their citizens. Such instability invariably spills over international borders.
One state’s problems not only affect the viability of other states in the MENA region, but also
the broader international community through increased refugees, shifting terrorism threats, and
larger humanitarian disasters. In meeting such challenges and supporting Arab states, the
international community has come up lacking. With few plausible or easily accomplished
solutions in sight, this dissertation hopes to contribute to our understanding of regional security
and therefore render scholars, civilians, and security personnel more prepared for future
instability if and when it occurs.
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